Reflexivity reconsidered: a Wittgensteinian approach to the self-referentiality of psychology and persons

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A thesis submitted in
fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

University of Canterbury
1999

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But just as when an Architect has laid all the foundations and raised the main walls of some great edifice no one doubts that he can carry his plan to completion, because they can see that he's already done what was most difficult . . .

Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul,* Preface, p. 12

The *edifice of your pride* has to be dismantled. And that is terribly hard work.

Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value,* p. 26e

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people, in no precise order of importance, without whom this thesis would not have been possible: Professor Ken Strongman, Professor Rom Harré, Dr. Darren Walton, Dr. Brian Haig, Brian Sullivan, Colleen Sullivan, Dr. Julie Fitness, Helene Seddon, Cameron Glass, Terri Hides, Claire Sullivan, Dr. Larry Owens, Felicity Bergin, Julie McCloy, Sue Densem and Vivienne Fisher. It is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother who, I believe, would have been proud of the project and its completion.

Abstract

The concept of reflexivity is important to many philosophical and theoretical positions on psychology and plays a central role in studies of people's private, personal and emotional experiences. Social constructionists, for example, emphasize both the self-referentiality of psychology *and* persons in their attempts to produce new, challenging and creative forms of social scientific knowledge. However, despite the metatheoretical insights and practical discoveries of social constructionism, in the two parts of this thesis it is argued that issues surrounding the respective notions of psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity need to be reconsidered. Part 1 provides a critical survey of issues connected with the notion of reflexivity in psychology such as the limits and consequences of reflexive studies. The framework for this reconsideration of psychological reflexivity is derived from a detailed examination of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein (1953). Despite similarities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and reflexive work in psychology, it is argued that his methods and remarks can only continue to contribute to psychology if they retain an "outside" status. Part 2 builds upon this understanding of Wittgenstein's enduring relevance to critical studies of psychological phenomena by engaging with Rosenberg's (1990) ostensibly reasonable theory of personal reflexivity and emotion. An account of the uniquely human potential for thoughts and actions to be focused self-referentially on cognitive and bodily components is achieved through a comprehensive Wittgenstein-inspired, conceptual-discursive survey of pride. The result is a detailed example of the relevance and limits of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to multidisciplinary studies of the discursive practices in which people control, embellish, endure and, in some respects, create their own and others' emotions.

INTRODUCTION

In order to represent the argument of this thesis, its development must be placed in a narrative that is more personal than the final product might suggest. My concern initially was to examine what it means to be a reflexive investigator in psychology. What are the advantages of being reflexive over using mainstream empirical methods? What creative directions might this lead one in? And how might these reflections connect with innovations in cultural theory and philosophy?

This interest in reflexivity quickly spread in two directions or, as some might describe it, towards work at two different levels. The first direction required an account of how a reflexive investigation of emotion might be carried out: the question of what methods and practical techniques any self-critical investigation should use. For example, would it focus predominantly on language and people's accounts rather than a survey or experimental study? And would it be best to work through and possibly integrate theories and studies especially of a relatively unexamined psychological phenomenon? The latter question was answered by an almost offhand remark in Rom Harré's (1986) *The Social Construction of Emotion* that pride had been ignored by traditional, biologically-oriented approaches to emotion. Thus I decided that the focus of any reflexive study would be pride and, moreover, that it would not merely be an integration of existing self and emotion theories.

While a focus on the social and linguistic aspects of pride was an obvious starting point, it also seemed worthwhile to explore Morris Rosenberg's (1990) strong assertion that forms of reflexivity demonstrated by

individuals in relation to their own emotions should be regarded as central to the construction (and maintenance) of personhood. For despite Rosenberg's sociological and psychological insights, his theory also contains conceptual errors in various remarks about people's use of language to express and explore their emotions. More interestingly, the conceptual errors appeared to be very similar to the problems highlighted by social constructionists in their interpretation of the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953). These interrelated concerns therefore combined to suggest the project that forms Part 2 of this thesis: a critical investigation of emotion and different related forms of personal reflexivity which would proceed through a study of the under-researched cultural, social and linguistic details of pride.

The second, contrasting direction for this thesis was generated by the need to explore the limits and consequences of a reflexive study of emotions and personal reflexivity. Since most of the relevant work at the time was discursive and social constructionist, it became important to examine the arguments for adopting social constructionism over realism or persistent, mainstream remnants of positivism. Moreover, because a large part of the justification for the social constructionist "turn to language" and pursuit of self-critical reflexive studies could be found in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the ongoing relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology had to be addressed.

The impetus toward this second line of investigation was also strengthened by disquiet over issues that had not been addressed in a thesis on Wittgenstein and reflexivity in psychology by a student within the University of Canterbury Psychology Department, Kevin Moore (1990). These concerns led to the project that eventually formed Part 1 of this thesis:

in particular, that instances of psychological reflexivity identified and emphasized by social constructionists might, especially when taken to their extremes, suggest unexplored Wittgensteinian criticisms of many Wittgenstein-inspired psychological studies.

Given this personal introduction to the collusion of several events, ideas and interests in this thesis, it is now possible to revert to a more formal disputation of its "argument".

It is important from the outset to distinguish two types of reflexivity that are revealed by a brief survey of remarks on psychology as well as a cursory investigation of theories and studies within the discipline.

The first form of self-referentiality, which I shall hereafter term psychological reflexivity, is mentioned by Bechtel (1988), Buss (1978), Gergen (1987), Harré (1989), Howard (1985), Oliver and Landfield (1962), Shotter (1992a, 1992b, 1996), Smedslund (1985), Stam (1996), and Steier (1991). It is variously described as a problem, a virtue and an unavoidable fact about psychology in its present scientific form: reflexivity is a problem where psychological studies of psychology seem to be self-limited, a virtue where critical studies reveal background assumptions and values that guide psychological research, and it is unavoidable where it is recognized that psychologists use similar concepts and language to share the experiences of the "subjects" they study. To simplify matters, psychological reflexivity can be described as work within the discipline that questions, challenges and attempts to articulate the basis of existing psychological studies, theories, and methods with the aim of making changes to the practice of psychology (and hence it potentially connects and combines with similar perspectives and criticisms from outside psychology).

Personal reflexivity, in contrast, is a more specific term which refers to

the self-referential abilities that people demonstrate in their everyday lives (i.e., in preference to the more confusing term "self-reflexivity"). The defining feature of studies of personal reflexivity by such theorists as Harré (1983), Kaplan (1986), Kemper (1991), Mead (1934), Parker (1994a, 1994b), Rosenberg (1990), Shotter (1991, 1997) and Smedslund (1990) is an emphasis on people's discourse and use of language-based skills to monitor, control and understand their own and others' public and private experiences. Rosenberg's (1990) theory is particularly relevant because he suggests that the most interesting, complicated and central examples of personal reflexivity are emotion-related. The category of personal reflexivity also includes emotions such as pride, shame and guilt because they are often experienced and expressed in a self-conscious manner (Lewis, 1993; Taylor, 1985). Thus to simplify and focus matters, personal reflexivity will be taken to refer to self-directed actions and skills that people explicitly use to change, control and understanding their own and others' emotions (i.e., in addition to the sort of activities and commitments that implicitly make such complicated, self-evaluative emotions as pride possible).

Given these distinctions it might be asked why psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity are being "reconsidered"?

One major reason for a reconsideration of both psychological and personal reflexivity is the need for a clear view of the relations between the practices in which they are important concepts. For example, Howard (1985) not only hints at this issue in a commentary on psychology but also implies that philosophy might challenge the equivocation of psychological reflexivity with more mainstream notions of subject reactivity and researcher bias:

> Psychologists are well aware of the phenomenon of reactivity in research and have made tremendous strides towards

> ameliorating its debilitating effects in psychological studies. Reactivity problems in psychological research are owing to the reflexive nature of human beings. But reflexivity, as the superordinate category, has important implications, which extend beyond reactivity concerns . . . (p. 260)

While Howard describes different forms of reflexivity in terms of superordinate and subordinate categories, others are more explicit in presenting psychological reflexivity as an abstract, theoretical and meta-level pursuit. The relevant point for the moment is that any account of the forms of personal reflexivity that people demonstrate in psychological experiments and everyday life needs to be kept distinct from the reflexivity of psychological, social psychological and relevant sociological studies (Parker, 1994b).

Another reason for reconsidering reflexivity also emerges: it is difficult to represent the nature of reflexive psychological investigations because the results are often indistinguishable from philosophy. While a simplistic view might be that this is a matter of different levels of investigation which can be kept separate, such opinions quickly become unhelpful in negotiating the issues raised by a critical account of personal reflexivity. For example, relevant issues include: the relations between theory and practice in psychology, the difficulty of identifying the social and cultural assumptions that provide the unchallenged foundation to many studies, the role that philosophy can play in commenting on these and other debates, and the use of accounts of private and personal experiences to advance psychology. The examples, arguments, methods and results of a critical treatment of personal reflexivity can therefore be used to illustrate the limits and consequences of psychological reflexivity (i.e., where it seems to lead "up" to philosophy or "down" to specific psychological studies).

Additionally, reflexivity needs to be reconsidered because it raises the issue of Wittgenstein's potential contribution to many sociological, social psychological and psychological accounts in which personal reflexivity plays a central role. Does Wittgenstein's philosophy inspire a novel investigation of the unexplored detail of personal reflexivity such as the nature of its limits, connections with specific cultural practices, links with language and the development of particular self-directed skills and abilities? Moreover, while it seems reasonable even for non-social constructionist theorists such as Rosenberg (1990) to argue that language is crucial to the development of personal reflexivity about emotions, the nature and detail of this and similar claims must be carefully examined. For example, despite recognizing the role of linguistic interaction Rosenberg (1990) still argues that reflexive agency and reflexive cognition in relation to emotion are *the* defining features of persons.

The reflexiveness of this study is described as a reconsideration for several reasons. The main reason is that many of the psychologists who emphasize both forms of reflexivity and are broadly allied to the field of social constructionism draw much — but not all — of their support from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein (1953). While social constructionists have created new, challenging and creative forms of social scientific knowledge — often in direct opposition to realist, cognitive and other approaches — it is timely to reconsider the limits and consequences of some of the more radical positions built around the "turn to language" and reflexivity in psychology (e.g., Gergen, 1985, 1995; Shotter, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996). Engaging with the detail of many of Wittgenstein's disjointed and often cryptic remarks allows philosophical attention to be turned to potentially mistaken metapsychological and metatheoretical accounts of the limits and

consequences of reflexive studies in psychology. It is also possible that a critical evaluation of the philosophical basis of social constructionism will provide a considered perspective on debates about critical, postmodern, discursive and qualitative forms of psychology. Finally, a Wittgensteinian reconsideration of reflexivity is also worth pursuing because attending too closely to the similarities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the reflexive methods and results of social constructionism can obscure important differences between philosophy and psychology.

Although the line between the issues raised by the notions of psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity may at some times seem blurred, the thesis will nevertheless be presented in two distinct parts.

Part 1 focuses on issues that surround surveyed talk of psychological reflexivity and which can be given a treatment that is broadly consistent with the spirit of Wittgenstein's many philosophical remarks.

Part 2 provides a critical examination of the notion of personal reflexivity and its relation to emotion through a detailed survey of pride that includes individual experiences, linguistic details and surrounding discursive and cultural practices.

The overall aim is not merely to adhere to the letter of Wittgenstein's work and thus to engage in extended philosophical exegesis — a criticism that can be directed at the otherwise excellent work of Baker and Hacker (1984, 1985) or the philosophical psychology of Budd (1989) and Schulte (1993). Rather, it is to provide a study that is sensitive to the demands for innovative investigative practices in psychology.

The following summary of the respective chapters of Parts 1 and 2 sketches the central features of the argument and the directions it will take.

Chapter 1 begins with an examination of Wittgenstein's philosophy

and some of the broader and more extreme forms of reflexivity that are often emphasized in postmodern philosophy and connected with the "turn to language". Given this important clarification the more relevant issue of whether Wittgenstein's "postmodern" philosophy can combine with reflexive and self-critical psychology is then addressed. Unexplored connections between Wittgenstein's remarks on psychology and mathematics will be introduced in order to provide a clear view of the relations between philosophy and psychology (i.e., in contrast to some of the positions that have been built around an emphasis on psychological reflexivity). The last part of the chapter highlights *in principle* limits on "complete" theories in psychology and finishes with an account of the way in which a Wittgensteinian surview — a type of comprehensive, conceptual survey of language use — provides an important non-theoretical resource.

Chapter 2 provides a critical account of a number of central social constructionist tenets from a Wittgensteinian perspective. The first section examines the limits and consequences of attempts to incorporate Wittgenstein's philosophical methods within psychology (e.g., Harré, 1986; Shotter, 1991, 1996). One question is whether reflexive work within psychology connects with Wittgenstein's type of conceptual investigation because both provide a kind of second-order method for advancing psychology and avoiding persistent problems (i.e., a position that contradicts Wittgenstein's view that his philosophy should not be used to reform linguistic practices). A central argument in social constructionism, namely that recognition of reflexivity in the discipline rules out objectivity, is then examined by way of Greenwood's (1991, 1992) contrasting realist position. The third important and related aspect of social constructionism is its reflexive critique of "everything that is taken to be an already existing, real

psychology object in the cognitive (realist) account" (Shotter, 1997, p. 21). The issue of ontology is examined through a Wittgensteinian account of what it means to discover new and previously hidden levels of phenomena in psychology.

Chapter 3 shifts from a focus on the problems of social constructionism to an examination of ways in which Wittgensteinian description can augment self-critical psychological studies. The issue of why reflexive work should not lead to doing away with all explanation is explored along with the contrasting need to avoid comprehensive general theorizing (i.e., as emphasized in naturalistic accounts of philosophy and science or produced by a sociological account of the construction of social scientific knowledge). Attention is then turned towards the explanatory systems of psychology and some of the ways in which Wittgenstein's remarks may be cautiously seen as similar to the results of reflexive psychological investigations because the same points of clarification may be reached from different directions. A critical account of causal explanation is also presented as a further example of how Wittgensteinian philosophy relates to self-critical psychological practice. The relations between training and the process of becoming a reflexive psychological researcher about such issues as causal explanation are assessed. The chapter concludes with a section on the relations between psychological theories and everyday psychological concepts and practices which is pertinent to issues raised by discursive alternatives to existing emotion and personal reflexivity studies.

Chapter 4 draws upon and reiterates many of the arguments already examined by addressing some aspects of Wittgenstein's conservatism in relation to theoretical and practical innovations in psychology. The concern is to examine issues surrounding reflexive studies that have proved useful in

opening new domains of inquiry (even though many of the arguments from postmodern studies and cultural theory are still regarded as radical and may not seem to get beyond potential Wittgensteinian criticisms). Issues relevant to the investigation of Part 2 include the importance of highlighting the cultural detail of different ways of life as well as unexamined concepts of power and control. The manner in which social arrangements and values provide psychology with unquestioned moral and political positions is therefore discussed (again using personality reflexivity and emotion as the main focus). Consideration of relevant reflexive techniques then leads to an exploration of critical work in psychology that can highlight and potentially change aspects of the discipline's direction and cultural surroundings. The last section provides a brief examination of how psychologists' familiarity with many of their own forms of personal reflexivity and emotion can be useful to the discipline without cultivating undue personal uncertainty and self-consciousness.

Part 2 provides an alternative to the type of general theory of emotion that is exemplified by Rosenberg's (1990) "reflexivity and emotion" account. It builds on the Wittgensteinian treatment of metapsychological, metatheoretical and conceptual issues in Part 1 to provide a study of ostensibly important, emotion-related forms of self-directed agency and cognition. The study aims to "get beyond" potential Wittgensteinian criticisms by presenting a non-theoretical surview. The surview counters conceptual problems in Rosenberg's theory and presents an alternative account of reflexive processes and emotion through a detailed survey of the complicated cluster of concepts, judgements and practices that surround pride. What pride means to "us" and, where possible, other groups is explored through discourse that has an everyday accessibility about it.

Examples are drawn from novels, newspapers and other cultural forms of presentation rather than a comprehensive survey of existing theories and studies. The potential for multidisciplinary, empirical work on personal reflexivity to flow from this survey is acknowledged without necessarily supporting any fragmentation of studies along disciplinary lines. Moreover, in contrast to other accounts of Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology, the resulting self-critical study is not an attempt to replace contemporary person and emotion theories or specific empirical work on pride (e.g., with discursive, "poetic methods" (Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). Instead, the aim is to highlight previously unexamined details of personal reflexivity and its practical and contextual limits which could be examined in future investigations.

Chapter 5 examines the limits and surroundings of personal reflexivity with a detailed consideration of the relations between forms and expressions of collective and individual pride. An account is provided of forms of personal reflexivity that are only visible in comparisons and interactions between cultures (and subcultures). The investigation then moves beyond cultural differences to examine some of the historical and natural historical discontinuities suggested by the issue of the emergence of forms of personal reflexivity. Returning to the present and recent past, issues of moral autonomy and group movements to construct and maintain a positive identity are also explored. Many of these issues provide insights into the nature and limits of the moves that individuals can make against the normative practices and reactions of a wider community. Using examples of family, group and national pride, practical limits on identity formation and choice are highlighted. The last section provides an analysis of social institutions and arrangements which are implied by cases of pride that

centre on notions of responsibility and ownership.

Chapter 6 takes a more obviously social-psychological orientation toward personal reflexivity with an examination of the practical and personal details surrounding potentially transgressive cases of "self-elevated" pride. Social limits on personal autonomy are also highlighted by examples of pride that seem to be independent of social comparison, confirmation and approbation. The further reflexive potential to engage in acting and deception that theorists such as Kaplan (1986), Rosenberg (1990) and Smedslund (1990) emphasize is also reconsidered through the detail of pride. The analysis then shifts towards many of the relationships that are implied by the role that other people play as the "objects" of many personal emotions. The underexplored sense in which pride can be said to prolong arguments and lead to a kind of personal communicative paralysis is also suggested by examples from the conceptual-discursive survey. The chapter concludes with the importance of forms of self-control to the maintenance of privacy and the potential for private reasons to become unintelligible to others.

Chapter 7 examines personal reflexivity as it pertains to issues raised by examples of the individual expression, experience and embodiment of pride. The initial focus is on intense emotions through examples of pride and their relation to a unique or personal history. Some remarks are made with regard to how individuals make the "linguistic transition" from private feelings to public language, before examining points about the duration of pride and individual experiences of its components (e.g., in relation to self-control versus embellished expression). The contemporary fascination with underlying processes and mechanisms is assessed through the notion that some emotions are caused by cognitive self-evaluation. The attempt to

provide research directions for an alternative conceptual-discursive approach includes an examination of conversation-based accounts of pride that do not necessarily exclude an account of its cognitive, thoughtful and immediate aspects. Self-consciousness is also examined in terms of our lack of awareness and control over many of the neurophysiological substrates of emotions. The chapter ends with the issue of vacillating emotions and the problem of identifying and describing ambiguous feelings.

Chapter 8 provides a critical account of how forms of personal reflexivity and emotion are cultural and linguistic constructs as well as individual "creations". The investigation includes the sense in which understanding the reflexivity of other persons is based on an individual's own potential for personal expression, exploration, and understanding of emotions. The development of older children's independence and identity projects (especially when these are explicitly about their own thoughts, actions and emotions) is understood through widely available cultural and textual examples of pride. The investigation of personal reflexivity also involves a treatment of privatization and internalization accounts of the control and content of emotions in younger children. The importance of linguistic supplementation to the creation of forms of personal reflexivity and reflexive emotions is also assessed. The last section examines prerequisites of reflexive techniques and pride in forms of prelinguistic, agentive emotional activity.

The Wittgenstein approach to and reconsideration of psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity is summarized in the section "Conclusion: Parts 1 & 2".

PART 1

Psychological reflexivity reconsidered: a Wittgensteinian account of the limits and consequences of self-critical investigations in psychology

Psychological reflexivity refers to the potential for psychological studies to become self-regarding and critical in a manner that it is hoped will lead to the discovery of new domains and forms of investigation. It can be distinguished from remarks on personal reflexivity by the fact that psychological reflexivity involves more than revealing how psychologists personally engage with, construct or change the knowledge of their discipline. Reflexivity should not be equated solely with individual reflection and will be, in a number of circumstances, contrasted with personal reflexivity (i.e., psychologists' use and explorations of their own personal feelings and experiences). Thus while individuals writing on the history of scientific psychology such as Klein (1970) are aware that "no science is likely to get under way without the impetus of a critical interest as manifested by some sort of reflective curiosity" (p. 4), the reflexivity of psychological studies to be reconsidered in Part 1 is primarily a philosophical examination of the limits, consequences and methods of self-critical psychological investigation.

The material for this reconsideration of psychological reflexivity has been assembled from a survey of philosophical, metapsychological, metatheoretical, theoretical and other remarks about psychology. At its simplest, examples were initially included because the word "reflexivity" was used to highlight an important feature of psychology that should be dealt with. For example, Smedslund (1985) argues that psychology "must be a reflexive discipline" (p. 73) and, not surprisingly, it is important to determine exactly what this means (as well as the reasons offered by those who agree or disagree). However, the final treatment of the issues raised by the survey bears little trace of the method used. In this sense, the contrast between the method used to achieve a position on psychological reflexivity and its end

product as a particular argument is similar to the approach that Wittgenstein took towards psychological concepts. But while Wittgenstein suggested that a detailed examination of the use of psychological concepts would dissolve conceptual confusions caused by theorizing in philosophy and empirical work in psychology, no analogous solution is applicable to psychological reflexivity. Thus although a detailed survey of the use of "reflexivity" helps to determine its meaning, this examination of use cannot, by itself, provide a solution to the philosophical issues raised[1].

In order to achieve an understanding of the limits and consequences of psychological reflexivity, some of Wittgenstein's relatively unexplored remarks will be used. As a matter of clarification it should be noted that the argument to be detailed below is not that reflexive forms of psychological investigation must inevitably end with Wittgensteinian philosophy. Instead, a number of Wittgenstein's remarks are used to counter some of the more extreme forms of radical reflexivity advocated by social constructionists (e.g., Gergen (1985) and Shotter (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996)) in addition to the type of "social psychology in the host discipline of psychology rather than sociology" that "traditionally abhors reflexivity" (Parker, 1994b, p. 528). The aim is to clarify the nature of the connections between Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks and contemporary forms of critical psychology (i.e., the fruit of several decades of reflexive theorizing and investigation). This treatment of reflexivity also recognizes that not all of the best critical work has come from within the discipline.

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[1] Also as Henwood and Parker (1994) note: "researchers with backgrounds in social studies of science, humanistic, or feminist research may conceptualize the issue of reflexivity differently" (p. 220).

CHAPTER 1: The relevance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to issues of psychological reflexivity

Introduction

While it is undeniable that Wittgenstein's later philosophy has affected psychology, a central question to be addressed in this chapter is whether Wittgenstein wanted to produce any of the changes that his remarks have inspired. In particular, social constructionists have based many of their valuable theoretical and practical contributions to understanding psychological and personal reflexivity on remarks from Wittgenstein's philosophy (e.g., Gergen, 1985; Harré, 1986; Shotter, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). Moreover, Wittgenstein's philosophy has been used to support new programs of psychological research, to persuade others of the linguistic nature of forms of psychological reflexivity, to highlight researchers' tacit assumptions and to challenge the persistent conceptual errors of mainstream, empirical and positivist psychology. Thus while many similarities exist between the descriptive approach of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and the reflexive work of contemporary psychologists, confusion remains about how Wittgenstein's philosophy and philosophical method can and should contribute to psychology.

Chapter 1 therefore explores connections between Wittgensteinian philosophy and forms of psychological reflexivity — such as their possible combination into a metapsychological or theoretical position — in the following manner. Section 1.1 examines Wittgenstein's status as a postmodern philosopher and provides a contrasting account of forms of contemporary philosophy and social science in which a general sense of

reflexivity is explored to almost paradoxical extremes. Despite some similarities, the general sense of reflexivity is contrasted with more specific forms of social scientific and psychological reflexivity. Section 1.2 introduces the possibility that an emphasis on psychological reflexivity attaches a false significance to forms of metapsychology that attempt to lay down new foundations for the discipline. An extended account of Wittgenstein's remarks on metamathematics, mathematics, and set theory is used to provide a treatment of "entirely analogous" problems with psychology (PI, xiv, p. 232)[2]. Wittgenstein's game analogy of the relations between philosophy and psychology is used to provide a metapsychological account of the relations between philosophy and the practices of psychology. Section 1.3 explores contradictory positions in psychology and the way in which they are the result of attempts within the discipline to build "complete" theories. Analysis of this issue centres on the supposed contrast between a "new paradigm", social constructionist understanding of emotion and its biological alternative. These considerations lead to the question of what it means to attain a comprehensive Wittgensteinian surview of a particular area of language and whether it provides the basis from which one can cross from philosophy to various specific multidisciplinary studies.

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[2] Usual conventions for referring to Wittgenstein's work will be adopted in this thesis. For example, BB (*The Blue and Brown Books*), CV (*Culture and Value*), LFM (*Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*), OC (*On Certainty*), PG (*Philosophical Grammar*), PI (*Philosophical Investigations*), RFM (*Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*), PR (*Philosophical Remarks*), RPP I (*Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume 1*), RPP I I (*Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume 2*), T (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*), and Z (*Zettel*; see References).

1.1 The relations between Wittgensteinian philosophy and contemporary forms of reflexive psychology

At many points throughout Wittgenstein's volumes of remarks and observations, there are attempts to clarify actual and potential misconceptions about the nature and limits of his philosophical approach. Philosophers such as Baker and Hacker (1984, 1985) have also contributed much to a detailed exegesis and understanding of Wittgenstein's remarks. However, they have not adequately addressed the issue of how Wittgenstein's philosophy seems to provide a context in which it is possible for psychologists and others to "undertake a logically compelling, theoretically neutral, and reflexive evaluation of many philosophical and other positions" (Bartlett & Suber, 1987, p. 10). Also, where psychological studies seem to combine with a more general or extreme sense of reflexivity caused by recognition of the need to work within language, there is a need to clarify connections with more specific accounts of reflexivity in psychology. It is therefore important to examine how Wittgensteinians deal with the relations between Wittgenstein's philosophy and contemporary, postmodern alternatives which recognize the importance of psychological reflexivity and encourage its pursuit in more radical directions than modernist philosophers.

Wittgenstein's later philosophy, postmodernism and recognition of psychological reflexivity

It has already been noted that a comprehensive survey of the word "reflexivity" in many philosophical and theoretical remarks relevant to

psychology provided the basis for this Wittgensteinian reconsideration. The definition (or restriction) of psychological reflexivity to these surveyed examples avoids a host of potentially related but broader reflexive issues (e.g., why Wittgenstein accords no special significance to metaphilosophy (PI, §121) and reflexive considerations in psychology need not produce an infinite hierarchy of further self-conscious and general levels of investigation (see LFM, I, p. 14 and Woolgar (1988)). Interest is centred on the way in which the postmodern "turn to language" and reflexivity (Bertens, 1995) has affected our recognition and understanding of reflexive issues in psychology. In this section, the general sense of reflexivity evident in Wittgenstein's philosophical work within language — the use of remarks about language-games to "establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not *the* order" (PI, §132) — is contrasted with more extreme postmodern accounts: more specifically, the widespread view that postmodern philosophy employs excessively self-regarding, deconstructive strategies. Uncertainty about these similarities demands an account of whether a Wittgensteinian position should be regarded as postmodern before attempting to provide a clearer picture of the connections between a Wittgensteinian position and the work of a reflexive, critical, postmodern psychology.

An initial question is to what extent does Wittgenstein's later philosophy offer a postmodern understanding of many contemporary knowledge and cultural practices? Bertens (1995) suggests one way in his description of two contrasting views in contemporary thought: the idealized pursuit of universal, transcendent knowledge and, in contrast, the recognition that knowledge has many self-limited, arbitrary, contingent and

local features. Bertens notes that modernity:

> sends out contradictory impulses which have come to constitute the two modes of thought — the one expansionist, transcendent, and omni-representational, the other self-reflexive, inward spiralling, and antirepresentational — that in our day and age have come to clash so violently. (p. 242)

With respect to Wittgenstein's philosophical career, it is interesting that both aspects of modernism are exemplified by Wittgenstein's earlier work in the *Tractatus* (i.e., the transcendental aspect of its overall approach *and* the paradox of its final, nonsensical conclusion (T, §6.54)). Such a description of Wittgenstein's early philosophy certainly accords with Bertens' view that both modes of thought "constantly lead us into the temptation of wanting it both ways, and thus into self-contradiction" (p. 242)[3].

But the central issue is really whether Wittgenstein's later philosophy can contain these contradictory impulses and thus resist the self-contradictions of postmodernism. Again a useful clarification of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is suggested by Bertens' remark that the "only option would seem to go beyond reflexivity itself" (p. 242). In the context of postmodern philosophy it seems that Wittgenstein has indeed gone beyond reflexivity rather than pursue it to an extreme, as Lawson (1987) remarks in her book *Reflexivity: the Postmodern Predicament*:

> The later Wittgenstein provides a . . . means of avoiding the paradoxical effects of reflexivity in his attempt to avoid any general theory of language, and to explicate philosophical problems by showing how language is in fact used. (p. 22)

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[3] The pronouns "we", "us" and "our" will be used throughout this thesis in discussions of psychological reflexivity and the relevance of philosophy. Where these pronouns are used in a manner that does not refer only to psychologists, social scientists and philosophers, an attempt will be made to clarify which groups of people are included and which are excluded. This approach is an important aspect of adopting a reflexive form of conceptual-discursive

Lawson suggests that Wittgenstein shows how important it is to describe our practices without relying on a general theory (or theories) to highlight hidden features of our language, culture and practices.

One effect of Wittgenstein's insights on psychology has been the emergence of discourse analysis and the further interest in forms of psychological reflexivity. Parker (1994b) suggests, for example, that "the study of discourse marks a further twist in the turn to language which characterized the 'crisis' in social psychology at the end of the 1960s, and explicitly opens the discipline to a reflexive critique" (p. 527). While for the moment the exact nature of this reflexive critique (or form of psychological reflexivity) and its relation to the broader sense of reflexivity will be eschewed, there are further reasons why Wittgenstein's emphasis on the description of ordinary language avoids the charge of self-contradiction (or the need to adopt a deconstructionist perspective in which self-contradiction is an unavoidable feature of any text).

An analysis by Strom (1994) is relevant because he notes that Wittgenstein would be "hoist on his own petard" if he were "advancing a philosophical thesis about everyday human activity and the conditions that make it possible" (p. 18). Instead of offering, for example, a theory of how theories are possible, Wittgenstein can be described as "a foundationalist *of sorts,* but not of a traditional sort" (p. 141). In particular, Strom argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not self-contradictory because "his form of foundationalism is consistent with his apothegem that description should replace explanation in philosophy" (p. 141). Although Wittgenstein's later philosophy is similar to other postmodernist positions with its emphasis on

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investigation (see chapter 3 and chapter 4 for more specific details in relation to cultural differences).

language and a broad sense of reflexivity, both Lawson and Strom show that Wittgenstein's disdain for general theorizing and preference for a form of descriptive foundationalism should be distinguished from paradox-embracing postmodernist perspectives.

Wittgenstein's view of philosophical investigation as a descriptive task also distinguishes his remarks from postmodernists who rely more heavily on potentially obfuscating theoretical concepts (see chapter 4). This effect of reflexivity is apparent in Lyotard's (1984) position on postmodernism which, although it is described as "simplifying to the extreme", is essentially to "define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives" (p. xxiv). For although examples of metanarratives within psychology that are informed by modernism and challenged by postmodern philosophers include humanized science, progress and individual meaning (Parker, 1989), attempts to connect Wittgenstein and Lyotard's popular position on metanarratives (as least in critical psychology), run the risk of treating important concepts in a theoretical manner. For example, Bertens argues that Lyotard builds upon the later Wittgenstein to suggest "that these metanarratives have been replaced by a great number of 'language games'" (p. 124).

However, while Wittgenstein's work contains analogies, comparisons, and detailed descriptions of linguistic and cultural practices, notions such as "form of life" and "language-games" only help to collect and organize these observations. Although "form of life" and "language-games" are not theoretical concepts, postmodernists seem to be unaware that indiscriminate use of these and other similar concepts might be seen only as creating a what Wittgenstein described as a "certain jargon" (LFM, XXXI, p. 293). The contention here is that postmodernism may reject metanarratives

only to create what Rorty (1989) describes as "the freedom to speak a kind of ironic theoretical metalanguage which makes no sense to the man on the street" (p. 88).

In a further distinction from other postmodern positions that take reflexivity to extremes, Wittgenstein's philosophy cannot be represented as a practice that seeks to replace metanarratives such as humanized science, progress and individual meaning in psychology with a theoretical metalanguage (or languages). By avoiding general criticisms of scientific knowledge and its problems, a Wittgensteinian approach avoids the sometimes incomprehensible extremes of postmodernism. Moreover, as already stated, Wittgenstein suggests that "the *edifice of your pride* has to be dismantled" (CV, p. 26e) which, in this case, can be taken to mean the results of modern philosophy and theory construction: in short the pride of "modern man". It may therefore seem that this "dismantling" — described elsewhere by Wittgenstein as destroying "nothing but houses of cards and . . . clearing up the ground of language on which they stand" (PI, §118) — is similar to Derrida's (1982) deconstructionism.

This point also requires clarification and it can be achieved through some of Parker's (1989) critical psychology remarks about the deconstructive approach. Parker suggests that both radical postmodernists and Wittgensteinians will not appeal to the truth of their position to justify their criticisms (i.e., the sort of perspective that Bartlett and Suber (1987) suggest is "outside" and "above" the philosophical and other positions that it comments upon).

> The politics of a deconstructive strategy twists around to deconstruct the position of the critic. The proposal that the world consists merely of discourses then entails that radicals must recant attachments to a truer account, admit that their own

> account is just another discourse and seek solace in 'reflexivity'. (p. 139)

While aspects of the deconstructive strategy apply to Wittgenstein, it is unreasonable to think that Wittgenstein's position is "just another discourse". Moreover, his approach does not merely seek solace in reflexivity, at least in the form advocated by Parker and other postmodernists, because the notions of "language-games" and "forms of life" collect together remarks that highlight important features of our cultural and linguistic practices (e.g., as demonstrated by the ground-breaking work that has occurred in psychology as a result of the notion of investigating the self and emotions within particular "language-games" and "forms of life")[4].

While Wittgenstein cannot be regarded as part of an "anti-reflexive" movement (Bertens, 1995, p. 242), there are further reasons why Wittgensteinians do not use deconstructive techniques to highlight contradictory assumptions and concepts within a position (or text). Parker (1989), for example, provides such a deconstruction of the internal contradictions of attribution theory in psychology (admittedly with the aim of reconstructing how one of the contradictory assumptions in a pair has attained dominance over the other). In this respect, Parker unwittingly extends and refines an earlier critical study by Buss (1978) to which the same argument (and a similar solution) applies. In particular, Buss (1978) argues that shifts between the contradictory positions of "person constructs reality" and "reality constructs person" in psychology are a direct result of

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[4] However, a point for further examination is the social constructionist argument that Wittgenstein's methods of "social poetics" (Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996) provide a practice that can be "inserted into psychology" to achieve the aims of reflexive psychological studies. Also the role of Wittgenstein's philosophy in providing an "outsider critique" of psychology needs to be more closely examined along with more specific remarks and, possibly, theories that will help to "throw light on the vexed question of when and where a

conceptualizations of personal reflexivity. Although Buss does not make the further move from reflexivity and the identification of this central paradox to a deconstructionist position, he does argue that these internal contradictions occur in psychology because "the objects of study in the social sciences (people) are also subjects" (p. 59).

The relevant question is whether a Wittgensteinian approach can dismantle such internal contradictions without recourse to a deconstructionist account? One way in which Wittgenstein treats paradoxes (i.e., internal contradictions) is evident from the following remark:

> Something surprising, a paradox, is a paradox only in a particular, as it were defective surrounding. One needs to complete this surrounding in such a way that what looked like a paradox no longer seems one. (RFM, V, §36)

By "complete this surrounding", Wittgenstein can be taken to mean an examination of the detail of language use that a position in psychology attempts to summarize. One of the most important means of completing the "defective surrounding" of a self-contradictory statement or position is to favour the notion of contradiction and then to examine the further question of whether the discovery of contradictions undermines psychology (see section 1.2). A simple example can be used to illustrate this point. Hochschild (1990) hints at a central paradox in the field of emotion with her remark: "a feeling is what happens to us . . . yet it is also what we do to make it happen" (p. 120). Wittgenstein's argument applies equally to this comment because the defective surrounding is a particular kind of useless metapsychological practice in which paradoxes are thought to be significant, and the solution is to examine the linguistic detail of emotion ascriptions, expressions and

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reflexive analysis is appropriate or useful" (Parker, 1994b, p. 528; as section 1.2 will provide

experiences in normative practices.

It may appear that Wittgenstein rejects forms of postmodern reflexivity. But rather than attempting to "get beyond reflexivity" by becoming part of an "anti-reflexive movement", Wittgensteinians realize that "critical reflexiveness is too great an intellectual and moral good to be thrown overboard in that way" (Bertens, 1995, p. 242). The broad reflexivity of working within language to highlight features of our linguistic practices has inspired many of the useful and revealing forms of psychological reflexivity to be examined below. But if an emphasis on psychological reflexivity can be regarded as postmodern because it emphasizes the creation of contradictions and disagreement in psychology, then a further difference between Wittgenstein's philosophy and other postmodernists emerges. However, to make this point we must provisionally accept the argument, to be presented in section 1.2, that there are many fruitful comparisons to be made between mathematics and psychology. For the moment, a more detailed consideration of Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology is possible if we substitute "psychological" for "mathematical" in the following remark and ask why, as psychologists, we might:

> . . . have *wanted* to produce a contradiction? Have said with pride in a mathematical discovery: "Look, this is how we produce a contradiction?" Might not e.g. a lot of people possibly have tried to produce a contradiction in the domain of logic, and then at least *one* person succeeded? (RFM, II, §81).

Even though Wittgenstein's remark is about mathematics, it is equally applicable to psychology because it raises the question:

> But why should people have tried to do *this*? Perhaps I cannot at present suggest the most plausible purpose. But why not

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with a detailed account of Wittgensteinian metapsychology).

> e.g. in order to show that everything in this world is uncertain? (RFM, II, §81)

The relevance of the remark to psychology is confirmed by one of Parker's (1989) comments about the postmodern and critical psychology he advocates:

> Postmodernity provokes an attitude of uncertainty, of studied doubt, and any attempt to gain knowledge involves a continual reflexivity which underlines the provisional and transitory nature of that knowledge. (p. 139)

An important part of the argument in subsequent sections is that Wittgenstein's philosophy provides a general form of reflexive approach that is useful to social scientists and psychologists *because* it does not produce uncertainty or highlight contradictions.

To summarize, Wittgenstein's later philosophy was described as postmodernist in its turn to language and interest in reflexive questions. However, it differs from more radical forms of postmodernism in which a general interest in reflexivity: creates potentially impenetrable general and theoretical metalanguages when challenging metanarratives, presents concepts such as "language-games" and "forms of life" as "just another discourse", deconstructs rather than dismantles positions, attempts to extend reflexivity towards the notion of highlighting paradoxes, and, as more specific examples of reflexivity in psychology indicate, attempts to create contradictions and to produce uncertainty. Wittgenstein can be seen to counter both general and more extreme forms of reflexivity in postmodern philosophy. However, the extent to which a Wittgensteinian position can be regarded as "outside" and different from the practices it comments upon remains.

A Wittgensteinian criticism of philosophy's subsumption by self-critical social science

Wittgenstein does not advocate the extreme forms of philosophical reflexivity that are found in the paradoxes and uncertainties of postmodernism, but the potential for his work to be combined with the results of critical studies in psychology needs to be clarified. One of the problems faced by supporters and critics of Wittgenstein alike is that by dismantling the traditional role of philosophy, Wittgenstein seems to pave the way for the work of philosophy to be subsumed by self-critical science. Of course, a number of diverse approaches and innovations in epistemology, philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge have attempted to build upon the insights of the *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty* (e.g., Bloor (1976, 1997)). The purpose of this section, however, is not to trace all of these possible connections, but instead to examine whether Wittgensteinian philosophical criticisms can be used in self-critical social scientific investigations and thus potentially combine with studies that recognize the importance and implications of psychological reflexivity without relinquishing an important "outsider" role for philosophers.

It is apparent from many of Wittgenstein's remarks that he is highly critical of the emphasis on scientific generality, explanation and abstraction (BB, p. 18) in Western culture. This attitude seems to concur with many of the popular modernist metanarratives identified by Parker (1989) and challenged by postmodernists. Moreover, Wittgenstein's position seems to work broadly within language but, at the same time, "outside" science. Finch (1995), for example, suggests that one of the most important features of Wittgenstein's philosophy is the tendency to stop and look around at our culture, language and practices when others would much rather have faith

in science to progress our understanding. Wittgenstein himself also remarked that the philosopher is "not a citizen of any community of ideas" (Z, §455). This remark serves as an important reminder of the outside, uncommitted role a philosopher should have towards different positions advocated in the social sciences. The result is that Wittgensteinians philosophers tend to eschew any encroachment of scientific values and methods into philosophy, hence their agreement with Wittgenstein's disdain for theory construction in philosophy (PI, §109).

However, one problem with Wittgenstein's dissolution of the traditional, overarching role of philosophy is that he seems to invite an alternative approach that blurs the boundaries between philosophy and science. Trigg (1991) suggests, for example, that "with the blurring of the distinction between the epistemological and the sociological, it could even appear as if social science would take over the former role of philosophy" (p. 219). Social scientists often work within and between their disciplines to include the insights of philosophical positions, an observation which may even seem to suggest that there are now more Wittgensteinians to be found in the social sciences than in philosophy. Presumably, this state of affairs is a consequence of the fact that "the work of the later Wittgenstein has had a vast influence in the field of social science" (p. 209). If correct, it certainly explains the increasing popularity of attempts to use Wittgenstein's ostensibly reflexive methods and techniques in the social sciences. Indeed, it is difficult to tell whether contemporary innovations are coming from philosophical work outside the social sciences or from versions of philosophical positions that have been usurped by social scientists (see chapter 3, section 3.2 for the issue of the point at which a critical "career" in psychology is likely to be most productive). But the problem remains that

Wittgenstein's method of dismantling theories and positions in philosophy is even more destructive when it is taken into the social sciences.

If Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not "above" or "below" the social sciences in the sense that Wittgenstein once thought his earlier philosophy related to the natural sciences (T, §4.111)[5], it is also appropriate to note that neither is it "beside" the social sciences. Moreover, further questions arise such as: how does the subsumption of philosophy by social science occur, what crucial aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy does this subsumption hide, and what are the implications for psychology? One way in which philosophy is subsumed is by claiming that its skills and perspectives are increasingly similar to those of social science. This position is evident in Bechtel's (1988) realist-cognitive summary of a critical perspective on science:

> . . . inquiry into the nature of science, whether carried out by philosophers or others, is a reflexive endeavour, using the very skills that are employed in human inquiry to understand the human race's most systematic example of inquiry — science (p. 2)

On the realist view, philosophy is an abstract extension of scientific thinking with no special warrant for consideration because "it employs the methods of science to study science, it is, where appropriate, constrained by the findings of science and it is itself a general scientific theory of science" (Haig, 1991, p. 82). Realists also favour the subsumption of philosophy into science as a type of super-scientific theorizing. This is evident in Hooker's (1987) view that the "complex internal and meta self-reflection" of science can be regarded as "an emerging scientific theory of human kind, the

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[5] The actual quotation from the *Tractatus* is: "the word "philosophy" must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences" (T, §4.111).

evolutionary theory of self-organizing systems" (p. 174). By regarding philosophy in his way, it may seem that a perspective is still provided from which it is possible to speculate on what scientists cannot see from within their own practices. The realist view of philosophy as an abstract and somewhat independent part of science is also attractive because it aims to provide "a 'halfway house' between some transcendent (and epistemically inaccessible status) for philosophy on the one side and the collapsing of philosophy into science on the other" (Hooker, 1987, p. 270).

However, arguing for a similarity between philosophy and science (and hence social science) by allowing that philosophy must be epistemically accessible and potentially fallible, contrasts with another of Wittgenstein's reminders: "I am not aiming at the same target as the scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs" (CV, p. 7e). An alternative picture is preferable to Hooker's account because it suggests philosophy's enmeshment within cultural and linguistic practices as well as its use of "poetic methods" (Shotter, 1996) to highlight important aspects of those practices. In particular, Dennett's (1995) view that "philosophy can be seen to lie about midway between science and the arts" (p. 141) seems appropriate to the conceptual-discursive survey that forms Part 2 of this thesis (even though Dennett is an avowed ex-Wittgensteinian).

A testing ground for a view of philosophy that is more allied to the arts than the natural sciences is the importance that Wittgenstein attaches to attaining a surview of cultural and linguistic practices through revealing remarks, analogies and internal comparisons. When realists emphasize the "synoptic character of philosophical theories" it is mainly for the purpose of "studying science in a general way" (Haig, 1990, p. 83). A Wittgensteinian perspective, in contrast, avoids generalities and philosophical theorizing

and must relies on different methods. To put this point in another way by using Dennett's (1995) philosophical work on evolutionary theory, it is reasonable for Dennett to state that even though his remarks may contribute to the construction of abstract theory in some areas of evolutionary biology, nevertheless it is "largely about science but is not itself a work of science" (p. 11; the topic of evolution will be further examined in section 1.3 and chapter 5, section 5.2). The implication is that a Wittgensteinian surview may engage with the detail of particular theories in psychology but need not be seen as a substitute for theory construction or particular types of investigation.

However, detail needs to be provided about how Wittgenstein's philosophy can provide non-theoretical insights, particularly in the social sciences. As Baker and Hacker (1985) note, there is considerable potential to explore the role of a non-theoretical, descriptive surview with respect to scientific creativity and similarities to the use of models in science. The usefulness of attaining a synoptic view of a practice is indicated by Wittgensteinian contrasts with attempts to subsume philosophy by social science (see also the importance of a synoptic view or surview of psychological concepts in section 1.3). For example, Barker (1989) shows that Wittgenstein's remarks about rules, which do not resemble a scientific theory, can be used to clarify the mistaken view that science cannot study itself (i.e., the claim that important points about science cannot be discovered from within because that would use the same method we wish to investigate). Barker argues that the "reflexivity objection" is predicated on the philosophical error that the rules of a practice cannot change because they prefigure their own application even in such new contexts as a sociology of psychological studies. Barker's use of Wittgenstein's remarks

on rules clarifies the problem and removes a meta-scientific objection and allows such forms of reflexive work to proceed simply by noting that the application of the new rule-governed methods and concepts in novel circumstances would be settled "on the basis of the common practice shared by competent practitioners" (p. 107; i.e., rather than by philosophers).

Barker's work not only suggests the utility of allowing Wittgenstein's type of philosophy to maintain an outside perspective on many practices, it also suggests that reflexive work within the social sciences does not necessarily solve every problem. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, it is interesting to note the growing agreement between realist-cognitive and social constructionist positions on psychology. For example, Greenwood's (1992) view that "scientific theories are themselves socially constructed" (p. 139) seems to accord with a Wittgensteinian perspective (see chapter 2 for more detail). Even though social constructionists are more likely to engage with Wittgensteinian remarks about the importance of particular judgements to linguistic practices from *On Certainty* (e.g., Shotter, 1992a), still they are also tempted to subsume parts of Wittgenstein's philosophy within psychology. Rather than showing where critical realists such as Greenwood (1992) misrepresent Wittgenstein's investigation of relevant epistemological issues, they are more inclined to suggest that Wittgenstein's methods replace forms of theoretical and empirical work in psychology.

Shotter (1996), in particular, generalizes Wittgenstein's rejection of theories in philosophy (PI, §128) to the social sciences, thus encouraging a radical position that is both reflexive and challenging even to other forms of postmodern psychology (e.g., many of the positions that constitute critical psychology such as cultural and feminist theory). The result is considerable

confusion about the role of theory in psychology and how Wittgenstein's philosophical aims could possibly be usurped to this end. Both Dennett (1995) and Barker (1989) indicate that the line between philosophy and speculative science is often difficult to draw (as section 1.2 will demonstrate with more exegetical material). In contrast, there is less support for Shotter's (1996) argument to replace theory almost completely in psychology with Wittgensteinian methods of "social poetics". The fact that subsequent sections challenge aspects of social constructionism with remarks from Wittgenstein himself provides an added reason for us to reconsider the relevance of Wittgenstein's diverse body of later writings to reflexive social scientific work.

To summarize, Wittgenstein's dissolution of philosophy as a position "above" the sciences seems to provide an opportunity for it to work "beside" social science work. Therefore it seems possible for Wittgenstein's philosophical method and remarks to be subsumed by self-critical social science. The rising interest in reflexivity in the social sciences and the incorporation of many Wittgenstein-inspired social constructionist criticisms by realists seems to indicate the potential for social science to solve its own problems. However, it was argued that philosophy and critical social science are practices that differ in kind and not in degree. Moreover, while there is no Wittgensteinian "reflexivity objection" to the possibility of science studying itself, it is unlikely that the insights produced would entirely replace an enduring role for philosophy. The importance of retaining philosophy as an outside perspective that can identify conceptual confusions and philosophical prejudices in the social sciences is shown by the need to reconsider positions that have been inspired by his remarks, as well as the approaches of individuals who attempt to use his methods within the social

sciences.

The contemporary relevance of specific Wittgensteinian remarks on the relations between philosophy and psychology

Wittgenstein's later philosophy has, to this point, been contrasted with other postmodern philosophical positions and distinguished from increasingly autonomous forms of self-critical social science. The fact that Wittgenstein offered few specific remarks on the relations between his philosophy and contemporary psychology does not help psychologists who are tempted to adopt only those aspects of Wittgenstein's work that they like. Some of the reasons for the lack of critical attention to the relations between philosophy and psychology have been intimated in previous sections: that is, Wittgenstein's attitude towards paradoxes and contradictions in deconstructive psychology was constructed from analogous arguments about mathematics. Although Wittgenstein's remarks on the relations between philosophy and psychology tend to be scattered, obscure and need to be carefully derived from other remarks (e.g., such as the claim not to want to "reform language" (PI, §132)), comparing mathematics with psychology provides a useful perspective on the relations between philosophy and psychology.

Traditional comparisons involving reflexivity usually focus on the similarities and differences between the social and natural sciences, which invite further specific comparisons between psychology and physics. In contrast, Wittgenstein was critical of such comparisons:

> The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not

> comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) (PI, xiv, p. 232e)

Wittgenstein's alternative comparison of mathematics with psychology is useful because exegesis of contemporary psychology's similarities with the problems of "certain branches of mathematics" can inform contemporary views of theoretical psychology and metapsychology. For although the following extract from the *Philosophical Investigations* suggests that Wittgenstein was about to produce remarks about mathematics based on an existing study of psychology, it is useful to examine the detail of his earlier remarks on mathematics:

> An investigation is possible in connexion with mathematics which is entirely analogous to our investigation of psychology. It is just as little a *mathematical* investigation as the other is a psychological one. It will *not* contain calculations, so it is not for example logistic. It might deserve the name of an investigation of the 'foundations of mathematics'. (PI, xiv, p. 232e)

The next section will present insights about psychology that come from a detailed exploration of Wittgenstein's "entirely analogous" work on the foundations of mathematics. However, some remarks that clarify Wittgenstein's philosophy in relation to the limits and consequences of reflexive work in psychology can be examined here: that is, where Wittgenstein's remarks seem to coincide with positions developed in response to forms of psychological reflexivity such as "new paradigm" attempts to create new methods and forms of psychology. Thus, given the obvious interests of psychologists, it is important to repeat an otherwise obscure admission by Wittgenstein — which can be extended to any investigation of the "foundations of psychology" — that he was not "interested in constructing a building, so much as having a perspicuous view

of the foundations of possible buildings" (CV, 7e).

Two important questions that produce conflicting answers from philosophers, social scientists and psychologists are: on what basis can Wittgenstein criticize psychology and, moreover, what influence did Wittgenstein wish to have on the discipline? For example, by his use of "we" and "us" in the famous quotation about psychology, Wittgenstein implies a waning faith in the methods of psychology to supply conceptually adequate answers to important questions of human existence:

> The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (PI, xiv, p. 232e)

Wittgenstein's later philosophy has nevertheless had considerable influence on the social sciences, even though it seems that he sought to have no such effect[6]. It seems more appropriate to argue that the use of "we" was justified only to the extent that psychologists might accept that the problems he identified were similar to theirs, hence the difficulty for social scientists who take seriously the dismantling of traditional philosophy and have incorporated his remarks in the social sciences as a broad theory of language and practices.

Wittgenstein also acknowledged the considerable potential for a descriptive philosopher to interfere in a practice such as mathematics. In this respect, Wittgenstein's remarks about the relations between philosophy and mathematics are directly relevant to understanding the importance of philosophy for psychology:

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[6] For example, the following remark can be extended from the treatment of mathematics to psychology: "labour in philosophy is as it were an idleness in mathematics" (RFM, IV, §52).

> The philosopher easily gets into the position of a ham-fisted director, who, instead of doing his own work and merely supervising his employees to see they do their work well, takes over their jobs until one day he finds himself overburdened with other people's work while his employees watch and criticize him. (PG, p. 369)

Wittgenstein clearly felt that his role was to comment upon the conceptual problems of a practice but not to take over the work of its practitioners. By extension, psychology is obviously regarded by Wittgenstein as an autonomous discipline that is as free to entangle itself in conceptual confusion as it is to acknowledge philosophical criticisms with the aim of disentangling itself. This analogy therefore confirms previous remarks about self-critical social science and shows that, despite the close links that have developed between philosophy and psychology, "it is important that the closeness of the links should not obscure the differences in what can be asked of each subject" (Rundle, 1995, p. 207).

The remark from *Philosophical Grammar* is also useful because it demonstrates the difficulty of adequately incorporating Wittgenstein's philosophy into psychology as a critical part of the discipline. An alternative view is that psychological reflexivity requires a broad to and fro movement between philosophy and psychology. In practice, of course, this might only mean that the psychologists concerned can confidently survive in both practices (i.e., to be proficient with the different skills, writing styles, concepts and techniques required by philosophers and psychologists). But the difficulty that I suggest occurs when crossing between psychology and philosophy also creates many problems for the interpretation and application of Wittgenstein's remarks (even though by helping psychologists to remove philosophical errors and find their way about the discipline, it might seem that Wittgenstein's philosophy offers many new ideas to exploit).

For instance, the work of Baker and Hacker (1984, 1985), Budd (1989) and Schulte (1993) on Wittgenstein seems to have little regard for its relevance to contemporary psychology. In contrast, Gergen (1985), Harré (1986, 1989, 1992), Shanker (1991, 1993) and Shotter (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1996) are not as concerned with the detailed exegesis of Wittgenstein in relation to traditional philosophical problems. Their interest is more in relating Wittgenstein's philosophy to contemporary psychological practices and, where possible, reinterpretating work that invites convincing Wittgensteinian criticisms. The latter group of individuals is more interested in how psychologists and social scientists are attracted to philosophical investigations from the direction of their specific practices and, moreover, what movement between the two practices will achieve.

However, the to and fro movement between philosophy and psychology that is occupied mainly by social constructionists and theoretical psychologists creates a number of problems which require clarification. One of the benefits of the benefits of combining the skills of philosophers and psychologists is that social constructionists, for example, understand the implications of Wittgenstein's philosophical attack on Cartesian dualism. While this to and fro movement can also lead to arguments about the extent to which cognitive scientists endorse a form of dualism, it is far more relevant here to examine the idea that philosophy provides a plan that either could or has the potential to be carried out and completed by social scientists and psychologists. In a remark that can be taken to mean that philosophers should not take pride in constructing theoretical edifices and, moreover, should dismantle such proud achievements by examining the detail of everyday language use, Wittgenstein stated: "The *edifice of your pride* has to be dismantled. And that is terribly difficult work" (CV, p. 26e). This remark

can be contrasted with a remark from the Preface to Descartes' *The Passions of the Soul* which is of contemporary relevance to person and emotion studies:

> But just as when an Architect has laid all the foundations and raised the main walls of some great edifice no one doubts that he can carry his plan to completion, because they can see that he's already done what was most difficult . . . (p. 12)

The point here is not merely of historical interest because it suggests that even those psychologists interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy can adopt a Cartesian view of philosophy if they think that Wittgenstein's remarks provide a plan, foundation or programme for "new paradigm" psychology (see section 1.3 for further remarks about the language that psychologists use to describe the relations between philosophy and psychology).

A more complicated version of this argument can be illustrated by remarks about the nature of Wittgenstein's effect on psychology. Coulter (1989), for example, argues that a Wittgensteinian rejection of a Cartesian approach provides a framework that allows for the "development of a fully *sociological* understanding of the mental, subjective and cognitive aspects of persons" and which "presages a redrawing of the intellectual boundaries of the human sciences" (pp. 6-7). Trigg (1991) similarly argues that the work of the later Wittgenstein "has provoked much interest in the philosophy of psychology, but his pre-occupation with the public world leaves little scope for psychology as a discipline except as a branch of social science" (p. 215). On the view adopted here it seems better to describe the effects of Wittgenstein's philosophy as the confluence of similar problems from different practices. Thus where Wittgenstein's work on rules, rule-following and the possibility of a private language suggests that Wittgenstein had a

plan for psychologists to follow, it is important to see how the confusion evident in many cognitive and mainstream psychological accounts of internalization, privatization and other rule-following abilities reflects a fundamental limit of Wittgenstein's seminal philosophical work.

A reconsideration of the use of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in psychology is important if, in this case, a comprehensive comparison of cognitive theories and fully developed aspects of social constructionism is to be avoided. The twists and turns of a Wittgensteinian treatment of philosophical errors — such as those identified by the remarks of the private language argument and the preceding account of rules — can occur regardless of whether the source is cognitive science or everyday accounts of how we are able to talk about private events. Accordingly, when approaching philosophy from the practice of psychology and specific accounts such as Rosenberg's (1990) theory, it is the freedom to entangle ourselves in our own concepts and then disentangle ourselves from particular representations of their use that is crucial to understanding the role of Wittgenstein's method. Wittgenstein's influence is therefore indirect since we may deny that conceptual therapy is required to remove misconceptions. On Wittgenstein's view of philosophy, a psychologist who commits a philosophical error can only be brought to the point of a clear view by assembling relevant reminders of language use. There is no room to push, persuade, convert, seduce or train an individual into accepting a philosopher's power to remove a conceptual problem.

These considerations bring us back to an account of how Wittgenstein's philosophy might be incorporated in the future work of psychology (or, in this case, the work of Part 2). Since Wittgenstein did not open up potential lines of inquiry to be "colonized" by particular social

scientific investigations, the aim of psychologists doing particular research should not be to use Wittgenstein's remarks as the foundation for their work. Instead, an alternative view of a future psychology can be inferred from one of Wittgenstein's further remarks about mathematics:

> A philosopher feels changes in the style of a derivation which a contemporary mathematician passes over calmly with a blank face. What will distinguish the mathematicians of the future from those of today will really be a greater sensitivity, and *that* will—as it were—prune mathematics; since people will then be more intent on absolute clarity than on the discovery of new games. Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the growth of mathematics as sunlight has on the growth of potato shoots. (In a dark cellar they grow yards long). (PG, II, V, §25)

The analogous point for psychology is that the positive contribution of philosophy now, as well as in the future, will be to place tighter conceptual limits on possible branches of growth without necessarily obscuring genuine opportunities for creative research. And, in this case, a greater emphasis on conceptual clarity should limit possible future investigations in the study of personal reflexivity and emotion. For example, the interdisciplinary explosion of interest in emotion may eventually need to be pruned by philosophical clarity because continuing growth in the area will eventually reach a point where a clear view cannot be achieved solely on the basis of a review of all relevant psychological studies. Thus, Wittgenstein's role is a kind of conceptual pruning in the consideration of actual and possible lines of investigation.

The suggested analogous future form of psychology that incorporates Wittgensteinian philosophical criticisms is, accordingly, the only one that Wittgenstein could consistently advocate: a future psychology in which sensitivity to language, expressions and concepts will help to avoid growth

in pointless areas but which will not undermine the freedom for psychologists to make conceptual mistakes in the name of theory construction and empirical work. The role of philosophy is to dampen the enthusiasm for potential areas of growth while also allowing the freedom of individuals within psychology to attempt the impossible, so to speak. Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks can provide the basis for a "Wittgensteinian program" in psychology (Harré, 1988) or, more specifically, a new "social psychology of human development" (Jost, 1995; cf. Part 2, chapter 8), but only in the sense that they are usurped by psychologists for a different purpose than Wittgenstein intended. Scince, as Bloor (1997) notes, even Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following can admit both collectivist and individualist readings, a crucial task is to bring these debates back to an examination of detailed but otherwise ordinary examples. More generally, heeding the call for conceptual tightness on the future possible directions of psychology assures a continuing role for philosophy to comment on advances and discoveries in psychology without the need to offer what Wittgenstein similarly referred to in mathematics as prophecies (LFM, p. 13).

In summary, recognition of the mutual limits of philosophy and psychology does not diminish the scope of the former or the freedom of the latter to become entangled in its own conceptual confusions. Some initial similarities between Wittgenstein's treatment of mathematics and psychology were discussed. The temptation to regard philosophers as "directing" psychologists was dismissed in favour of the view that Wittgenstein's philosophy offers assistance to disentangle psychologists from their conceptual problems. Wittgenstein does not necessarily attempt to redirect every branch of the social sciences, but rather aims to convince

psychologists to stop growth in pointless directions through conceptual clarity. On this account, the future form of psychology owes less to a Wittgensteinian programme within psychology that extends notions of rules and rule-following, and more to an era in which psychologists attend more closely to conceptual issues. The difficulty of connecting psychologically reflexive work with the methods and remarks of Wittgenstein's philosophy therefore raises issues for further investigation which include: the usefulness of a game analogy of psychology, the difficulties of switching between philosophy and psychology, and the nature of psychologists' critical careers.

1.2 Metapsychology and Wittgenstein's "entirely analogous" treatment of mathematics

Often it is difficult to determine whether the process and results of reflexive and critical psychological studies should be regarded as philosophy or, instead, should be treated as a subdiscipline within psychology. Although the Wittgensteinian treatment of psychological reflexivity given thus far demonstrates the importance of the "turn to language" — hence leading to the growth of discursive studies — the line between philosophy and theoretical areas of psychology is still difficult to draw. The previous section began to address some of the details of Wittgenstein's relevance to contemporary psychology through the largely unexamined potential of Wittgenstein's "entirely analogous" remarks on mathematics and metamathematics. In this section, further remarks on the similarities between psychology's problems and set theory in mathematics will be assembled and analysed in order to clarify the role of theoretical psychology, offer an

alternative Wittgensteinian metapsychology and examine the issue of contradictions in psychology.

Wittgensteinian metapsychology: the game analogy of psychology

The reversal of Wittgenstein's suggestion that a philosophical investigation of mathematics could be undertaken that would be "entirely analogous" to that of psychology (PI, xiv, p. 232) leads to the potential for a comparison between Wittgenstein's extensive remarks on mathematics and contemporary metapsychology. The topic is relevant to a reconsideration of psychological reflexivity because metapsychological remarks are the formalization and disputation of what psychologists are tempted to say about what they do. While Wittgenstein denied that metamathematics has the philosophical significance that some claim, it seems reasonable to think that his alternative metamathematical "game analogy" remarks may usefully inform our understanding of the limits of reflexive work in psychology (i.e., work that might connect with metapsychological attempts to use such a perspective as well as to change the practices of the discipline).

Wittgenstein was highly critical of problems with accounts of the foundations of mathematics:

> The *mathematical* problems of what is called foundations are no more the foundation of mathematics for us than the painted rock is the support of a painted tower. (RFM, V, §13)

It is reasonable to think that he did not wish to establish or deny contemporary forms of metapsychology. For example, Gergen's (1989)

mention of the different methods that metapsychology employs to highlight what cannot be investigated by the use of the discipline's techniques and methods seems reasonable. Instead, Wittgenstein would probably be critical of attempts to claim that the "meta" in "metapsychology" implies that this work provides the foundations for psychological practices. For example, problems identified in a metapsychology position would not undermine the actual practices of psychology. Also while metapsychology could be a complicated combination of theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy, it is only "about" psychology in the sense that it involves different methods, concepts and skills to describe psychology and it is not "below" the discipline in a foundationalist sense.

A particular task here is to show the utility of extending the game analogy that Wittgenstein used to understand mathematics (RFM, V, §12) and metamathematics to psychology. The analogy serves as a simplified "object of comparison" and does not play a foundational role because, for example, the discovery of disanalogous aspects of the game account does not lead the practices of psychology to be undermined (i.e., just as dismantling a painting of a tower's supporting rock does not lead the tower it represents to fall down). The point that the analogy of psychology as a game is to clarify the relations between the tasks, skills and resources of philosophers and psychologists. The game analogy is, therefore, not a metapsychological theory that is being used to set up a new game for psychology (PG, pp. 289-293; PR, p. 327). In fact, the irony of the game analogy is that it is a means of showing the limits of Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks to psychology. What the game view highlights, according to Monk (1990), is that "you cannot gain a fundamental understanding of mathematics by waiting for a theory" (p. 307). This is

simply because "the understanding of one game cannot depend upon the construction of another" (p. 307).

The analogy also shows that metapsychological theories need not be described as organizing important empirical discoveries about the discipline and its history. Although the use of particular rules in psychology can be described in factual terms, such a factual description does not mean that the rules themselves are facts that need to be explained (i.e., empirical propositions that are organized by a theory). This is indicated by Wittgenstein's treatment of a similar case in mathematics. He notes that an individual might claim with regard to a particular rule-governed practice: "surely it remains an empirical fact that men calculate like this" (RFM, V, §15). Wittgenstein's succinct reply is "yes, but that does not make the propositions used in calculating into empirical propositions" (RFM, V, §15). Hence, in this case, the game analogy is not a theory that organizes facts about the use of rules in psychology.

The game analogy therefore suggests that philosophy only plays the role of describing the rules of psychology and addresses such nonsensical questions from psychologists as "So where are the rules?". It should be noted that the rules of psychology are the complicated concepts, propositions and rule-governed techniques used in the discipline that are demonstrated in "knowing our way about" (RFM, II, §81). This is in contrast to the sort of philosophical confusion — generally described by Wittgenstein as "I don't know my way about" (PI, §123) — that might prevent such an overview of the discipline. An example of such a philosophical problem is the view that contradictions identified in metapsychological accounts undermine the practices of psychology. It is also important, as the next section will demonstrate, to be aware of Wittgenstein's important distinction

between rules that are grammatical propositions, which function as rules for the use of concepts, and empirical propositions. This is because empirical propositions might, once they have been tested, "be transformed into a postulate—and then become a norm of description" (OC, §321). The rules of psychology evident in the correct use of its propositions, concepts and techniques cannot exist above, separate from, or independent of their use and application: in other words, propositions that function as rules can only be redescribed by philosophy or metapsychology. Thus, Wittgenstein notes that propositions and facts about the history of the game are often not included in the rules of a game in any clear sense (PG, VI, §75).

The game analogy instead functions like the notion of a surview of science that was indicated by Barker's (1989) clarification of how rules can change in a practice (i.e., rather than mysteriously prefiguring all future applications and extensions; see section 1.1). In this case, the game analogy is not a claim about the real, structural nature of psychology. Rules cannot be described as procedures that psychologists unknowingly follow and which can only be revealed by theories about psychology. A rule should not be regarded as an explanatory concept because, as Wittgenstein notes, it is "what is explained, not what does the explaining" (RPP II, §405). Wittgenstein adds detail to the description of rules in a way that avoids the difficulties "associated with the attempt to define science, or any other human practice, by rules alone" (Barker, 1989, p. 95), but is still relevant to the extension of the analogy to psychology. For example, he notes "I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by *teaching* you, *training* you to employ rules" (RPP II, §413). The issues of teaching and training in psychology, and the important question of whether psychologists can be trained to be reflexive, will be addressed in chapter 3 (i.e., since critical

psychology may seem to encourage training to "break the rules"). For the moment, the analogy suggest that it is only within psychology that attempts to alter the rules can be undertaken by individuals who have mastered important skills, techniques and concepts.

Philosophers, in contrast, can only describe the rules so that while they may propose rule changes that will alter the character of the game, they cannot institute them since that would be to *do* psychology, to become a psychologist, albeit perhaps only in the manner of a theoretical psychologist or, as in mathematics, a set theorist. Wittgenstein is clear that his purpose is not to attack the metamathematics of set theory from "within", but from "without":

> That is to say: not to attack it mathematically—otherwise I should be doing mathematics—but its position, its office. (RFM, V, §16)

It will often be more interesting for philosophers to describe the nature of the innovations and, as subsequent sections will show, that the kind of practical knowledge acquired by individuals who participate in a culture cannot be mastered by learning rules alone. Moreover, to extend the director analogy in section 1.1, the role of a philosopher is like a referee who broadly participates in the game in the sense that he or she polices the rules. However, this referee role is also "outside" the play in the sense that the individual philosopher cannot, so to speak, score a goal for one side or the other. Although the details of this position will be explored in subsequent sections, it is most appropriate to apply it to the issue of the relations between philosophy and psychology, as directed by the reconsideration of psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity.

The analogy is relevant to the reconsideration of types of reflexivity in their contexts because it shows how the remarks of Part 1 about psychological reflexivity can describe some of the studies examined in Part 2. That is, while the attempt to provide a reflexive study of personal reflexivity suggests an account that is, in some respect, at a higher level, this contradicts the fact that this task is accomplished within the same broad, discursive game. An enduring picture of philosophy and theoretical psychology as the higher and more abstract of two levels can be dismissed as a myth which is created by much of our everyday language. Although it might seem helpful to regard the different treatments of psychological reflexivity and its consequences and limits in Part 1 as the higher level and the treatment of personal reflexivity in Part 2 as the lower level (i.e., closer to the reality of people's experiences that we wish to investigate). But the game analogy favours an analysis of the roles and skills of the individuals concerned within what is broadly regarded as the game. Thus, the game analogy suggests that there are simply two different practices that are related in a manner that is better described in terms of the roles, skills and tasks of the director or referee and the players.

To reiterate, Wittgenstein's remarks and their use within psychology should not be seen as the metapsychological provision of a foundation for a new psychology. For example, the game analogy that was extended to psychology is metapsychological only in the sense that it is "about" how philosophy relates to psychology (i.e., it is not a theory of the game of psychology and its rules). The game analogy is important because it shows that connecting Wittgenstein's remarks with the results of self-critical psychology is not the same as moving from a description of the rules to proposing new rules and forms of investigation in the "game" itself. This

helps to clarify how Wittgenstein could be consistent on maintaining a position that entails "there is no metapsychology" in a foundational sense, while at the same time making useful remarks about psychology's concepts, techniques and propositions. The utility of the game analogy and the focus on rules, despite disanalogies that will be mentioned in subsequent sections, is further extended in the next section to deal with the problem of contradictions.

Further remarks on the rules of psychology and the consequences of contradictions for the game

While the description of the rules of psychology has provided an account of grammar of the propositions of psychology, their different roles and surroundings (RFM, V, §14), further clarification of the rules of psychology is required. Whether a rule, axiom, or proposition in psychology is grammatical or empirical (OC, §321) is important to consider because it tells us whether some of the more radical statements we might be tempted to make are contradicting a rule for teaching a concept or a point that has been established on the basis of experiments and observations. This conceptual distinction is also useful as a way of clarifying the issue of contradictions in psychology, especially when they are thought to suggest fundamental problems that only the unity of a new paradigm will solve (Buss, 1995; see section 1.3). Furthermore, considering the issue of contradictions in psychology also allows us to address the view that many of the contrasting positions in psychology are the result of our failure to deal appropriately with the personal reflexivity of the discipline's "subjects" (Buss, 1978; Howard, 1985).

An important Wittgensteinian point that can be made about psychology is that although many of its concepts seem to refer to real objects, it is important occasionally to accept Wittgenstein's challenge of imagining a quite different history for the discipline and then ask whether its concepts still seem quite as natural (RFM, II, §80). The point is relevant to the issue of psychology's "rules" because a common, contemporary remark is that an independent reality does not justify the current shape of the discipline and its concepts. While the following point about rules of grammar describing the correct use of concepts may seem irrelevant, it is an important prelude to a clarification of the role, if any, for contradictions and their identification in psychology. The point is that:

> There is no such thing as a correct rule of grammar (it can only be correct or incorrect, true or false, that *this is* a rule of grammar). For there is no such thing as justifying grammar by reference to reality — as strange and counterintuitive as this may sound. (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 54)

This point initially rejects a broad view that the rules of a game can be said to contradict reality and restricts the notion of contradicting reality to the more limited sense in which an empirical proposition may be false (PG, X, §133). For if a proposition is to function as a rule of description that is certain (i.e., rather than hypothetical and hence potentially leaving one with two choices) it cannot leave two paths open (RFM, V, 32).

The rules of psychology do not contradict reality and it is more pertinent to examine where two propositions or concepts in psychology contradict each other (i.e., the type of problem that could not be resolved simply by empirical investigation). In this case, the Wittgensteinian solution is to note that either a new rule is required or some other form of appropriate investigation should be carried out to determine which rule is correct, simply

because "it is part of the grammar of the word 'rule' that if 'p' is a rule, 'p.~p' is not a rule" (PG, II, 14). The specific point is that while there are numerous contradictions within psychology that seem to involve what Wittgenstein described as grammatical propositions, Wittgenstein suggests that there are limits to the use of philosophy to resolve such contradictions. This is especially important because mainstream psychologists such as Staats (1991) regard contradiction as a fundamental obstacle to psychology's development beyond its present pre-paradigmatic scientific status (see section 1.3 for a Wittgensteinian treatment of the "new paradigm" approach to broad theoretical contradictions in psychology).

However, as Wittgenstein notes with regard to similar problems in mathematics:

> . . . it is one thing to use a mathematical technique consisting in the avoidance of contradiction, and another to philosophize against contradiction in mathematics. (RFM, III, §55)

A case of using a psychological technique "consisting in the avoidance of a contradiction" in psychology would be where two contradictory theories (i.e., theoretical or hypothetical propositions) can be decided, it is hoped, on the basis of empirical evidence. By analogy, Wittgensteinians should not circumvent the use of legitimate techniques for avoiding contradictions within the practices of psychology. In other words, they cannot take over the role of a psychologist who, when faced with a particular contradiction, may well ask "how must I change the rules of this game, so that such-and-such a situation cannot occur?" (RFM, V, §27).

In contrast, philosophizing against a contradiction in psychology should instead occur where problems arise from persistent conceptual

problems or a mistaken ideal. For example, the view that unification is an ideal for psychology is predicated on the view that psychology contains deeply problematic contradictions (of the binary form, for example, that deconstructionists aim to identify and subvert (Parker, 1989)). The potential for a Wittgensteinian treatment is especially relevant where it is argued that the provision of a unifying theory may eventually remove the contradictions in psychology (a position advocated by Staats (1991) and evident in paradigm accounts of psychology; see section 1.3). Wittgenstein attacks the view that highlighted contradictions have the potential to undermine or "infect" the discipline. In a striking mixed metaphor, Wittgenstein argues that the game "is only sick if we do not know our way about" (RFM, II, §81). Such a position is referred to — albeit in a tongue-in-cheek allusion to earlier accounts in psychology such as Oliver and Landfield (1962) — by Shotter (1992): "we have been infected with a touch of reflexivity: psychologists are people too, and we live in the same world as that we attempt to investigate" (p. 178). But the view that there is a serious problem can only occur where there is a misconception about the problem and the way in which it may be solved, hence Shotter's ironic use of "infected" in a position that nevertheless conforms with Oliver and Landfield's (1962) earlier conclusion that "psychology should be reflexive, but should not commit fallacies of self-reference" (p. 118).

As the following analysis will show, metapsychological accounts of psychological reflexivity generating contradictions in psychology hinder a clear view of these problems and their significance. The alternative position advocated in Section 1.3 is that a surview can be used, as Shotter (1993a) argues, to counter the "painful contradictions" of conceptual problems in psychology. A relevant Wittgensteinian position is that an emphasis on the

ideal of a contradiction-free, unified psychology prevents its practitioners from correctly negotiating (and treating) the discipline's conceptual problems. It is almost as if the unity that psychologists seek is hidden and needs to be discovered in the same manner that contradictions are often viewed as hidden but, in contrast, are regarded as potentially destructive. Interestingly, Baker and Hacker (1983) present a view which suggests that the latter problem occurs when the "rules" of the social scientific practice are viewed in theoretical terms:

> A putative system of rules may be vitiated by a hidden contradiction, conflict or inconsistency among the rules. Since the only role of such *postulated* rules is theoretical and explanatory rather than normative, contradictions may lurk unbeknown to anyone. It seems to be the task of the theorist to 'ensure' that his system of rules is consistent. (p. 61)

However, Wittgenstein worked through the confusions of this position in conversations with Turing about set theory and contradictions in mathematical logic (LFM, pp. 138, 210, 221-224). Allusions to the problems of psychology and "certain branches of mathematics" (PI, xiv, p. 232) can now be made explicit. The analogous problem for psychology — and clarification of remarks at the end of the *Philosophical Investigations* — is that inconsistent rules may seem to lurk hidden within its systems and theories in a manner that has the potential to undermine the whole discipline. But the solution to the deep problems supposedly caused, in this case, by personal reflexivity is to achieve a descriptive surview of the relevant psychological concepts and clarity about the role of such a comprehensive survey (see section 1.3).

Thus the actual or potential preoccupation in metapsychology with the identification of contradictions can be challenged by noting that it makes

as much sense to look for hidden contradictions as it does to look for a hidden unity. In both cases, Wittgenstein philosophizes against an inappropriate ideal for psychology which, if left unchecked, would continue to inspire respective forms of pessimism and optimism. As a result, where it is tempting to say that "finding a contradiction in a system, like finding a germ in an otherwise healthy body, shows that the whole system or body is diseased", Wittgenstein's reply is:

> Not at all. The contradiction does not even falsify anything. Let it lie. Do not go there. (LFM, p. 138)

Wittgenstein's work cannot be used to remove all of the contradictions that can be found in psychology and which are sometimes resolved by the use of psychological techniques. However, his remarks do help us to challenge the nonsense of an inappropriate ideal which is nonsensical because achieving it would dissolve the discipline (or, as Wittgenstein suggests in a different context with regard to false moves in a practice: "if what we now call by that name became the rule, the game in which they were false moves would have been abrogated" (PI, p. 227)). In the process it may seem as if an important goal has been dismissed which inspires many forms of theoretical system building and talk of new games based on different foundations, but the clarity achieved and its potential effects should not be underestimated.

Exploration of some of the connections between Wittgenstein's remarks about set theory, mathematics and psychology now provides an opportunity to clarify problems raised by contrary accounts of personal reflexivity. A relevant example to psychology is Buss' (1978) already mentioned account of the history of different theories in psychology which

can be described in terms of shifts between the positions of "person constructs reality" and "reality constructs person" (p. 59). In particular, Buss argues that this problem in the treatment of what has been termed "personal reflexivity" can account for such transitions in theoretical orientation from behaviourism to cognitive psychology (and might also be applied to more recent contrasts between the broad positions of social constructionism and evolutionary psychology; see section 1.3). For Buss argues that contradictory theoretical positions in the history of psychology reveal "a *submerged pattern in the coming and going of psychological revolutions*" (p. 59). The relevant point is that recognition of psychological reflexivity by Buss — namely, that "the objects of study in the social sciences (people) are also subjects" (p. 59) — seems to produce a contradiction that cannot be resolved by the discipline. The oscillation between contradictory theories would seem to have the potential to undermine the scientific status of psychology, perhaps because arbitrarily favouring one side of the contradictory poles in the discipline for reasons of fashion or power (Parker, 1989) would hardly be regarded as progress. The relevance to positions within psychology such as behaviourism, cognitive psychology, and social constructionism is that these and other positions come and go in the history of psychology because at various points the reflexivity of persons is emphasized or denied.

However, Buss' account of the way in which people are variously emphasized to be subjects *or* objects should only be accepted as metapsychologically revealing in the sense that it is a highly theoretical way of redescribing psychology. The fact that this metapsychological account needs to be explained for us to understand it does not mean that psychological reflexivity really describes a hidden structure within

psychology that generates contradictions. For if this really were the case, there would seem to be no way of prevent future contradictions from emerging or that we could "get outside" these positions to the phenomenon "in itself". Buss, of course, wants to end the continuing oscillation between contradictory position, but the way of achieving it is described as a dialectical revolution which, when realized, will "end the need for revolutionary subject-object transformations" (p. 63). While subsequent work will show that Wittgenstein's notion of a surview is different from a dialectical solution, Buss at least provides some support for the decision not to examine personal reflexivity in terms of all the contrasting theories that are potentially surveyable.

However, one criticism of Buss' account is that it is now quite dated and, moreover, does not seem to have inspired much similar work. It is therefore useful to provide a further, more recent example of a position that not only accords with many of the features of the social constructionist focus on language but also is analogous to set theory. In particular, Smedslund (1990) provides an example of an attempt to describe, draw out and formalize tacit rules (or axioms) for the use of psychological concepts into what he terms a "psycho-logic". The analogy with set theory is that its main concern was to the "reduction of arithmetic to pure logic (set theory)" (Hacker, 1996, p. 403), a task that Smedslund's "psycho-logic" emulates. This is interesting because Hacker describes the importance of Wittgenstein's entirely analogous treatment of problems in psychology as the parallel between the above point about arithmetic and:

> . . . the envisaged eliminability (in principle) of what Köhler called 'qualitative observation' (e.g. of a subject's anger or pleasure, hope or fear) in favour of quantitative physiological

> and neurophysiological description in a future psychological science. (p. 403)

While Hacker's analysis is relevant to issues which will examined in chapters 2 and 3, exegesis is limited here to the issue of discovering a hidden contradiction in such a "system" or "calculus". For it is conceivable that there is a technique that allows one to look for hidden contradictions in the results of his investigations. Thankfully, Smedslund does not seem to be concerned with this potential problem even though it is possible that someone may find it has escaped Smedslund's notice that one proposition contradicts another in his system of rules or axioms (LFM, XXI, pp. 209-10). Would even this sense of a hidden contradiction in a position that is close to the social constructionist interest in describing the results of a linguistic survey undermine anything?

This point is crucial to an understanding of the usefulness of such a system and its applicability in contexts such as the representation of forms of personal reflexivity (see chapter 2, section 2.1.3 and section 2.2.1). Wittgenstein's response to such an inconsistency in the rules is to note that either one of them is not a statement or, if it is a statement, "it is a useless one" (LFM, XXI, p. 209). Again the result is that nothing is undermined by the identification of such a hidden contradiction, even though this seems to be one of the consequences of the activity. Description of the system of rules does not provide a foundation for the actual use of concepts in the normative practice of psychology. In other words, if it is a game (or what could be described as a calculus) that is only used in metapsychological "theory" (i.e., as a description of the game), the following interrogation might well be conducted about the "practical effects" of any identified contradiction:

> I should like to ask something like: "Is it usefulness you are out for in your calculus—In that case you don't get any contradiction. And if you aren't out for usefulness—then it doesn't matter if you do get one." (RFM, II, §80)

In other words, a contradiction does not arise in a useful calculus (or game) simply because those problems will tend to be cleared up when they occur in practice, usually by producing a new rule or making a decision about which rule will be followed. Moreover, contradictions in metapsychological theory or in the theoretical foundations of psychology are not symptoms of a more general problem. Rather, the role of what respectively can be called the "discovery" of an error in a metapsychological system or the invention of a new game or calculus needs to be called into question because, if application is not a goal, a contradiction in it will not matter. If these points are not recognized it is likely that an emphasis on the reflexivity of psychology and especially the need to pursue radical forms of reflexivity, will produce confusions that are analogous to the results of mistaken programmes in the history of metamathematics (i.e., to find contradictions in the rules of a system which is not meant to be applied).

To summarize, the game and rule analogy was extended to the issue of contradictions in psychology where concepts, rules, axioms or propositions contradict others and not reality. Wittgenstein's remarks suggest that it is only possible to philosophize against contradictions in psychology where, for example, it seems that a mistaken ideal or solution can overcome the "ill", pre-paradigmatic state of psychology and its endless oscillations around the confirmation or denial of the similarity between psychologists and the subjects (or objects) they study. While it remains to provide more detail about Wittgenstein's alternatives, a dialectical revolution and production of a "psycho-logic" were both dismissed as solutions.

Moreover, since the latter position is close to social constructionism, it implied an interesting parallel with set theory and suggested the important issue of how useful such a system or calculus could possibly be.

A Wittgensteinian view of theoretical psychology and metatheoretical description

The Wittgensteinian position on psychology adopted in the previous section used the game analogy and an account of rules to distinguish between different philosophical and psychological techniques for removing contradictions. The indication was that a surview of psychological concepts could achieve this outcome, although it is difficult to determine whether this activity would be regarded as describing the rules of psychology or playing the game. The Wittgensteinian treatment of contradictions therefore suggests that theoretical psychology is a complicated combination of both practices that is not entirely at home in either. Because theoretical psychologists draw on the concepts, skills and techniques of both practices they may seem to occupy a level between philosophy and psychology. While we need not endorse such a view, the issue to be addressed in this section is whether Wittgenstein's comparison of psychology with mathematics has further implications for our understanding of contemporary forms of theoretical psychology and metatheoretical description.

Although theoretical psychology provides a perspective on highly theoretical and conceptual debates within psychology, it has fashioned an outsider role to such an extent that some regard it as occupying a hinterland. But if reflexive work is so important to psychology why does it seem to leave its practitioners stranded without a strong basis either in

philosophy or psychology? Some of Wittgenstein's further remarks on mathematics and set theory provide an answer, especially when theoretical psychology is viewed as a form of pure psychology that contrasts with applied psychological work such as counselling and empirical research. A misleading picture that Wittgenstein identifies in the branch of metamathematics known as set theory is equally applicable to forms of theoretical and "pure" psychology: that is, the similarly misleading "charm" of pure mathematics is that it "looks as if it were applied mathematics—applied to itself" (LFM, XV, p. 150). When the analogy is extended to psychology it seems that some psychologists argue for this view in a more literal fashion. For example, Gergen (1985) argues that "the study of social process could become generic for understanding the nature of knowledge itself" (p. 266). But in contrast to Gergen's project, the main point here is that although both pure mathematics and theoretical psychology seem to have an autonomous existence, it is important that the practice is not cut off from any application in the practices of psychology *as well as* the potential clarity of philosophical description.

This comparison may seem to provide a sweeping characterization of theoretical psychology, but the problems of psychology cannot all be solved from within. Moreover, many of the conceptual problems that lead to reflexive work and theoretical psychology would not occur in an entirely practical, applied, technological, or otherwise restricted form of psychology. The individuals of such a discipline would not be concerned with the propositions of any "pure", theoretical psychology simply because their "centre of gravity" could be said to found in doing rather than thinking, hypothesizing or reflecting (RFM, III, §15). Psychologists concerned solely with the aim of practical application would not be free to become entangled

in conceptual problems and, therefore, to disentangle themselves through the kinds of highly conceptual twists and turns identified in the previous section. Wittgenstein's philosophical methods are relevant to psychology because our freedom to produce complicated conceptual vocabularies also contains the greatest likelihood of philosophical error (i.e., the reintroduction of persistent misrepresentations of our psychological concepts in new theory-oriented concepts and practices). Thus although it would probably not occur to individuals with a practical interest to explore conceptual possibilities, this is what reflexive psychology should attempt.

An important task of reflexive psychological work is to determine which concepts, models and ideas work in theory, rather than solely being concerned with what works in practice. This activity does not necessarily begin with a survey of theories and end in metatheoretical description. Instead, an important aim for reflexive work is to examine alternatives to theory construction. For example, Shotter's (1997) case for social constructionism is summarized as an attempt to provide new "vocabularies" that change the subject, "rather than simply proposing another new theory within the methodological framework of contemporary academic psychology" (p. 8). On this view it is important to show that practice can drive theory in a more reflexive and discursive way than theory alone (see chapter 2 for a more detailed treatment of social constructionist alternatives to existing methodologies in psychology). This is simply because, as the explication of the notion of a surview in section 1.3 will demonstrate, "the vast majority of the psychological concepts that are the starting-point for psychological investigation are ordinary, everyday ones" (Hacker, 1996, p. 412).

However, have social constructionists been too hasty in following

Wittgenstein's rejection of theory in favour of the sort of philosophical psychology that Hacker describes (i.e., to generalize Wittgenstein's remarks in philosophy to the social sciences and, in particular, psychology)? It seems reasonable to argue that the pursuit of critical, reflexive work in psychology is not necessarily the construction of new theories. Shotter argues that the relevance of Wittgenstein's remarks — what he describes as inserting a Wittgensteinian practice into psychology — is to show that the resulting discipline:

> . . . must be unamenable to disciplinary confines. It must be continuous with and work from within our ordinary everyday practices, without its being necessary to step outside them. Hence, theoretical explanations are not only unnecessary but inimical to what is required. Their aim is simply to make the subtleties and nuances we sense in dealing with the unique relational moments in which we are involved rationally-visible to us. (p. 6)

In contrast to a survey of relevant theories and studies, a survey of ordinary examples is preferred. Shotter also suggests that a focus on theory construction as the most appropriate means of driving further innovations in psychology has led to forms of knowledge that bear little resemblance to the detail of people's everyday lives.

Shotter (1996) describes the alternative to theory as "a new practice that now directs our attention and guides our conduct in new ways" (p. 10). The difficulty is that while use of methods of "social poetics" seem capable of complementing the attainment of a surview, it should not be seen to replace theoretical and empirical work in psychology completely. Although a surview is not like the collection of linguistic data that should eventually be understood through a theoretical explanation, it is difficult to understand how it provides a resource from which theoretical work may grow. A good

summary of this problem can be found in Shotter's (1996) argument for a supposedly Wittgensteinian alternative:

> . . . what is new in all of this is our coming to a more direct and immediate understanding of how to deal with our practices in practice, using methods that by-pass the whole attempt to first understand them in terms of theories (as at present we feel we must). (p. 11)

Although theory-first views of understanding abound in psychology, the work in Part 2 on personal reflexivity and emotion does not assume that a survey of theories and empirical studies is the most important focus (i.e., even though it may seem as if the notion of a surview is presented as a complicated combination of philosophical psychology and psychological studies). Instead, the surview of pride that informs the general issue of personal and reflexivity is regarded as the basis from which theories may grow using the discursive material that surrounds us (and can even be said to constitute us). As already noted elsewhere, a surview provides a resource that even theory-first supporters may occasionally return to for clarification. Thus, a surview is not just the result of a broad survey of relevant theories and empirical studies.

But since reflexive work usually leads to the consideration of metatheoretical issues, it might be argued that this should be the focus of a critical study. Indeed, the often complicated and technical points that arise from a metatheoretical survey can be seen as an attempt to achieve a surview. For instance, Kemper's (1990) description of work in the sociology of emotions, to offer one example, suggests that a "synoptic view" needs to be attained of particular themes and variations in the literature. These themes are presented to form a table of all the possible choices for the theoretician to explore in detail or, optimistically, attempt to integrate

(possibly with one new theory). Thus Kemper states: "as one opts for one or another side of each of the alternatives [of particular theories of emotion], one achieves a definite position that comprises a metatheory over and above the substantive core of one's work" (p. 5, *brackets added*).

However, any superficial similarities between a surview and metatheoretical surveys such as Kemper's need to be distinguished by examining their fundamentally different roles. A comprehensive survey of psychological concepts can collect together remarks in order to combat particular metatheoretical issues: that is, through its detail a surview may provide clarification of such metatheoretical issues as objectivity, causation, ontology and explanation (see chapters 2, 3 and 4). But the relevance of Wittgenstein's remarks and methods is not merely in their contribution to psychology at this "level". Knowing our way about the discipline is not achieved metatheoretically or, for that matter, by reflexive work that entails a to and fro movement between theory and metatheory. The description of the "substantive core of one's work" by Kemper also implies a combination of theories and studies from a particular area.

On my view the "substantive core of one's work" is instead a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey which precedes theory construction and may, when used to disentangle the problems caused by pictures and philosophical errors in psychological theories, suggest aspects to phenomena that might promote further studies. A surview provides one of the most obvious points at which one can cross from philosophy to work within a kind of conceptually-oriented approach within psychology (such as, in this case, the broad topic of personal reflexivity and emotion). Moreover, its purpose is not to describe the point at which differences between potentially competing approaches arise. The key point to recognize about a

surview is that it is between philosophy and psychology rather than wholly within one practice. It is contributed towards by both practices and either provides the basis from which further work may flow or, at other times, functions as a resource that psychologists may return to for clarification and important reminders of cultural and linguistic detail.

Metatheoretical description of a domain of investigation such as studies of personal reflexivity and emotion does, of course, provide an agenda that any self-respecting theoretician will feel compelled to address. But perhaps the most important point to emerge from this Wittgensteinian clarification of the traditional aim of reflexive studies in psychology is that it not only challenges but reverses an implicit notion of levels. For example, in contrast to accounts of levels within psychology such as that offered by Rosenthal (1976), the interest for Wittgensteinians is not in problems that occur "at the highest level of generality" in which "differences in interpretation are nothing more than differences in theoretical positions" (p. 17). Applying this view to the attempt to provide a critical study of personal reflexivity and emotion, Rosenthal's remarks imply that a surview of pride provides bottom-level data which can be explained by an appropriate theory (or theories). In an extension of a point by Shotter (1992), I argue that talk of levels is a salient example of a debate "within which we have ensnared ourselves in our academic thought about ourselves and our psychology" (p. 66). The Wittgensteinian alternative is that a comprehensive conceptually-sensitive survey of the everyday detail of people's lives should have precedence over the theories drawn from this resource.

In summary, because new forms of critical and theoretical psychology draw on philosophy and the practices of psychology they may appear capable of solving any problems in an autonomous manner (i.e., by the use

of their own or usurped methods and philosophical remarks). However, psychologists whose reflexive work leads to theoretical psychology may find themselves positioned outside psychology by both philosophers and mainstream psychologists. Moreover, it can be argued that theoretical psychology does not connect with potential sources of clarification in philosophy or applications in psychology. But one of the important tasks of theoretical psychology has been to argue for less theory in the discipline, a point which is also reflected in the fact that reflexive work in psychology does not aim only to propose yet another theory. Shotter's remarks on the alternative use of Wittgenstein-inspired methods of "social poetics" were examined in order to highlight some similarities between his anti-theoretical account and the notion of a surview. However, while it was argued that a Wittgensteinian position reverses our understanding of the relations between theory and data, suggesting instead a more reflexive and dialogical approach, the methods of his philosophy should not replace existing theoretical and empirical work. Attention then turned to the notion of metatheoretical description and Kemper's account of a synoptic view of the differences between theories. I argued that although a surview may provide the basis for specific theories, reflexive work should not aim to produce a to and fro movement between metatheory and theory. By replacing levels of theory and data with a surview account, it is possible that a surview of psychological concepts can provide the "substantive core" of a study from which multidisciplinary theories may be derived without being considered as the "lower level" of data to be explained.

1.3 The role and status of a Wittgensteinian surview

A Wittgensteinian treatment of metapsychology and metatheory can be used to identify correctly the way in which Wittgenstein's remarks can contribute to clarification of psychology's problems. In particular, the aim is to examine whether our recognition of reflexive issues in psychology should lead to attempts to achieve a Wittgensteinian descriptive surview: that is, in order to remove problems within psychology that do not arise "out of any lack of empirical knowledge, but out of 'painful contradictions' in our ways of representing such knowledge to ourselves" (Shotter, 1991, p. 196; Baker and Hacker, 1985). This section uses Wittgenstein's notion of a surview to inform our understanding of self-conscious attempts to fashion "new paradigm" work within psychology. In addition, it counters the problems of pursuing "complete" psychological theories with an account of the importance of achieving a pretheoretical surview. Thus while some accounts of psychological reflexivity, its consequences and limits have been clarified from a Wittgensteinian perspective, there is still considerable scope for confusion about the potential contribution of Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology.

Wittgenstein's notion of a surview and "new paradigm" work in psychology

The notion of a synoptic view, übersicht or surview is not only useful in the philosophy of social science (see Baker & Hacker, 1985), but is also a central concept in Wittgenstein's treatment of psychological phenomena. To this point, descriptions of the synoptic nature of Wittgensteinian

philosophical inquiry has already been contrasted with general theorizing and used to show why "outside" philosophical remarks should not be subsumed by self-critical social science. Moreover, Wittgensteinian remarks by Baker and Hacker (1985) again demonstrated the difficulty of deciding where the line should be drawn between philosophical work and potentially integrative, creative work within the social sciences. In this section, the goal of attaining a surview is contrasted with the attempts of social constructionists and evolutionary psychologists to fashion a "new paradigm" of psychological studies (Buss, 1995; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Parker, 1989; Shotter, 1991, 1996).

Kuhn's (1970) notion of a paradigm has considerable appeal to psychologists whose recognition of psychological reflexivity drives the production of new discursive approaches, insights and methods. As Parker (1989) notes:

> . . . critics of traditional laboratory-experimental social psychology a decade and a half ago actually used the terms 'old paradigm', 'new paradigm', and 'paradigm shift' self-consciously as rhetorical constructions. (p. 12)

The term "paradigm" is used not to describe some ideal state for psychology, but is instead used to challenge traditional views of the nature of changes in psychology with the aim of eventually realizing a whole new position (i.e., especially where one's work is described as "new paradigm"). Interestingly, Wittgenstein seemed to consider seriously a paradigm-like account of psychology: either that or his remarks pre-empt a paradigm account of the discipline's failings while they emphasize the failure of positivists and empiricists to solve important problems. For in a quotation that has already mentioned, Wittgenstein remarked that "the confusion and

barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings" (PI, xiv, p. 232). Wittgenstein's account contrasts with contemporary attempts to claim that the problems of psychology are the result of its "pre-paradigmatic" status akin to the beginning of physics (Staats, 1991). It does not imply that multidisciplinary studies of emotion, for example, are just another aspect of "the present period of deconstruction, in which no paradigm is credible as more worthy than another" (Kemper, 1990, p. 22). Rather, Wittgenstein suggests that a different means of attaining conceptual clarity has to be found.

But given the necessity of working within language, should reflexive work attempt to represent clearly our cultural and linguistic practices with a surview? We might also ask whether social constructionists have equivocated the aim of producing non-theoretical, descriptive work and the different goals of contributors to "new paradigm" research? These issues can be clarified by examining contemporary remarks about "new paradigm" studies in psychology and comparisons with work from "other" and "older" paradigms. To delimit this task, remarks that are relevant to studies of personal reflexivity and emotion will be examined in the hope that they are representative and refer to a central debate in psychology. Thus although a more comprehensive account of paradigm differences might have included older biologically-oriented emotion studies and work from cognitive science, the analysis will focus on social constructionism and evolutionary psychology (mainly because the former can be taken to include cognitive psychology in its account of the "second cognitive revolution" (Harré and Gillet, 1994)).

The appeal of the paradigm account is that it suggests a "gestalt", a

whole that can be known in broad aspects that are different theories (i.e., amounting to something like Buss' (1978) contradictory positions on personal reflexivity (see section 1.2)). Parker (1989) suggests that the notion of a gestalt is usually described in terms of the:

> . . . perceptual metaphor of the *gestalt* switch [which is] designed to sell the idea of 'paradigms' in science. You are often, in this literature, invited to collude in a little experiment which will confirm a particular model of science and even flatter you into believing that you too are a (naïve) scientist: you see a duck which changes magically into a rabbit and back again. In reality, of course, this model of change is too free-flowing and it needs to be supplemented with an account of the constraints which hold interpretations of a figure as duck or rabbit in place; the 'disciplinary matrix' of the paradigm, perhaps, that Kuhn (1970) describes. (p. 12, *brackets added*)

Parker correctly recognizes that the problem is not merely one of explaining individual psychologist's experiences of perceptual shifts when changing from one paradigm to another (i.e., because he emphasizes broader constraints). It is perhaps better, then, to extend Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit problem (PI, IIxi, p. 194) to understand how we view the mutually exclusive theories and paradigms which contain such theory-informed, observational "gestalt switches": in other words, to regard paradigms as contrasting, organized impositions on a whole that we cannot get outside of (i.e., it is impossible to see the whole of the evidence "in itself" or to use a clear-cut empirical test to decide between competing paradigms). With regard to the aims of this thesis, accounts of emotion that place contrasting emphases on discourse or cognition can be described as a field within psychology "where two (or more) competing theories will both (or all) remain epistemically viable in the face of the total 'evidence'" (Greenwood, 1991, p. 104). Thus we see the "whole" of people's emotions and their reactions toward them through the concepts of social constructionism or evolutionary psychology

but never as they really are in some mythical, non paradigm-informed reality.

However, there is a clearly a tension between the description of social constructionism as a "new paradigm" and recognition that the "whole" of psychological concepts and their circumstances cannot be known in its entirety by theory. Wittgenstein's notion of a surview has informed some of the seminal work in the "new paradigm" such as Harré's (1986) social constructionist work on emotion, to the extent that he suggests that a survey of cognitive and moral language-games needs to be carried out before biological studies (see the previous section for an alternative interpretation). Evolutionary psychologists, in contrast, would probably argue that the "old paradigm" biological studies that Harré attempted to replace are "new" in a manner that directly competes with social constructionism. It is tempting to view social constructionist and evolutionary accounts of emotion as different paradigms that have led to different treatments of such obviously human, linguistic and cultural phenomena as pride, shame and guilt. Of course, the aim here is not to speculate on how the form of psychology and its theories of emotion would have been quite different if "instead of focusing on such 'bodily' emotions as anger and fear, we focused instead on such intellectual emotions as hope and pride" (Averill, 1992, p. 4)[7]. But it is important to ask whether there is any useful Wittgensteinian approach to this debate.

In reply, it seems reasonable to think that Oatley (1993), in particular, is closer than most social constructionists to realizing that the "gestalt" upon which broad theories are imposed *is* a surview. Nevertheless, he obviously

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[7] Averill's (1992) point here also raises the question of the connection between such an intellectual emotion as hope and the importance placed on personal reflexivity. For the moment, it may be said that although hope is not a "reflexive emotion" it may still be an object of self-control or, in other situations, self-created by earlier choices and commitments (which

finds it difficult to resist adopting a similar picture to the paradigm account of what it is required to attain "the whole" against which competing theories can then be compared:

> One would have to judge from a much wider gestalt of evidence on emotions. This gestalt has not yet been fully defined, nor has it been subjected to detailed scrutiny from different points of view. (p. 342)

The emphasis on points of view is similar to the notion that one may organize particular parts of this gestalt in accordance with particular techniques and possible lines of research. But what social constructionists attempt to achieve should not be called a broad theoretical "aspect" of a whole, since this view implies that there is no point at which both positions have some concepts in common.

From a Wittgensteinian perspective, Oatley provides a worthwhile contribution to this debate with the following observation:

> . . . although arguments from either side of a social-biological divide can readily be found, they are often based either on evidence that is ambiguous, or on different working definitions of emotion (which will then relate to different kinds of evidence). (p. 341)

Oatley's account is relevant to the critical study of personal reflexivity and emotion because he notes how emotions can be treated in different ways by social constructionist and biological-evolutionary accounts of emotion. The problem with the social constructionist account of emotion, in particular, attaining a gestalt is that it is "usually contrasted with biological accounts in which universality is asserted, and continuities of adult emotions with those

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then raises the issue of whether people find it important to predict and control *in advance* emotions that they could have).

of nonhuman animals and with those of childhood are pointed out" (p. 341). Interestingly, these experiences can be described as forms of "seeing as" to social constructionists — akin to the duck-rabbit example — which evolutionary psychologists instead "take as" evidence of our evolutionary past (see chapter 3, section 3.3). Furthermore, Oatley concurs with the extension of the duck-rabbit account to paradigms themselves when he suggests that "one way to see these two approaches is as different theories in competition: either emotions are social constructed or they are biological" (p. 341).

However, since an evolutionary-biological account of personal reflexivity and emotion is clearly unfeasible — at least where it results in what Dennett (1995) terms "greedy reductionism" — it is appropriate to agree with Oatley's metatheoretical scepticism "as to whether this is a viable way of proceeding at our present level of understanding" (p. 341). Oatley's view is also endorsed because his emphasis on personal reflexivity and emotion is not regarded as an aspect of a gestalt. In other words, emotion accounts that emphasize personal reflexivity are not viewed as theories in direct competition with other, perhaps exclusive, evolutionary-biological accounts. Moreover, if the social constructionist account of emotion is methodologically true to Wittgenstein's philosophy, the outcome should not be a theory that competes against its biological counterpart. Perhaps because social constructionism is so often connected with Wittgenstein's form of philosophical description, it is not surprising for Oatley (1993) to admit that "social constructionism is at present an approach to understanding emotions rather than a theory, though the approach does contain some fully developed theories of aspects of emotion" (p. 351; some of these fully developed theories from a Wittgensteinian surview will be

examined in the next section).

Where social constructionism is connected with Wittgenstein's notion of a surview, it should not be regarded as part of a rival paradigm to that of the evolutionary-biological perspective. The aim of Wittgenstein's remarks is to attain a perspicuous representation of the ordinary use and surroundings of person and emotion concepts (not to do the work of psychology). More specifically, the nature and limits of Wittgenstein's contribution need to be clarified simply because Oatley hints at the alternative basis for limited theory construction that Wittgenstein offers. Since it has been admitted that social constructionism is not a theory, then it can reasonably be said to be a perspective on persons and emotion that approximates a surview but does not entirely achieve it. But what prevents social constructionism from achieving a surview? One answer is that social constructionists have been misled by talk of offering a rival paradigm, in part because they share the same desire as evolutionary-biological theorists to offer a complete account (see next section). Oatley's account not only unsettles the paradigm account of competing theories but also highlights the motivation behind Harré's (1986) remark that "pride is another puzzling emotion, at least if one tries to understand it within the old paradigm" (p. 9).

In attempting to achieve a reflexive study of the group of emotions and types of personal activities that pride represents, it is appropriate to deal with this issue by showing on what grounds misleading aspects of the biological theory must be avoided. For example, Harré's (1986) presentation of social constructionism implies that a survey of everyday emotion practices and language must be carried out *before* the work of biological theorists can proceed. But in contrast to Shotter's (1996) more extreme view, it seems clear that the philosophical errors of evolutionary-

biological theorists can be explored from a surview without throwing out all existing biological studies or making a surview of psychological concepts a methodological prerequisite for neurophysiological studies. Otherwise the result would be to commit us to a new insular perspective without giving any priority to the task of reinterpreting existing studies of the same or similar psychological phenomena.

In this section, an attempt was made to provide a Wittgensteinian treatment of the view that there is a domain, a whole of the reality of forms of personal reflexivity and emotion, that is organized into mutually exclusive social constructionist and evolutionary paradigms. An account of social constructionism was presented which suggested that it approximates a Wittgensteinian surview of psychological concepts. While a surview should not be thought to provide a methodological prerequisite for specific empirical work in psychology, it may nevertheless provide a resource that reminds both social constructionist and evolutionary-biological accounts of features of personal reflexivity and emotion that might otherwise be overlooked. This is particularly important when the narrow pursuit of particular research within a theoretical position leads to a loss of judgement about emotions as meaningful phenomena in the lives of different peoples.

The limits of "complete" theories in psychology

Wittgenstein's remarks can be used to philosophize against forms of contradictory organization of knowledge that are the product of inappropriate forms of theoretical completion. More specifically, describing a surview as an integrated theoretical (and possibly interdisciplinary) survey

does not achieve the clarity that Wittgenstein envisaged because of the importance of contributing towards the "new paradigm". The Wittgenstein-inspired approach towards personal reflexivity and emotion through pride provides such a surview in Part 2. However, before detailing what a comprehensive, pretheoretical surview will look like, it is important to examine some of the limits on "complete" theorizing about psychological phenomena. For example, Averill (1992) presents a metatheoretical view that it is important to focus on social, psychological, and biological "levels" of emotion because "any analysis that remains on only one level must . . . be incomplete" (p. 20). However, Averill's account begs the more general question of whether there is a Wittgensteinian perspective that might connect with scepticism within psychology about such a "complete" theory.

It has been argued that the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology is the potential to describe the whole of a surveyed domain of psychological grammar *before* being distracted by the specific views, different techniques, contrasting evidence and meta-theoretical commitments of competing but ultimately "incomplete" psychological theories. While it is important to examine the detailed support and techniques that lead one position to be preferred over another, a metatheoretical solution may only be found — as strange as it sounds — by challenging the need to achieve completeness. Since Wittgenstein's aim is not to contribute towards an established form of theoretical organization, a surview represents language use in practices that constitute our social and personal "worlds". Wittgenstein confirms this in a remark that extends the surview account of the previous section:

> The treatment of all these phenomena of mental life is not of importance to me because I am keen on completeness. Rather

> because each one casts light on the correct treatment of *all.* (Z, §465)

More specifically, the example of emotion is appropriate because of the recognition that it is now an interdisciplinary pursuit and, as a result, it is unlikely that the methods of one particular area will achieve a synoptic view of them all. However, some crucial qualifications need to be made in order to understand the role of a surview and how it contrasts with the results of interdisciplinary, theoretical integration.

But surely there is no relevant Wittgensteinian treatment of personal reflexivity and emotion that attends to this issue of forms of theoretical "completion"? Surprisingly, Wittgenstein does investigate this issue by asking the question of how one may attain "'expert judgement' about the genuineness of expressions of feeling" (PI, p. 227). The example not only implies different cultural forms of personal reflexivity and emotion but also suggests that individuals need to be able to make appropriate judgements about what Rosenberg (1990) terms the "reflexive phenomenon" of acting. The Wittgensteinian point is that in cases such as judging a false or true case of a particular emotion in another culture, "correcter prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of those with a better knowledge of mankind" (PI, p. 227). And it is obvious that such knowledge would not be learned by taking a course or even learning a particular theory. Moreover, it may only be approximated, for example, by reading about the travel experiences of other people or by watching a wide variety of films from countries that we would not otherwise encounter. For that reason, it would be difficult to describe the collection of such experiences as forming a system or as amenable to explanation by one theory.

However, it is not inconsistent for Wittgenstein to note that some

individuals can learn this knowledge and, moreover, that an individual may be someone else's teacher in imparting such knowledge. Wittgenstein's primary aim is to dislodge the notion that there are "techniques" to be learned and a complete system to be discovered (PI, p. 227). In contrast, Averill's (1992) contemporary account of emotion attempts to survey the type of levels that must be included if an account is not to be incomplete. Interestingly, one consequence of this approach is that it will "highlight gaps in our current efforts" and show that "some variables have received relatively little attention compared to others" (p. 1). The difficulty facing psychologists and other social scientists is that these judgements do not form a complete system of rules as in, for example, the practices of mathematics. Wittgenstein therefore concludes that in learning the practice of judging the genuineness of emotions "there are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right" (PI, p. 227). This point not only demonstrates an important disanalogy between mathematics and psychology, but also place a crucial *in principle* limit on any attempts to provide a complete account of personal reflexivity and emotion.

The analogous point here is that a comprehensive account or surview of emotion need not be a complete theory although there are certainly worthwhile attempts to represent the entire domain of emotion studies (e.g., for the purposes of predicting possible novel directions for research; see chapter 2, section 2.2.3). For example, while the complicated phenomena that fall within the purview of Rosenberg's (1990) broad account of reflexivity and emotion cannot be represented as a complete system of rules that can be taught to someone else, the theory seems to offer genuine insights (cf. Kaplan's (1986) social psychology of self-referential behaviour). However,

the distinction between reflexive agency and reflexive cognition does little to provide convincing detail (and also highlight the limits of our forms of personal reflexivity). More importantly, many of the examples in Rosenberg's analysis bear a striking resemblance to the discussion of problems about first-person psychological concepts that constitute Wittgenstein's "Private Language Argument" (Baker & Hacker, 1985). "Private Language Argument" is presented in quotation marks because it can be argued that many of the remarks that constitute it, as well as the preceding sections on rules and rule-following, are the result of a careful and detailed survey that is designed to remove philosophical errors, many of which are reinforced by pictures contained in our linguistic expressions.

Rosenberg's theory is, accordingly, what would be expected from a theory that integrates others and can be contrasted with other approaches such as social constructionism. It does not, however, resemble a surview because it collects together a variety of theories and studies of the fully developed type that Oatley (1993) suggested can be found in social constructionism, some of which may have been inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks on rules and rule-following (e.g., work on displays rules or, in contrast, Schachter and Singer's (1962) account of the interpretation of rules to identify emotions which is a precursor of more complicated cognitive theories). Moreover, it is possible for a complete account of emotion and personal reflexivity also to include fully-developed attribution theories covering pride, shame and guilt (Weiner, 1986) and studies of how individuals actively create or maintain their own self-esteem (e.g., Wells & Marwell (1976)). Examining all of these theories and some of their connections to Wittgenstein's remarks would not, of course, remove the conceptual entanglements they contain. Instead, it is sufficient to note that

while theoretical integration works toward the aim of offering a complete theory, there is no guarantee that it will attain conceptual clarity.

In this regard, a comprehensive surview is better than a general and complete theory of personal reflexivity that operates through broad categories and attempts at generalization. The fact that many of the more specific theories demonstrate some connection with Wittgenstein's remarks on rules, rule-following and the possibility of a private language reinforces the importance of attaining a surview. Moreover, it provides some insights into Wittgenstein's general criticism of inappropriate and "falsifying" accounts of psychological phenomena which can be dismissed by "renouncing all theory" and coming to "regard what appears obviously incomplete, as something complete" (RPP I, §723; PI, p. 227). Wittgenstein implies that a mastery of theory-based rules, concepts and categories cannot substitute for the experience of applying particular concepts and making appropriate judgements in everyday practice. A surview draws out the background of concepts that are used without reflection and heralds this achievement with the acknowledgement that even "the most general remarks yield at best what looks like the fragments of a system" (PI, p. 228). What Wittgenstein's method shows is that theories organize and "complete" remarks that should be left incomplete if the aim is to achieve clarity (see chapter 3 for a criticism of Shotter's interpretation and application of Wittgenstein's supposedly "atheoretical" approach to psychology).

In this section, the limits on complete theories in psychology were examined using an example that resembles the central focus of Rosenberg's (1990) theory of personal reflexivity and emotion. In particular, Wittgenstein's remarks about "'expert judgement' about the genuineness of expressions of feeling" provide a different treatment of cases that Rosenberg

would redescribe as forms of "reflexive agency". Wittgenstein's point that such remarks do not form a system also highlights an important disanalogy between psychology and mathematics. The fact that Rosenberg's account also includes philosophical errors that Wittgenstein addressed in remarks on rules, rule-following and the possibility of a private language, is further support for the importance of achieving a surview. Finally, where theoretical integration seems to provide one means of achieving a complete account, Wittgenstein suggests that it is important to avoid completing by theory what seems "obviously incomplete".

The importance of achieving a comprehensive pretheoretical surview

In an early remark on the need for a surview of psychological concepts, Wittgenstein remarked: "I strive *not* after *exactness,* but after a synoptic view" (Z, §464; although it should be noted that Wittgenstein's initial plan of a genealogical tree for the treatment of psychological concepts (Z, §472) looks distinctly Cartesian before its subsequent abandonment). It is obvious from the treatment of completion and theories in the previous section that there are undoubtedly many other criteria on which Wittgenstein's philosophy and modern psychology part company. Nevertheless, achieving a comprehensive surview is useful for psychology as is evident from attempts to make Wittgenstein's remarks and methods part of a new psychology (Harré, 1989; Shotter, 1991, 1992b, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). In this final section of chapter 1, the reasons why it is important to attain a comprehensive pretheoretical surview are detailed as a prelude to the work on pride in Part 2.

A comprehensive surview is not an integrated theory even though the impetus towards the attainment of such a "synopsis of trivialities" (Shotter & Katz, 1996) often comes from dissatisfaction with the variety of conflicting theories and empirical studies in psychology. Similarly, even though the collection of ordinary examples of the use of psychological concepts may seem to resemble an empirical method, it is not the case that every collected example should be regarded as a fact that needs to be explained. As Baker and Hacker (1985) note:

> . . . the outcome of a surview of a segment of grammar is not a *theory* (a 'theory of truth' or a 'theory of mind' in philosophy is nonsense) nor an *explanation* . (p. 545)

In this case, the survey of pride which is used to counter the conceptual confusions contained in Rosenberg's (1990) and others' theories is not a replacement for those theories. Thus the product of a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey of pride is not a theory of pride and provides detail that cannot be explained by a general theory of emotion.

However, the results of the surview in Part 2 are described as pretheoretical rather than nontheoretical because they represent concepts that must be mastered before any theory can be constructed. Moreover, in contrast to Shotter and Katz's (1996) position, there is considerable potential for a surview to connect with specific instances of theoretical and empirical work in particular disciplines; that is, with the purpose of informing those debates through the detail of psychological discourse and disabusing theoreticians of misleading pictures of phenomena. The argument that Wittgenstein's methods provide an atheoretical alternative to existing and possible theories fails to recognize those situations in which a particular

theory should be retained for pragmatic reasons. The notion of a pretheoretical surview also highlights the fact that the subtleties and intricacies of the examples surveyed are not informed by existing theories in psychology (although, as indicated in chapter 3, people's talk about psychological matters in Western culture is often informed by particular theories and concepts). Instead, it is simply a presentation of the detail of people's everyday lives and the complex activities and practices in which we, sometimes self-consciously, perform with the words, concepts, narratives and vocabularies at our disposal.

The surview of pride is as comprehensive as any other survey of a psychological concept, but not because it is concerned with grammatical and discursive minutiae. Rather, some of the reasons for a wide ranging surview are indicated by the following quotation from Hacker (1996):

> The mastery of our psychological vocabulary involves neither homespun philosophy nor psychological theory. The suppositions underlying this picture involve a profound misconstrual of the role of psychological predicates (vaguely circumscribed as that category is) in human life, of their logical character, and of the grammatical nature of both first-person present-tense uses of these expressions and of third-person uses. (pp. 414-415)

The interconnected cluster of concepts surrounding pride is used to highlight important, unexamined features of our psychological vocabulary. And as Hacker suggests, it is important to examine more than first person and third person singular cases. Accordingly, the use of the words "pride", "proud" and related expressions are examined in all possible pronominal forms in Part 2. In this respect, it resembles Mühlhaüsler and Harré's (1990) interdisciplinary study of persons and pronouns, although it should be noted that the chapters of Part 2 are grouped according to pronominal structure

rather than contemporary disciplinary demarcations (i.e., because a surview is a description of a normative conceptual structure that is antecedent to the concerns of particular disciplines). Although examples such as "they are a proud race" might seem to be superfluous to a psychological investigation, a representation of the everyday use of what shall be called social concepts can provide many insights into the relations between individuals and collectives (see chapter 2, section 2.1 for consideration of related ontological issues and Part 2, chapter 5).

The philosophical task of attaining a surview of a particular fragment of grammar is described by Wittgenstein as the attempt to represent the relations between concepts and overlapping families of cases that often form a "complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail" (PI, §66). Wittgenstein's argument is that it is difficult to represent language as a whole without the further task of examining specific "grammars" or clusters of related expressions. Baker and Hacker (1985) clarify many of the philosophical issues raised by the notion of a surview (e.g., such as similarities and differences with scientific theories). However, arguments for the importance of attaining a surview are more likely to come from psychologists adopting social constructionist and related conceptual-discursive approaches rather than philosophers. For example, Shotter and Katz (1996) argue that it establishes "a knitting together of all the details and subtleties into a great overall network of possible concrete ways of 'going on'" (p. 232). Although the work of Part 2 can only hint at the likelihood of a similar outcome for an investigation of other emotions, some comparisons and connections between pride, shame, love and other emotions are included. Moreover, the fact that examples can be derived from the work of

philosophers, psychologists, other social scientists, artists and ordinary people is less important than their use in clearly representing distinctions, subtleties and background practices which we might otherwise overlook.

In this section, some of the reasons why it is important to achieve a comprehensive surview of psychological concepts were contrasted with the ubiquitous interest in theory construction. The comprehensiveness of the synoptic view of language is different from the results of an interdisciplinary investigation. A surview is also pretheoretical rather than atheoretical because it may inspire or need to engage with multidisciplinary theories of a particular psychological phenomenon. In this respects, Wittgenstein's restricted interest in first person and third person singular uses of psychological concepts was extended to first person and third person plural examples, thus creating an additional interest in the use of "social concepts". The comprehensive survey of pride therefore has a structure that is pronominal rather discipline-based.

Summary

In Chapter 1, an account of the limits and consequences of psychological reflexivity was presented. The first section examined the similarities between psychological reflexivity and aspects of the reflexivity that are the result of the "turn to language" in postmodern philosophy. Wittgenstein's later philosophy was distinguished from more extreme forms of reflexivity that occur in postmodernism and further distinguished from psychological reflexivity. A general consideration of reflexive work in the social sciences suggested that an outside role needs to be retained for philosophy (i.e.,

rather than view Wittgenstein's philosophy as super-scientific theorizing or allow his remarks and methods to be subsumed by self-critical social science). Moreover, although aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy are similar to the results of reflexive work in psychology, it is important to retain an understanding of the differences between philosophy and psychology. Thus subsuming Wittgenstein's later remarks and methods within psychology does not rule out the possibility of future Wittgensteinian critiques and reconsiderations of "new paradigm" studies.

Wittgensteinian points about the relations between philosophy and psychology derived from "entirely analogous" earlier work on mathematics were also extended to address further reflexive issues. Wittgenstein's game analogy and remarks on rules were used to address contemporary issues about the limits of reflexive psychological studies, including possible connections with Wittgenstein's philosophy and any effects on the discipline's practices. The role and status of theoretical psychology and metatheoretical description were also examined with respect to psychological reflexivity. While it was argued that a comprehensive surview can inform metatheoretical issues, it is important that the central role of theory construction in psychology is questioned (otherwise the results of a surview would be seen as bottom-level empirical data to be explained by a theory). Moreover, when reflexive work leads psychologists to try to attain a surview, it is important to resist being positioned by philosophers and mainstream psychologists into a theoretical hinterland (i.e., one removed both from any potential application as well as further philosophical clarification).

It is also important to recognize that philosophers and psychologists are the primary contributors to a comprehensive surview of psychological

concepts and it is not formed for the purposes of producing a complete, integrated and interdisciplinary theory (i.e., even though a surview may inspire different multidisciplinary investigations). While in this case the surview is achieved by examining the detail of pride and is used to counter conceptual confusions in existing theories of emotion and personal reflexivity, it should not be regarded as a form of philosophical psychology. The resulting surview is pretheoretical because it describes psychological concepts that need to be mastered in everyday practices before we can construct theories about specific psychological phenomena. A surview also provides the basis for potential multidisciplinary theoretical and empirical work, as well as a resource to counter the confusions that such investigations will inevitably generate. Thus even though some have used Wittgenstein's remarks and methods for the purposes of doing work within psychology, a surview does not compete directly against or replace the theories and methods of particular disciplines.

CHAPTER 2: A Wittgensteinian account of reflexivity and its treatment by social constructionists

Introduction

Wittgenstein's philosophical method and the attempt to achieve a surview have been distinguished from the results of interdisciplinary theoretical integration and completion. Perhaps because of the similarities between reflexivity in postmodern philosophy and already examined forms of psychological reflexivity, parts of Wittgenstein's work appear to provide a type of reflexive, second-order investigation for psychology. Shotter (1992b), for example, describes the relevance of Wittgenstein's remarks and methods as precipitating a move from metatheoretical to metamethodological concerns. More specifically, Shotter and Katz (1996) argue that types of Wittgensteinian practice can be inserted into psychology in manner that is "beside" — and therefore in competition with — existing methods. While it is sympathetic to Shotter's view, the position developed here uses Wittgenstein's remarks to address further consequences and limits of reflexive work within psychology; in particular, to draw out debates between social constructionists and their realist-cognitive critics for Wittgensteinian consideration.

Wittgensteinian remarks on the social constructionist and realist-cognitive treatment of further reflexive issues in psychology are addressed in the following manner. Section 2.1 examines objections to the use and limits of a Wittgensteinian conceptual-discursive investigation in psychology. This section criticizes the tempting view that Wittgensteinian philosophy offers a kind of second-order methodology for revealing and avoiding

problems in psychology. The advantages and limits of conceptual-discursive studies are also examined in relation to more traditional psychological approaches. Section 2.2 strengthens the presentation of a Wittgensteinian reconsideration of reflexivity by clarifying some of the pictures and problems surrounding the use of psychological methods (e.g., to reveal an objective and independent psychological reality). The main question to be examined is whether psychological phenomena have an independent existence even though they presuppose an interdependent language. This issue is relevant to a critical treatment of the view that many forms of personal, reflexive and emotional activity are dependent on and constructed by language. Section 2.3 examines the social constructionist ontology and specific talk of levels within psychology. In contrast to broad presentations of the realist-social constructionist debate, the status of discoveries of structures and processes that are hidden from our ordinary talk and practices is addressed. The aim is to provide a detailed account of the way in which conceptual-discursive investigation can help to decide whether talk of new objects or levels of phenomena should be challenged.

2.1 Wittgenstein's philosophy and the role of conceptual-discursive investigation in psychology

Wittgenstein's philosophy has been introduced as postmodern and reflexive in the sense that it works within language to highlight important features of our cultural and linguistic practices. Wittgenstein's rejection of his earlier philosophy shows that metalogical perspectives, pictures and ideals require philosophical treatment because they are ungrammatical, nonsensical and

unattainable (i.e., where "metalogical" means a perspective that uses language in its attempt to stand outside language and describe the foundations of grammar or logic). But while it is not necessary to work through all of the related philosophical points inspired, for example, by the related "urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical" (PI, §89), it is important to examine some of the more specific reasons why Wittgenstein argued that is extremely difficult to represent grammar from within. Further implications of Wittgenstein's later philosophy will then be addressed through an examination of conceptual-discursive responses to more specific reflexive issues in psychology.

Wittgenstein's method and the difficulty of representing "grammar"

Wittgenstein's method for representing the grammar of psychological concepts acknowledges that there is no position outside language from which the relations between words and the world can be viewed. Wittgenstein recognized in his later work that we must work within grammar to represent the words and rules governing their use that create what will count as particular phenomena; that is, "grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (PI, §373). However, a detailed account of what a grammatical investigation is, especially in relation to conceptual investigations in philosophical psychology (e.g., Budd (1989)), will not be provided. It is more important to examine how Wittgenstein rejected the notion of an outside view — as a prelude to a treatment of realist misconceptions of a similar social constructionist argument — and then to address the issue of why it is so difficult to represent our psychological

concepts.

Recognition that all investigations work within the bounds of grammar may sound as if Wittgenstein's position has consequences for psychology that many would rather ignore. The confusion surrounding the notion of grammar — which can be defined as the rules that govern the use of concepts and thus can be said to form the possibilities of language — is not cleared by many of Wittgenstein's poorly defined and even contradictory statements. For example, Wittgenstein suggests at one point that grammar is autonomous (Baker & Hacker, 1985) and, at another, that it is arbitrary (PI, §497). However, Baker and Hacker (1983) offer some initial clarification:

> Although it lacks features of both content and form that typify system-building, the *Investigations* is not a random collection of remarks without internal unity. Rather the source of its unit is in its method. The aim is always to generate an Übersicht of parts of the grammar of language that give rise to puzzlement, and the method is to explore and describe the criterion of understanding the relevant expressions (or kinds of expressions). (p. 368)

Baker and Hacker's remarks help to establish connections between an investigation of grammar and notion of a surview in chapter 1, but it still remains to detail why it is so difficult to represent grammar and how Wittgenstein's method (or methods) help.

An understanding of the difficulty of working within grammar to reveal important features of language and concept use can be improved by contrasting the later philosophy with the earlier perspective of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The *Tractatus* is metalogical in the sense that it aims to get outside language to examine the nature of the logical correspondence of words with reality (even though, paradoxically, this task requires language). An crippling problem with Wittgenstein's earlier position was the

difficulty of reconciling the view that "propositions can represent the whole of reality" with the competing proposition that those propositions "cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form" (T, §4.12). This is simply because "in order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world" (T, §4.12).

The move that Wittgenstein initially thought would allow him to *show* rather than *say* the logical form — to use language to describe its extra-linguistic correspondence with reality — was to rely on a form of realism about how the names that constitute propositions attach to the objects that constitute the world. He argued that the logical possibilities of language are restricted by "rules of logical syntax" which:

> . . . specify the logical form of a name and . . . permit only those combinations of names that mirror the combinatorial possibilities of the named objects. (Arrington, 1993, p. 56)

The important point is that it may seem as if it is possible to get outside and describe what is behind language and that this "can be justified . . . by reference to some transcendent logical reality that stands behind the rules that constitute our form of representation" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 315).

In contrast to these objectivist and transcendental leanings, a description of Wittgenstein's later view is that "everything is held together by connections of concepts expressed within grammar . . . by overlapping criteria of understanding" (pp. 316-317). Any person asserting otherwise fails to recognize that the account of language required is one "that is *part of the calculus*" (PG, p. 70, §33) and works within it to highlight relevant

internal connections. Philosophical problems therefore demonstrate that the individual or individuals concerned cannot find their way around these complicated relations. Moreover, when philosophers, psychologists and others attempt to theorize about these relations, they are likely to misrepresent the criteria for the concepts we use. The relevant Wittgensteinian conclusion with regard to reflexive psychological work is that any attempt to use language to get outside to an extra-linguistic reality is a nonsensical activity.

However, realists such as Greenwood (1992) generally misrepresent this point as the social constructionist argument that realism is nonsensical. For example, Greenwood considers "the general philosophical thesis of realism to be relatively uninteresting" and mentions it only because "some constructionists claim it is unintelligible" (p. 184). But in Wittgensteinian terms, the latter remark is most probably based on social constructionists' acceptance that "the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application" (OC, §215). To put this point in another way, whether the proposition that "language must agree with reality" is asserted or denied is irrelevant because the proposition does not play any useful role in a language-game (even though it may seem to "do work" especially in a philosophical language-game). On this view, denying the proposition serves a similar purpose with regard to language as the following "logic" serves with regard to personal embodiment: "since we cannot escape our own bodies we must be trapped in them". The point is to "cure" realists of the view that we potentially have access to something outside, something more than we would have if we represent ourselves as "trapped" in language (i.e., a view that is mistakenly attributed to a relativist, social

constructionism)[8].

A further advantage of Wittgenstein's philosophy is that the method can also be extended towards other propositions in language that do not so easily admit the possibility of an alternative perspective. For example, it is difficult to see how anything meaningful could be achieved by contradicting such propositions as "theories are language-games" (Moore, 1990, p. 211), "every rod has a length" (PG, VI, §83), "my images are private" (PI, §251) and "people are reflexive agents". However, imagining the opposite of a particular proposition is a useful technique to determine whether a statement that is accorded philosophical significance is really an example of idle language; since it not only helps to distinguish grammatical propositions from empirical propositions which, when contradicted are false, but also shows that the supposedly positive statement is similarly idle (PI, §251). Moreover, Wittgenstein also shows that the only reason why we do not reject such positive but idle propositions as "people are reflexive agents" is that they are connected with many other useful propositions. That is, grammatical propositions represent what Wittgensteinians describe as "the internal relations between essentially connected, interdependent concepts" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 265).

The issue of contradictory positions adopted within language also suggests the issue of the autonomy of grammar that Wittgenstein emphasized and which can be extended to indicate the nature of limits on reflexive studies in psychology. Wittgenstein invoked the notion of autonomy of grammar even in quite particular linguistic practices. For example, Baker and Hacker (1985) notes that the autonomy of grammar is "expressed in the

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[8] See chapter 3 for more useful remarks about the relations between "language-games" and a "form of life" which are concepts used by Wittgenstein to emphasize that "our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings" (OC, §229).

negative dicta that there is no metalogic, no metamathematics" (p. 315). This point can be extended to include metapsychological projects such as Smedslund's (1990) "psycho-logic" which similarly would not affect linguistic practices if one of its axioms or rules was contradicted (see chapter 1, section 1.2). Moreover, the notion of the autonomy of grammar also provides a fresh perspective on the traditional contrast between subjectivity and objectivity. For example, an individual who surveys concepts that are independent and thus seem to express metaphysical truths, may also realize that he or she is powerless to alter what are, at the same time, conventions (even where they appear to be metamathematical or metapsychological).

The issues here are complicated but worth spelling out since the fact that grammar can be both conventional and arbitrary in its origins does not undermine the necessity that is found within it (i.e., the already mentioned point that propositions such as "my images are private" cannot be contradicted even though at some point no human used such concepts to describe their experiences in this way). The necessity of these conceptual connections and the "truths" they express seems to contradict the view that grammar is arbitrary. But the limit to this arbitrariness is demonstrated by the fact that individual "subjects" are not totally free to invent new concepts for themselves even when challenging the conventions of grammar. An example of this issue is the possibility of a private language explored by Wittgenstein and the fact that although we may think that we can invent a new emotion term and make it refer to an "inner experience", our language simply will not allow this move (i.e., the "argument" leads the reader through a series of detailed remarks about the attempt to set up such a private language, for example, through what turn out to be useless definitive rituals

(PI, §253); see chapter 7). It is clear that "subjects" or people must instead work within grammatical conventions that at times appear to have the hardness of objective, independent and undeniable truths.

Wittgenstein, of course, remarks on the difficulty of representing grammar and the actual use of language from "within". For example, he notes:

> A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of our use of words. — Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. (PI, §122)

Rather than looking at how language is used, it is tempting to offer explanations. But the grammar of "pride" and the grammar of "shame", for example, cannot be explained as different because the words refer to different objects. In this respect, Wittgenstein can also offer analogies of language that help to turn attention towards the telescope (or microscope), so to speak, of language through which the world is viewed.

A lack of recognition of language in psychology leads to a restricted diet of examples for explanation (which is also reflected in the discipline's individualism). But in such cases, Baker and Hacker (1985) note that a surview of the segment of language that surrounds the confusion will dissolve it. Moreover, a surview:

> . . . removes those *misunderstandings* which stem from false analogies, misdirected questions, and failure to apprehend the status of grammatical sentences. The aim of a surview is to be able to 'take in at a glance' a segment of grammar, so that one will not be misled by surface grammar, false analogies, or pictures embedded in language which, considered independently of their application, mislead us. But our grammar, or those crucial parts of it that give rise to

> philosophical problems, is not readily surveyable. It is embodied in our dynamic linguistic practices, not in a concretized 'frozen' structure" (p. 542)

However, *pace* Parker (1994b), it is not simply the case that the task of representing grammar, "the process of identifying discourses, and the presentation of the material, depend, to a large extent, on the analyst's ability to be 'reflexive'" (p. 531). That is, while there are obviously different forms of skill involved, the reflexivity of identifying and presenting discourses is simply the ability to provide a comprehensive survey of the use of relevant psychological concepts in particular cultural practices. Moreover, the difficulty of representing a part of grammar is that a surview cannot be achieved solely by reflection or description. Instead, a clear and surveyable representation of language involves participating in related practices and undertaking a study that is inclusive of all forms of language-related examples.

To summarize, some of the difficulties of representing grammar from within were examined through an account of the philosophical problems with Wittgenstein's earlier *Tractatus*. What Wittgenstein attempted to show (rather than to say and thus risk self-contradiction) was a connection between language and reality. From the perspective of the later philosophy, reflexive work would not have to achieve such a nonsensical perspective. Instead, grammar is regarded by Wittgenstein as autonomous in a way that is not explained by concepts such as "agreement with reality". Accordingly, where it might seem that the nonsensical contradiction of propositions such as "my images are private" supports their positive role as expressions of metaphysical truth, Wittgenstein regards such propositions as similarly idle pieces of language which only seems to be doing work because of their

interdependent connections with other concepts in our language. This point about grammar was illustrated also by the difficulties of changing language which are suggested, for example, by Wittgenstein's remarks about private experiences that constitute the "Private Language Argument". Thus although it may seem that for psychologists to achieve a surview of a part of grammar depends on their ability to be reflexive, this simply means that they should represent all of the relevant forms of discourse that can be found the linguistic practices in which they participate.

Can reflexive work in psychology prevent problem and method from passing one another by?

Given Wittgenstein's criticisms, an important aim connected with reflexive work in psychology is to prevent the conceptual problems and methods of the discipline from continuing to pass one another by (PI, xiv, p. 232). The highly conceptual problems that allow psychologists to become entangled in their own rules, propositions, models and theories are often compounded by misunderstandings of the nature of Wittgenstein's contribution to the disentangling of any "knots in our thinking" (PR, I, §2). Wittgenstein's form of conceptual investigation seems to offer a way of discovering widely shared conceptual problems that are beyond the limits of contemporary psychological methods. Further Wittgensteinian remarks will therefore be assembled and extended to address these issues.

Although Gergen (1985, 1989) correctly notes that conceptual problems in psychology are due to widely shared misrepresentations of language, it is important to understand the role and limits of any conceptual investigation of psychology's methods. The fact that advances have

occurred in dealing with reactivity concerns without dealing with the broader notion of the reflexivity of psychological studies is a good example of Wittgenstein's claim that method and problem in psychology pass one another by. But one of the problems with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophical psychology is that it seems as if his methods can be part of a reflexive psychology. In other words, one problem with the linguistic solution that Wittgenstein appears to offer psychologists is that attaining a conceptual surview may be viewed as a type of second-order method. In particular, a conceptual investigation can seemingly achieve answers to psychological questions that contemporary empirical methods of observation and experimentation cannot because, as Wittgenstein recognizes, "there is no sharp boundary between methodological propositions and propositions within a method" (OC, §318).

The blurred line between conceptual investigation and the methods of psychology can lead to improvements in the discipline that favour qualitative rather than quantitative approaches. However, equivocation also occurs between Wittgenstein's philosophical labours and the use of qualititative approaches to challenge traditional studies in psychology. Harré (1986), for example, argues that comprehensive linguistic studies based on a Wittgensteinian approach, provide the "methodological enrichment necessary to study scientifically what we can now see as the domain of the emotions" (p. 12). More recently, articles by Shotter (1996) and Shotter and Katz (1996) suggest the importance of using Wittgenstein's methods of "social poetics" in the practices of psychology to counter the importance placed on theory as the basis of practical knowledge. The methods they suggest can be used within psychology include: attempts to arrest or interrupt spontaneous activity, use of selected images, similes, analogies,

metaphors or 'pictures' to suggest new ways of talking, the use of objects of comparison such as the notion of language-games, and, more generally, avoiding the view that any method in psychology will lead to "a final, fixed account of what something 'really' means" (Shotter & Katz, 1996, p. 232).

However, while Shotter and Katz suggest that these methods will create new forms of knowledge within psychology and, moreover, bypass the traditional problems of empirical work, it is debatable whether existing empirical practices should be disregarded. For example, where a practical survey and collection of experiences of being struck by the similarities between pride and guilt or, in Wittgenstein's case, sorrow and care, it is important to ask whether this is a grammatical or empirical fact (RPP I, §69). While a surview does promote a practical understanding and situated knowledge, it may be important to assess such connections (and general statements) in more rigorous terms. To offer a more extreme example, Rosenberg (1990) claims as part of his theory that reflexive processes "pervade virtually every important aspect of human emotions" (p. 1). However, while Rosenberg can therefore see reflexive processes almost everywhere he looks, it is important to ask whether such processes pervade *psychologically* in observable, empirically-ratified differences or *grammatically* in a form of representation that has yet to prove its worth.

These criticisms of both theory and its practical alternative suggest an issue that seems to be missing from Shotter and Katz's (1996) metamethodological account: namely, that it is important to distinguish between grammatical and empirical propositions. In this respect, Smedslund's (1985, 1990) work is useful — and also relevant to the "treatment" of personal reflexivity and emotion — because of the recognition that in many cases, psychological studies conduct tests that are "pseudo-

empirical". In other words, Smedslund points to the fact that many of the propositions supposedly tested by the methods of psychology are not empirical propositions but "tests" of grammatical propositions. There is considerable potential for confusion about the role of conceptual investigations with regard to empirical studies of particular psychological phenomena. For example, in an article about the form that reflexive psychological studies should take from a social constructionist perspective, Gergen and Gergen (1991) argue that:

> The confirmations (or disconfirmations) of hypotheses through research findings are achieved through social consensus, not through observation of the 'facts'. The 'empirical test' is possible because the conventions of linguistic indexing are so fully shared ('so commonsensical') that they appear to 'reflect' reality. (pp. 81-81)

While there is an element of truth to this point, understanding an empirical proposition should not be regarded as prefiguring the result of any test. Indeed, if the emphasis on conventions with regard to empirical propositions does point to something important, it is that it is not always easy to determine what the result of an empirical study means (and the process of deciding its significance is quite different from agreement about the concepts). Moreover, it is simply not possible to know in psychology how fruitful an experiment (or study) will be (RPP, I, §1039).

It therefore seems better to admit that although some generalizations about emotion may seem to be amenable to an empirical test, they may be more closely examined by restating the detail of existing conventions for the detailed everyday use of concepts. For example, Rosenberg's (1990) general distinction between reflexive cognition (i.e., cognitive strategies designed to change a person's emotions) and reflexive agency (i.e., what

individuals do to change an emotion or produce a new one) can be informed by detail about specific emotions. This point is supported by Smedslund's investigation of the "psycho-logic" of surprise which, it should be noted, also criticizes any simplistic attempt to operationalize definition for the purposes of specific empirical observation for everyday conceptual reasons: that is, Smedslund (1990) notes that an operational definition of surprise cannot be given because "one may successfully *simulate* surprise and *hide* surprise" (p. 46; see Part 2, chapter 6 for this issue in relation to pride). Thus it is important for general categories or generalizations about emotion to be examined — rather than tested — by providing everyday conceptual-discursive detail (which is perhaps what Gergen and Gergen (1991) meant)[9].

The use of a surview should reduce the potential for empirical methods to bypass important conceptual issues by incorporating Wittgenstein's criticisms, but not necessarily his specific philosophical methods, in the future conduct of reflexive psychological work. Attaining a comprehensive surview of, for example, our use of the word "pride" with the aim of clarifying a more general position on emotion does not allow us to collapse the distinction between a conceptual investigation of the methods used in psychology, and the use of the methods themselves. This point can be illustrated by extending a remark that Wittgenstein made in the context of commenting on a physical investigation: that is, in an investigation of "determining the length of an object" — which could easily be extended to the example of "measurement of psychological phenomena" — Wittgenstein

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[9] However, *pace* Smedslund (1990) on surprise, Parrott and Harré (1991) on embarrassment and Gergen and Gergen (1991) on jealousy, the aim will not be to extend the view that "an important step into a reflexively oriented inquiry into jealousy [for example] would be to formalize the understandings already contained in the common conventions for talking about jealousy" (Gergen & Gergen, 1991, p. 81, *brackets added*).

argues that:

> . . . the word 'methodology' has a double meaning. Not only a physical investigation, but also a conceptual one can be called 'methodological investigation'. (PI, p. 225)

This is not only the "physical" investigation exemplified by the use of a particular method to make observations and "measurements" of a psychological phenomenon, but also what Wittgenstein describes as a conceptual problem: for example, where adhering to a view such as "the method of measuring a psychological phenomenon determines what it is" in practice would produce obvious conceptual confusions. Hence, a surview will help to counter the problems of a particular method but should not replace the psychological equivalent of the "physical investigation" Wittgenstein describes.

To reiterate, although a surview of a particular psychological concept and its connections may seem to be the collection of factual examples of language use, it should not be regarded as a method that can be easily incorporated within the methods of a new, critical psychology. However, using the example of person and emotion studies, it was argued that it is inappropriate for Wittgenstein's methods of conceptual investigation to be described as a contribution to the methodology of investigations. Since Wittgenstein's remarks do not substitute for or replace more limited empirical research within psychology, they can hardly be said to provide a type of critical, second-order method for psychology. Nevertheless, by being aware of the potential for a conceptual type of methodological investigation, reflexive work in psychology can help to prevent conceptual problems and methods from passing one another by.

The practical limits and advantages of conceptual-discursive investigation

A surview that aims to be comprehensive will draw on conversational and discursive examples in a way that includes "all forms of spoken interaction, formal or informal, and written texts of all kinds" (Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p. 6). But however richly a reflexive, conceptual-discursive investigation is grounded in the texts and conversation of a culture, it will inevitably confront practical limitations when it is based solely on a survey of language. In particular, a surview cannot substitute for judgements that are formed in mastering a linguistic practice: that is, on the basis of individual participation in and mastery of the linguistic practices of culture. It is important to consider some of these problems and potential Wittgensteinian approaches before confronting the linguistic and cultural detail of Part 2.

An *in principle* constraint on the possibility of a comprehensive Wittgenstein-inspired, social constructionist and discourse-based research programme is suggested by extending the Wittgensteinian remark that was introduced at the end of the previous section. In a relevant quotation, Wittgenstein notes that the conceptual investigation of a method does not substitute for a practical mastery of "determining the length of an object":

> What "determining the length" means is not learned by learning what *length* and *determining* are, but the meaning of the word "length" is learnt among other things, by learning what it is to determine length. (PI, p. 225)

Thus, learning what the words or concepts mean is part of a conceptual investigation which cannot substitute for the skill of being able to determine the length of an object in a particular practice. As noted in the previous section, this example can be extended to studies in psychology that attempt

to "measure" various aspects of psychological phenomena.

The implication of the analogy for critical studies of personal reflexivity and emotion is that the detail of appropriate words and expressions is learned as part of training in a practice. For instance, there is the already mentioned example of judging the genuineness of expressions of feeling (PI, p. 227). A reflexive researcher cannot learn about cases of acting, self-control and deception solely on the basis of a conceptual investigation because the use of these concepts presupposes mastery of complicated judgements and, moreover, a broad experience of humanity (PI, p. 224). As a result, the meaning of the words "genuine" and "emotion" is initially learned as part of the practices of everyday life before their significance can become a specific topic for treatment by psychology. A conceptual investigation therefore cannot substitute for ostensibly independent skills created in the practice of making ordinary empirical judgements (apart from the sense in which it is a conceptual error to claim that a particular complicated form of emotion *is* determined by the way it is measured). Thus the "measurement" of genuine and acted cases of pride, for example, cannot be achieved solely by the description or definition of the concepts.

Practical limitations on what a conceptual-discursive survey can achieve and therefore contribute to psychology must therefore be acknowledged. Where particular words provide the basis for a survey, further limitations may depend on the source of the material for analysis. For example, one of the problems of relying on examples from novels, plays, newspapers and other cultural sources is that psychologists seem to be put in a position usually faced by inexperienced directors and actors. That is, when using texts as examples it seems important to imagine how the scenes involved, the pieces of conversation reported, or the specific

reactions of individuals could be realistically portrayed. Many of the examples that form the study of pride in Part 2 may seem less certain than other forms of psychological knowledge because they can be reconstructed in different ways with different emphases. In other words, we would hardly want to conduct a rigorous observational study of pride if our only subjects were bad actors reconstructing segments of dialogue from, for example, Ibsen's *A Doll's House.*

A great deal of emphasis in psychology is also placed on studies that are real, rather than imagined. This criticism can be extended to the use of novels because even if the segments of discourse contained in them are based on careful observation, it may be difficult to know how much is described from the author's potentially distorted perspective. Examples gained from newspapers also have this problem because it is not possible to interrogate the reporter or the individuals reported to find out more detail about a particular incident (i.e., that their ascription of pride, for example, is correct or that the words they report were actually used in that manner and context). Similarly, it may be argued that writing based on an author's or psychologist's own experiences is simply a form of self-report that also might be challenged if we were able to see the actual events.

Interestingly, if an example of a good performance of a relevant piece of discourse is captured on film this may give the example a form of validity that texts are denied. For example, it is possible that a case of suppressing pride from a novel might be realized on film and serve a similar role to an incident in everyday life. The example might prove to be similar to an opportunity for ostensive definition of the notion of controlling an emotion in everyday life (e.g., such as when prompted by a child's question). There are also legitimate concerns that too narrow a focus on language may make it

seem as if we were more concerned with words, rather than with what the words describe or represent. But in reply it may be argued that conceptual-discursive studies do not always privilege what people say to such an extent that what they do is ignored. Moreover, such examples are offered in place of the sort of empirical study that would ignore much of the conversational detail of everyday events. Nevertheless, doubts about the authenticity and hyperreality of examples that are derived from fiction, drama, film and newspapers might continue to be used to undermine the results of a comprehensive survey of linguistic practices (see chapter 4 for a consideration of the cultural aspects of a broad survey).

While many of these issues suggest serious limitations to a survey based on particular words, in reply it is worth noting that conceptual-discursive studies can be rigorous and, moreover, conform to many of the existing criteria for good social scientific work. Also it is quite possible to make legitimate discoveries about the detail of people's conversations and the functions that particular uses of words perform. The use of the word "pride" in a particular circumstance, for example, might not necessarily be an expression of the emotion "pride", but may nevertheless be chosen to have a particular effect on another person. Moreover, the use of imagination in connection with a surview can help to chart the logical features of the appropriate use of a word — or cluster of related concepts — in a way that a discursive analysis of factual examples cannot. For example, in an examination of the variety of circumstances in which the word "fear" is used, Wittgenstein notes that "it would be possible to imagine people who as it were thought much more definitely than we, and used different words where we use only one" (PI, p. 188). Thus some of the limitations of having to focus on actual examples of discourse gathered in a methodologically-

ratified manner can be overcome.

The result of a comprehensive survey may therefore provide examples that would not be imagined, let alone included in a more specific study. They can include, for example, not only translated accounts of individuals from other cultures but also the experiences of individuals who become members of what can broadly be described as our culture. The attempt to attain a surview in this manner may resemble the "achievements" of armchair psychology, sociology or anthropology. However, it could contrast the results of a linguistic surview with specific examples of relevant theories and studies, thus examining the detail of language as well as overcoming the fact that "time and training assure that an investigator will be able to conduct research only on a narrow range of topics, for example, neurological mechanisms, facial expressions, or social rules" (Averill, 1992, p. 1). A conceptual-discursive surview can present a much broader "diet" of examples (PI, §593) for potential research that an individual might otherwise ignore. The result should be examples that would not normally be included because of the more restricted engagement of individuals with relevant discourses and cultural practices dependent also upon how much the "subjects" of research choose to reveal. Finally, a survey does not aim to achieve specific practical knowledge, it is also worth noting that acquiring an ear for linguistic differences is an ability that can lead to further "testing" in everyday talk (e.g, in interview situations).

In this section, the practical limits and advantages of conceptual-discursive investigations were discussed. The extension of Wittgenstein's analogy of the practice of determining the length of an object clearly demonstrates the limits of any attempt in psychology to make a conceptual survey achieve practical ends. One problem with the outcome of a

conceptual-discursive survey is that examples from texts may need to be reconstructed (and, moreover, could be acted out in different ways). Also it is often not possible to engage in dialogue with the writer or reporter of events as well as with the individuals reported or described. One advantage is that we can attend to many features of language that we usually "look through" and use to co-ordinate activities in everyday life, but do not examine in psychology. Also the more comprehensive a survey is in collecting examples from different media, the more likely it is that the limitations of time, perspective and traditional methods in psychology can be overcome (see chapter 4 also for the lack of attention paid to culture). Moreover, aspects of the type of conventional distinctions revealed by a survey can be informally "tested" and refined in practical conversations with others and thus assessed for their representativeness.

2.2 A Wittgensteinian treatment of psychological reflexivity and the denial of objectivity

The rigours of scientific methodology have traditionally been invoked to guarantee an objective account of the world that is independent of individuals as observers (Gergen & Gergen, 1991, p. 76). In this context, recognizing the importance of psychological reflexivity is thought to undermine objectivity because the ostensibly independent relation between "knower and known" presupposes some participation by both in shared cultural and linguistic practices. However, the aim is not to focus on objectivity in the general sense of certainties that seem to hold fast despite cultural and theoretical differences (see chapter 3, section 3.1) since this is

the more general question of whether realists should be "forced to abandon epistemic objectivity because [of] arguments developed by relativist philosophers of science that have been generalized by social constructionists to the social psychological domain" (Greenwood, 1991, p. 103, *brackets added*). Rather, a Wittgensteinian account will be presented of how best to represent the linguistic interdependence of so-called "objective phenomena" — especially about such language-dependent psychological phenomena as emotion and personal reflexivity — when recognition and acceptance of psychological reflexivity seem to entail that knowledge is a social and linguistic construct.

Problems in the social constructionist-realist debate about linguistic reflexivity and objectivity

A considerable challenge for the present task is whether it is possible to make a Wittgensteinian contribution to debates about objectivity in psychology. More specifically it is interesting to examine how realists and social constructionists picture the debate, in part because they reject the positivist view that psychology should be like physics in its objectivity (cf. PI, §571). For example, social constructionists such as Shotter (1992) argue that we cannot talk of individuals in an objective and external world without presupposing a shared language. In contrast, realists who are exemplified by Greenwood assert the possibility of epistemological objectivity — there is not *always* "a multiplicity of competing theories that are epistemologically viable with respect to any empirical domain" (1992, p. 188) — and therefore conclude that many theories in psychology are linguistically objective (i.e., where this later notion suggests that theoretical descriptions can refer to

postulated entities regardless of whether these are the very terms and "descriptions that participants offer of their own social psychological lives" (p. 185)). Given these conceptualizations, the interest in psychological reflexivity and the potential application to emotion and personal reflexivity, it may be asked whether a telling Wittgensteinian perspective can be adopted towards this debate.

An initial Wittgensteinian point relevant to the contrast between positions that emphasize psychological reflexivity *or* objectivity comes from an extension of the game analogy and a further remark on mathematics:

> . . . what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical *treatment.* (PI, §254)

An appropriate extension of Wittgenstein's analogy to psychology is that it is clearly mistaken for psychologists to state that their "game" is about the study of "objective psychological phenomena". In part, a philosophical treatment of objectivity in psychology can begin with a restatement of the aims of the practice. We could also engage with the sort of pictures and arguments that tempts us all to adopt a general approach that resembles Greenwood's (1991, 1992) emphasis on "epistemic objectivity". However, there seems to be less disagreement between realists and social constructionists in recent work about the material constraints and persistent regularities in the world that form the background and basis of our judgements about "objective certainties" (see chapters 3 and 4 for an alternative treatment of general accounts of the relations between our concepts and certainties in everyday life which could be described as very general facts of nature).

Instead, the relevant issue for psychology is that there are a number of cases where recognition of psychological reflexivity is thought to undermine what we are usually tempted to say about the objectivity and reality of psychological facts. That is, where linguistic interdependence seems to undermine the claim that the reality of psychological phenomena, like mathematical truth, is "independent of whether human beings know it or not!" (PI, p. 226). The point is directly analogous to contemporary problems in psychology except that in order to inform the debate between realists and social constructionists, the problem is changed to whether psychological truth is "independent of whether human beings talk about it or not". For example, Greenwood (1991) wants to maintain that theoretical descriptions of psychological reality are "linguistically objective". In contrast, social constructionists such as Potter (1992) deny linguistic objectivity and argue that "the central trope of realism . . . is the constructed distinction between 'the phenomenon' and 'the description'" (p. 132). Realists therefore want to claim that there are independent properties which exist without (or despite) our descriptions of them, whereas social constructionists argue that this distinction is simply another linguistic construction, regardless of how we picture it as independent of language (and, more specifically, the language used to describe it).

Does Wittgenstein's analogy resolve this problem? In a dense series of remarks concerned with this issue, Wittgenstein redescribes the debate about the proposition that "mathematical truth is independent of whether human beings know it or not", moving it away from a useless picture of an extra-linguistic objective reality to the more reasonable (and accurate) description of the sort of statements that would actually be made. For example, it is more helpful to imagine metamathematicians arguing about

the propositions "human beings believe that twice two is four" and "twice two is four" in terms of the circumstances in which they are used. This approach dismisses the unanswerable issue of whether mathematicians have managed to discover pre-existing truths and replaces it with more appropriate examples of what mathematicians discuss. Clearly, in this context the word "believe" might be replaced in the proposition mentioned above with a more obviously discursive word. The result would then be an examination of the proposition "human beings say with conviction that twice two is four". Also we could make a number of points, as Wittgenstein does, about the "kind of certainty" involved in the "kind of language-game" in which an individual may ask: "Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four?" (PI, p. 224). But the more general focus remains, for the moment, the most relevant to the explication of psychological reflexivity as a "problem" (i.e., so it does not matter whether we use "believe" or "say with conviction").

Given a general focus, we may ask what is an analogous example for psychology that may inform the debate about reflexivity and language as it is construed by realists and social constructionists? The argument adopted here is that realism can provide support for psychologists who believe that the "game" is about studying objective psychological phenomena in contrast to social constructionists' overemphasis on the constructive role of language. In this respect, the distinction between the two propositions identified by Wittgenstein and the suggestion of different contexts in which they are used is consistent with the analogous account of the different roles of philosophers and psychologists in chapter 1, section 1.2. The implication of Wittgenstein's analysis for psychology is that if independence is a part of a useful description, it should point to the fact that the two propositions

clearly have different uses. The result is to replace the broad picture of the relations between mathematical propositions and an independent reality with the view that these two more reasonable propositions have different uses.

Since these different uses are appropriate to their respective contexts, the first proposition that "human beings believe that twice two is four" is part of a metamathematical investigation and is therefore a potential subject for philosophical treatment. In contrast, the statement "twice two is four" is used within the practice of mathematics itself and is comparable, in some respects, with psychological language-games in which we ascribe pain to others. Attention will initially be focused on the first proposition because it is similar to metapsychological points made — and supposedly generalized by — social constructionists: namely, equivalent arguments about the psychological truth, reality or objectivity that is supposedly independent regardless of whether human beings talk about it or not (e.g., the certainty that "this man is in pain"). The relevance of the analogy to psychology is difficult to demonstrate because no one participating in the realist-social constructionist debate exemplifies the move from "knowledge of an independent reality" to "human belief in a particular proposition" (see Parker, 1998). However, it is reasonable to suppose that this shift could appear in the metapsychological literature since, for example, the position that human beings have constructed the truth is an argument Greenwood (1992) attributes to all social constructionists.

Interestingly, Wittgenstein's treatment of any temptation towards metapsychological theorizing of a social constructionist form is stopped by further clarification that his remark about what humans believe only means something like "human beings have *arrived* at the mathematical proposition"

(p. 24). Remarkably, if this extension of Wittgenstein's remarks to psychology is defensible then it would seem to make sense to say that human beings have similarly "*arrived* at" particular forms of psychological description. The implication is that social constructionism and its emphasis on the constitutive role of language is subject to Wittgensteinian criticism. In contrast to remarks made by Potter (1992) about the constructed nature of the distinction between "the phenomenon" and "the description", the Wittgensteinian position is that "we" have "arrived at" equivalent propositions to "twice two equals four" in psychology. This is presumably why Wittgenstein is careful not to use such expressions as "constructs" or "invents", in contrast to phrases that social constructionists commonly employ in remarks about psychology (and the potential for changes in language to supposedly change the background of psychology as will be examined in chapter 4).

Greenwood's (1991) realist criticism of Potter's form of social constructionism might therefore seem to be consistent with Wittgenstein's philosophical position, but is it? In terms of the framework already described, it is reasonable for Greenwood to conclude that "the metatheoretical or philosophical claim that many forms of human action and social practice (such as psychology) are constituted by our social discourse about them has nothing to recommend it" (p. 24, *brackets added*). This point is examined more fully in the next section because it is very close to a point about the dependence of emotions and forms of personal reflexivity on language (e.g., the application to emotion of Howard's (1985) recognition that "humans are language users, and the most striking feature of a language user is the ability to monitor the control of his or her own actions" (p. 260)). However, while Greenwood's brand of realism seems to have

Wittgensteinian support, the issue that Wittgenstein raises is what would happen for psychology if there were a shared change in beliefs or, in this case, its related language. That is, the analogous case to "human beings believe that twice two is five" invites us to speculate what would happen if particular forms of psychological description (and linguistic distinction) were made quite differently.

Although Wittgenstein supplies the example of pain, it is more relevant to examine a case where the "language system" (Gergen, 1991, p. 80) that supports psychological concepts such as jealousy changes so that a particular objective description of personal reflexivity and emotion no longer seems to exist (i.e., due to a linguistic change)[10]. For it is possible that similar changes might lead us to realize that some objective fact about a psychological phenomenon is not as independent of language — and therefore immune from revision — as it might seem. For example, while it might be said that "human beings believe that a positive emotional response and personal success constitutes pride", the same proposition would be treated quite differently within, for example, the "language system" of a religious framework (see chapter 4, section 2.4.2 for a cultural example of a debate in which the question "is there no objectivity?" can be given a Wittgensteinian answer). It is relatively easy to imagine us "arriving at" the proposition mentioned above only to have it change to "a positive emotional response and personal success constitutes arrogance". But is this possibility a legitimate analogy to a change in circumstances that results in everyone believing, for example, that "twice two is five"?

Baker and Hacker (1985) suggest that if the proposition "twice two is

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[10] Although jealousy is not a reflexive emotion it is connected with personal reflexivity due to the fact that it is often regarded as an emotion to be controlled and, moreover, it also is not

five" were "part of a system of internally related propositions, it would be a nonsense to insist that it would nevertheless still be four, since we would be talking about a different calculus or technique" (p. 293). That is, while from the point of view of the old game or calculus one might want to claim that "twice two really still is four", it would be correct to describe "twice two is five" as odd, for example, but not "less objective" (PI, p. 227). The relevant point to psychology is that social, moral and historical changes might render some propositions about psychological phenomena in psychology less useful rather than "less objective". To use the example of a "language system" that has changed, it would similarly be wrong to claim from the perspective of the old game that "a positive emotional reaction and personal success really still constitutes pride" and the statement "a positive emotional reaction and personal success constitutes arrogance" is "less objective".

To reiterate, dismissal of the view that psychology is a game "about" the study of objective psychological phenomena led to a consideration of an analogous treatment of the notion that mathematical truth is "independent of whether we human beings know it or not". Wittgenstein's response is to reject immediately the misleading general picture and focus on more specific and reasonable examples of what metamathematicians and mathematicians, respectively, would be likely to say "human beings believe that twice two is four" and "twice two is four". The former example is changed by Wittgenstein to the view that we have "arrived at" such a proposition and an analogous psychological case of "a positive emotional response and personal success constitutes pride" was explored. The issue of principal interest was that a change in circumstances might mean that the proposition

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consciously cultivated (which is indicated by the fact that very few individuals set out to make themselves painfully jealous).

also changes, so that we might be tempted to say that "a positive emotional reaction and personal success really still constitutes pride" even though what we used to call pride is now described as arrogance. In this case, it would be mistaken to say that arrogance was "less objective" and the implication for the social-constructionist-realist debate is provisional acceptance of Greenwood's approach, that is, pending a more detailed treatment of Greenwood's view of "linguistic objectivity" as approaching a psychological phenomenon from a legitimately fashioned "distance".

Wittgensteinian remarks on objectivity as independence and distance

Since on the Wittgensteinian view it makes no sense to claim that there is an outside, independent reality to be discovered — even about our own psychological phenomena — nothing is given up by denying this claim. However, there is still potential confusion about alternative accounts because it may seem as if social constructionists wish to do away with any picture of objectivity as independence. The debate between social constructionists and realists will be examined by focusing briefly on some Wittgensteinian remarks on measurement. This account should help to assess Greenwood's (1991, 1992) realist account of "linguistic objectivity" and his view that use of a common language by psychologists and their subjects does not undermine an epistemologically significant "distance" between psychological theories and the phenomena they describe. The section will also examine the contrasting social constructionist position on psychological reflexivity in which it is thought that the terms of psychological theories must eventually be evaluated and "made intelligible in ordinary

language in the same way that they (ordinary people) do" (Shotter, 1992, p. 179).

While it was suggested that emotions such as pride and jealousy are described in a language system that might change, the example of pride changing to arrogance was used to undermine the view that something objective has become "less objective". It is interesting to consider the picture of objectivity that appeals to many philosophers and psychologists because it resembles a similar image evoked by Wittgenstein in relation to the practice of measurement. In particular, Wittgenstein highlights a widely shared temptation to compare "'ever more accurate measurement of length' with the nearer and nearer approach to an object" (PI, IIxi, p. 225). His example can be extended to studies of psychological phenomena because it can be argued that refinements in description and measurement similarly (or inevitably) move closer to what is "really there". Moreover, a radical extension of this view occurs when philosophers and psychologists stress the eventual elimination of our ordinary language psychological concepts by theoretical descriptions of underlying cognitive and neurophysiological processes (Hacker, 1996). Although the realist account of psychology has undergone much development (see Collier 1998; Willig, 1998), it nevertheless seems that the picture of theoretical descriptions referring to objective phenomena has a strong hold in many areas of psychology.

What is the realist position and is there any social constructionist alternative? In a statement that bears a striking resemblance to Wittgenstein's remarks about mathematicians, Greenwood (1991) argues theoretical descriptions in psychology are linguistically objective because they can be true or false "independent of whether anyone employs these descriptions, or represents reality in terms of them" (p. 9). While we might try

to convert this statement to a form analogous to "human beings believe that twice two is four", a recurring difficulty is the lack of a convincing advocate of this position within psychology. Nevertheless, the account presented in the previous section is relevant because of a further remark by Greenwood (1992):

> In order to understand how theoretical descriptions can correspond to or fail to correspond to reality, one need only grasp the meaning of theoretical descriptions: what it means to ascribe helical structure to DNA, or shame to a person. (p. 187)

To make a small argumentative leap, if we can accept that pride and arrogance are similar to shame then, on Greenwood's view, we would demonstrate understanding of these theoretical descriptions when we find "that reality has or has not the properties ascribed to it by such descriptions" (p. 187).

Furthermore, this position allows Greenwood to claim a:

> . . . clear division between the constitution of the meaning of actions by participants and analysts: how participants constitute the sense of an action is quite independent of how analysts constitute that meaning. (p. 144)

In other words, linguistic objectivity (or independence) for Greenwood is secured where the same word or theoretical description is not necessarily used by subjects in a psychological study. But in the case of pride or shame some initial problems present themselves before further issues bearing on psychological reflexivity can be addressed. First, it seems unreasonable for Greenwood to imply that ascriptions of pride and shame to a person are instances of theoretical description (i.e., of the same form as helical structure

to DNA). If we allow Greenwood the picture of entities that are separate from us — perhaps referring to an individual who is physically isolated — then we might accept, for example, a person hiding in a corner with her head bowed could confirm our tentative ascription of shame (i.e., because if she were smiling and strolling around the description would obviously "fail to correspond to reality" (p. 187)). In this respect, we might at least want to say that we have good grounds for ascribing the complicated concept of shame to a person although we could also be wrong (hence the theoretical aspect of the ascription).

However, Wittgensteinians such as Hacker (1996) contest the theoretical nature of third person ascriptions, even when the concepts involved are highly conceptual and, therefore, potentially subject to error. There are also disanalogies between third person ascription and theoretical description, such as the fact that we do not normally make ascriptions on the basis of inferences from other people's behaviour. For example, it is sometimes the case that we react almost instantaneously to a person's remarks or actions, as Wittgenstein noted, with a complementary or contrasting reaction (i.e., in a manner that seems to accord with the social constructionist emphasis on relational-responsive aspects of people's actions (Shotter, 1996)). Moreover, Greenwood's presentation of linguistic objectivity undermines social constructionists' emphasis on psychological reflexivity and its attendant imperative to "formulate accounts of the *real* politico-moral transactions people conduct between themselves" (Shotter, 1992, p. 179). Greenwood's (1992) reply is that there is no reason to deny that the theoretical descriptions offered by a psychologist "might not be the very descriptions participants offer of their own social psychological lives" (p. 185). But again Greenwood is only concerned with what people have to say

when they potentially provide the "best theoretical account" (p. 185). In contrast, Shotter (1992) implores Greenwood and other realists to go further: "And (to be really radical) why not seek a meaning for such accounts back in the activities from which they were drawn" (p. 179).

In the case of the individual pictured by the account of physical isolation, however, it may be that the only way of confirming our theoretical description (i.e., the properties ascribed to her by the statement "she's obviously ashamed") may only be confirmed by the person. Sometimes the only way we can know that someone is feeling a particular emotion (or the beginning of one that is suppressed) is to ask the person. In the case of the individual in the room, her confirmation is probably crucial: an obvious point to which has nevertheless been a persistent problem in psychology of determining and articulating how people's private, subjective or internal states are expressed in and created through conversation. A Wittgenstein-inspired position will not always give precedence to people's accounts over theoretical redescriptions offered in psychology or, for that matter, the elaborate and sometimes contrary interpretations of literary and cultural theorists. However, it is important to represent clearly the detail of people's lives and the way in which psychologists negotiate a to and fro movement between theoretical descriptions and everyday use of psychological concepts. In this regard, a criticism of the "distance by theoretical discourse" account is its devaluation of an enduring need to attain a clear view of current use of concepts and to address related conceptual problems in psychology through the detail of conversation.

Does Greenwood maintain the notion of linguistic objectivity of theoretical description in psychology by, for example, relying on a metaphor of the "nearer and nearer approach to an object"? In this respect,

Greenwood's account of theoretical description creates a sense of distance which not only deprivileges people's accounts, clarifications and explanations but also provides for better approximations of particular phenomena. Because analysts are not compelled to use the same discourse as research participants the need for participants to understand the theoretical account of their actions is diminished. On Greenwood's view, distance is therefore created and theoretical descriptions are able to approach the psychological phenomenon of interest more closely (i.e., descriptions which also have the potential to identify the overarching or underlying causes of people's meaningful interactions; see next section).

At this point it is useful to draw upon Bowers' (1991) relevant and critical account of this distancing process as revealed by cognitive psychologists' rhetorical devices for responding to and avoiding the problem of reflexivity. As identified by Bowers, realist-cognitive scientists often provide a superficial defence against conceptual criticisms offered by philosophers and others by claiming that these "outsider critiques" are irrelevant to cognitive science as a knowledge-producing practice. However, a Wittgensteinian approach may nevertheless describe ways in which cognitive scientists attempt to avoid engaging with the topic of reflexivity by a number of more or less complicated devices. An instance of the latter is described by Bowers as cognitive scientists' "manipulation of time" response to reflexivity as a "methodological horror" (i.e., a problem which if "true" would otherwise undermine the possibility of objective knowledge about forms of individualistic and internal processes). Not surprisingly, Bowers realizes that the distancing between subject and object emphasized in the activity of creating theoretical descriptions is often regarded as a mark of good science. But his particular concern is how

objectivity as "distance" is created by employing a discourse of temporality (e.g., discursive moves which are easy to imagine when we consider studies of psychological phenomena in other historical periods rather than cognitive processes in the laboratory).

According to Bowers, psychology can learn from practices such as anthropology in which strategies of investigation often involve a sense in which "the subject/object of research is projected into a different time and a different space from the researcher" (p. 557). Bowers highlights the tendency in psychology to create a sense of objectivity by making the past seem distant. In this manner psychology can claim to examine events that have already happened without any sense of a continuing interaction with (or participation in) those events. More specifically, manipulation of time in presentations of specific psychological studies such as cognitive experiments maintains the sense of distance because it suggests "there can be no back-and forth process, none of the disruptive to-ing and fro-ing which reflexivity implies" (p. 557; e.g., in taking the provisional, emerging knowledge back to the participants). Additionally, we can also examine the way in which the realist-cognitive account invokes a sophisticated "nearer and nearer approach of an object" picture in psychology (especially in relation to emotion and personal reflexivity research). Reflexivity is therefore deferred when researchers participate in events by examining psychological phenomena which occupy a different "space". The combination of rhetorical techniques seems to add legitimacy to a realist-cognitive view in which many important psychological phenomena are inaccessible to research participants (hence essential aspects of phenomena can be described in terms which are not used or necessarily understood by the subjects of psychological research). Through such complicated pictures and their

application in the practices of psychology, hidden levels of psychological phenomena can be regarded as real properties that correspond with theoretical descriptions and which also have an existence independent of any clarification an individual could offer about the significance or meaning of their experiences.

This section examined different responses to reflexivity and their implications for social constructionist and realist-cognitive positions on objectivity. Wittgenstein's account of objectivity as the "nearer and nearer approach of an object" was introduced before identifying similar pictures in Greenwood's (1991, 1992) realist-cognitive account. Greenwood dismisses the importance of psychological reflexivity because it seems possible to achieve "linguistic objectivity" for theoretical descriptions which ascribe properties to independent objects. Greenwood also devalues participants' accounts of their activities and suggests they are only important where explanations in ordinary language have the potential to agree with or improve psychologist's theoretical descriptions. It was then argued that linguistic objectivity occurs by two contestable forms of distancing which supposedly allow theories to become better approximations of particular psychological phenomenona. On this view, psychologists can use terms that isolated research subjects do not necessarily agree with, use or even understand (despite the obvious importance of a participant's clarification or admission to the confirmation of the existence of many psychological phenomena). The second form of distancing found in the realist-cognitive avoidance of psychological reflexivity is expressed as the view that theoretical descriptions refer to objects that occupy a different time or space to the researcher (see section 3.3 for a further discussion of a different space in relation to talk of hidden levels of phenomena in the study of cognitive

abilities). The major point to emerge from this Wittgensteinian reconsideration of a persistent debate is that linguistic objectivity does not provide an adequate case for denying a reflexive to and fro dialogue between researchers and participants.

The criterion of intelligibility and the objectivity of reflexive abilities

The previous section demonstrated the importance of a reflexive to and fro movement between the descriptions, whether theoretical or otherwise, of participants and the accounts of those participants in psychology. In many cases it is what individuals say that will help to solve the problem of an ascription that might otherwise seem to be hypothetical or theoretical. However, the issue to be addressed here is not whether social constructionists have made a mistake by dismissing as unintelligible the notion that "theoretical propositions can provide accurate descriptions of an independent reality" (Shotter, 1992, p. 178). Instead, a Wittgensteinian account will be offered of a further issue that separates social constructionist and realist-cognitive accounts of such psychological phenomena as emotion and instances of personal reflexivity: whether the temptation to view many individual psychological attributes of people as objective, autonomous and independent is undermined by the view that to "exist" as conversational realities they must be intelligible within a wider linguistic community.

Wittgenstein's contribution to this debate is to clarify issues arising in the social constructionist and realist-cognitive debate. The aim is to achieve conceptual clarity rather than address more specific agendas within psychology such as those identified by Bowers (1991) around cognitive

psychology:

> . . . each side is trying to *institute* its version of the social, the cognitive, the phenomenological, etc., against other disputants, *not* report on the nature of an independently existing phenomenon plain for all to see. (p. 548)

A Wittgensteinian focus on intelligibility can avoid *both* the problem of assessing competing theories with evidence in psychology *and* making realist assumptions, a point that is especially important with regard to the work on emotion and personal reflexivity carried out in Part 2 as well as the temptation to think that Wittgenstein's work might help to produce a predominantly social account of pride which is consistent with social constructionism (i.e., in contrast to an individual account of pride that is consistent with a realist-cognitive position). Focusing on the issue of intelligibility, however, does not necessarily avoid Wittgensteinian exegetical disagreements. Indeed, a debate similar to the social-individual contrast in psychology has occurred also in the exegesis of Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following. For example, Bloor (1997) provides an account of the debate between collectivist and individualist accounts of rules and, in particular, the support for the latter position:

> The individualist analysis of rule following is sustained by the intuition that a person who is physically isolated can still follow a rule. This alone seems to prove that there must be something wrong with any collectivist account. (p. 91)

Although this issue is topical in contemporary philosophy and may seem to connect with theoretical perspectives in psychology, it should not distract us to the point that a broad account of collectivism and the criterion of intelligibility is essential.

Instead, the importance of intelligibility to determining the meaning

and existence of many psychological phenomena can be addressed through the detail of Wittgenstein's remarks and relevant examples of psychological concepts (i.e., rather than assessing contrasting arguments). It is clear that without use of a shared or potentially sharable language, it would be difficult to determine whether the criteria for a particular psychological phenomenon such as pride had been exhibited by "me" or another individual. It is often only when individuals use particular words that the content of their private experiences and evaluations can be judged, a point which indicates that privacy and individuality occur against a background of common understanding. As Wittgenstein notes, a person simply cannot create a language that supposedly refers to private states without presupposing a public language that is already set up. Accordingly, there is no sense in which an individual could construct a private language in the sense that it is a discourse only that person could understand. Instead, if a first person expression were uttered in circumstances quite different from the usual ones it would not be clear that this individual was even talking the same language (i.e., despite the fact that similar words were used).

These Wittgenstein-inspired remarks are relevant to the treatment of emotion and personal reflexivity because as already suggested they are ascribed only to beings that use language. More specifically, the issue is whether many of these forms of personal reflexivity such as emotional identification must accord with the criteria of a particular linguistic community. For example, it might seem as if phenomena such as reflexive speech-acts of praising or blaming oneself, reflexive emotions such as pride, or other reflexive skills such as commenting self-consciously on particular private "states" do not have an objective existence because they

are *constituted* by a shared language. Wittgenstein's explicit considerations of the potential of some "reflexive phenomena" to develop within a community is therefore relevant to the social constructionist view, in particular, that all psychological phenomena are discursive products:

> A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves.—An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.) (PI, §243)

The crucial point, as Hacker (1990) notes, is that Wittgenstein does not claim that "reflexive speech-acts are essentially parasitic on non-reflexive communicative ones" (p. 38). And as Bloor (1997) more specifically suggests, it is important to note that many activities can occur "by oneself" but not "with oneself" (i.e., as Wittgenstein illustrates with the example of an individual who is not engaging in commerce when he hands himself a note (PI, §268)).

Hacker's analysis is useful because it implies that Wittgensteinians should not be concerned with the attempt to prove that reflexive speech-acts like language in general should be regarded as "essentially, logically, social — like trade and barter" (p. 38). Wittgenstein avoids the notion that all forms of language-use and rule-following are dependent on a community (and thus should lead to the conclusion that language-based emotions such as pride are "essentially social"). Wittgenstein continues this line of thought:

> But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner

> experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?—Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. (PI, §243)

Wittgenstein's philosophical target is "the idea of an unsharable language, one which cannot, in principle, be made intelligible to anyone other than its speaker" (Hacker, 1990, p. 38). Theoretical debates about the dependence of particular forms of emotion and personal reflexivity on a linguistic community should not therefore be conflated with the results of Wittgenstein's philosophical clarification.

Recognition of the linguistic nature of psychological reflexivity — that a shared language is assumed — also needs to be contrasted with a further claim. It is undeniable that many forms of personal reflexivity and emotion are dependent on both language and culture, as social constructionists and critical psychologists recognize. But does recognition of the dependence of psychological reflexivity on language entail the further view, which Harré (1992) claims is common to all the various positions that constitute social constructionism, that "all the psychological phenomena *and the beings in which they are realized* are produced discursively" (p. 154)? In this respect an important point of clarification can be taken from Bloor's (1997) treatment of collectivist and individualist accounts of rules:

> . . . physical isolation is a different phenomenon from social isolation. Total physical isolation, from birth to death, would entail social isolation, but physical isolation, as such does not entail social isolation. (p. 92)

In the latter case, it is likely that possibilities would exist for physically isolated individuals to demonstrate their ability to accord with community-

based rules for the use of psychological concepts (e.g., such as correctly distinguishing happiness from sadness). A more important point is that there are obviously degrees of difference with regard to particular phenomena and that each case has to be carefully examined (i.e., in order to avoid reproducing the social-individual division that is prominent in psychology (Parker, 1989)). Thus while it is logically possible that an individual might develop a form of rule-governed, language-like expression in social and physical isolation that is translatable as "pride" in our linguistic community, the matter of determining which forms of our pride will occur at particular points of individual development is a matter for research within psychology (see Part 2, chapter 8).

The relevant Wittgensteinian point is that the concepts used by psychologists to produce objective observations and descriptions would not be intelligible without a common or shared language. In other words, the possibility of objectivity in psychology presupposes shared concepts, conventions, and actions (and intelligibility is the potential for these concepts to be shared). Nevertheless, realists such as Greenwood (1991) pursue a further criticism of social constructionists in which their denials of linguistic objectivity are based on the claim "our psychological discourse — our discourse putatively about psychological states — is simply not descriptive" (p. 44). Greenwood's rejection of this point implies social constructionist acceptance of the view that description of another person somehow creates the phenomenon involved. It seems more reasonable to allow that the individual speech-acts, reflexive speech-acts and other activities of individuals who are not trained in any culture may inadvertently accord with the words and phrases of our linguistic community or achieve aims that are similar through their discursive acts (i.e., both achievements do not

necessarily imply that we always give their words and actions meaning). To use the example of pride, an empirical issue is the extent to which some forms of pride would not occur in an individual who developed in social and physical isolation from birth, in contrast to the fact that someone from our culture would probably retain the ability to distinguish correctly and express their own feelings of pride and happiness even when physically isolated from other people for an extended period of time.

However, this last example does get to the heart of the debate between social constructionists and realist-cognitivists about the objectivity of persistent, meaningful individual abilities that presumably developed in our linguistic community. Greenwood's (1991) move from individual abilities that develop and are judged on the shared criteria of a collective to a focus on individual "properties" can also be found elsewhere. Gadenne (1989) provides a similar view of cognitive abilities in which "the ability to perform them . . . is a property of an individual person" so that we are supposed to conclude: "the last survivor on earth can have a property of this kind" (p. 459). With regard to a critical treatment of forms of language-related personal reflexivity and emotion, this "picture" can be seen to support the view that many forms of persistent individual psychological phenomena are best accounted for as objective cognitive properties. Admittedly, social constructionist accounts of phenomena described as "cognitive" have been refined since Harré's (1989) illustration of the thoroughly linguistic nature of calculation in his debate with Gadenne (i.e., see Harré & Gillett, 1994). Moreover, while many social constructionists do not accept that all psychological phenomena are produced and maintained by linguistic participation, they are able to demonstrate particular conceptual problems. For example, emotions such as pride, shame and guilt need not be

described as the product of internal comparisons between an individual's actions and his or her internalized representation of a standard, rule or goal (Lewis, 1993; see Part 2, chapter 7).

Social constructionists instead seek to determine how many forms of personal reflexivity and emotion involve conversation: to highlight, for example, the way in which people's complicated thoughtful reactions and attempts to change their own psychological states are closely related to language-use, linguistic skills and conversation-based activities. On this view not all cognitive activity should be regarded as public conversation by an individual rendered private (and perhaps also automated) through practice or silent self-control. But social constructionists emphasize the personal transformations and possibilities that occur through individual mastery of particular forms of rule-governed discourse. Is there, after all, a connection with the sense in which Gadenne argues that to know a rule in the sense that it has been internalized, privatized or mastered is for that rule to play a causal role in that individual's activities? At this juncture the debate surrounding intelligibility diverges into issues of causation and ontology. The relevant Wittgensteinian approach is to emphasise that the debate between social constructionists and realists is not more clearly understood by asking, for example, whether self-evaluation is the cognitive property essential to the emotion of pride because it must continue to exist in a physically isolated individual? Instead we need to show why a focus on inferred, hidden but nevertheless real cognitive structures is not necessarily wrong but, instead, is often irrelevant to a clear view of an individual's participation in social practices.

In summary, a Wittgensteinian examination of the "objectivity of psychological phenomena" between social constructionists and realists was

provided through the issue of the intelligibility of individual language-use and activities. The realist-cognitive position represents individual cognitive abilities as embodied, objective properties which persist even during periods of physical isolation from a linguistic community. In contrast, social constructionists emphasize the linguistic and conversational nature of emotion and forms of personal reflexivity to the point that they seem to claim that all psychological phenomena *must* be the products of discursive and conversational activities (e.g., the privatization, internalization or mastery of rules). This position was rejected in a manner that separates an investigation of the logical possibilities of psychological concepts and their potential intelligibility from empirical studies of the complicated degrees of dependence or independence of particular psychological phenomena from prior participation in the conversational practices of a linguistic community. The realist-cognitive position was also avoided in favour of a detailed examination of the importance of language to particular forms of personal reflexivity such as emotional identification. Wittgenstein's remarks suggest the importance of actual or potential intelligibility of putatively objective and individualistic uses of a language and linguistically-related abilities. More specifically, autonomous forms of human action in social and physical isolation do not require us to adopt a realist-cognitive ontology or translate ordinary linguistic practices into a discourse of objective psychological properties. The criterion of actual or potential intelligibility therefore indicates why studies of individual embodied cognitive properties and, in the next section, "hidden" levels of psychological phenomena are not necessarily wrong but irrelevant when attempting to understand the meaning and significance of particular linguistic acts and the consequences of other forms of discursive participation.

2.3 Social constructionist ontology and its problems: a Wittgensteinian account

The Wittgensteinian treatment of divisive social constructionist and realist-cognitive positions has, to this point, been given in predominantly meta-methodological and epistemological terms. However, social constructionists provide a new twist to the debate and its relevance to emotion and personal reflexivity by arguing that conversation is "the primary human reality" (Shotter, 1992, p. 176). As Shotter indicates, the centrality of language, in general, and conversation, more specifically, presents psychologists with an ontological issue:

> While realists may not want to bother with their own ontology, the better to pay attention to the ontology of their surroundings, social constructionists loop the circle of reflexivity around onto themselves. From our point of view, it thus becomes a problem as to why, at this moment in history, we account for ourselves in the way we do—as if we all existed from birth as separate, isolated individuals, containing wholly within ourselves 'minds' or mentalities, set over against a material world itself devoid of any mental processes. (p. 177)

Given this view and its possible consequences, an important question is whether there is a Wittgensteinian treatment of new discoveries in psychology that supports or is critical of the social constructionist ontology. For example, is it possible to describe potential studies of levels of reality other than the discursive or conversational while, at the same time, avoiding the problems that plague talk of cognitive models and discoveries? And can talk of hidden and new levels of psychological reality be assessed by re-presenting our conversational use of social and psychological concepts?

Conversational reality and the status of hidden phenomena in psychology

On the realist view, for psychology to be a science it must go beyond our everyday concepts to reveal the structures and patterns of different levels of reality: what may be described as phenomena of importance to psychology that are hidden from the "level" of everyday conversational reality. Reinforcing this view are a variety of ostensibly legitimate technological means of getting beyond shared "form of life" limitations provided by cultural-linguistic practices and individual perceptual abilities. Of course, there are many challenging discoveries in psychology that do have the distinct feel of stripping away levels of preconception and revealing fundamental processes. Emotions, for example, can be described in neurophysiological and social-functional terms and forms of personal reflexivity can be seen to serve the needs of supra-conversational and agentive social forces and institutions[11]. However, given our recognition of the inescapability of language as well as the more specific social constructionist emphasis on conversation as the "primary human reality", a Wittgensteinian account is required of how hidden phenomena can be revealed (e.g., on the basis of sense-extension from the conceptual-discursive practices of reflexive psychologists).

A point of fundamental importance to a Wittgensteinian perspective is that "there is no semantic exit from this language, either upwards into a hierarchy of meta-languages, or downwards to reality" (Glock, 1996, p. 246). By working within the complicated linguistic practices of psychology as they

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[11] Willig's (1998) critical realist position is relevant in this regard because she is:

> . . . concerned with finding a method of analysis which is historically and linguistically reflexive, and which is also capable of guiding active intervention in ideological and material struggles. (p. 92)

have been, presently are and could be, we fashion concepts and practices that highlight important features of psychological phenomena. Wittgenstein's philosophy provides an outsider's perspective on psychology without producing a metalanguage (e.g., for describing the structures that underlie historical and cultural change). And, as already mentioned, the notion of a surview provides a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey without being regarded as the "level" of "real data" that we must descend to from theory or, for that matter, use as the basis for theory building. We are, therefore, surrounded and constituted by conceptual-discursive activities: the phenomena of psychology cannot exist independently of our language and concepts except in what largely seem to be less complicated but not necessarily primitive forms of life (see chapter 3).

The sense in which the conversational reality and practices of psychology exist in relation to psychology has already been described in terms of the game analogy (i.e., different roles and skills for philosophers and psychologists rather than different levels of knowledge). There is an additional sense of levels that it is tempting to adopt and which is demonstrated by Averill's (1992) presentation of social, psychological and biological perspectives on emotion (see chapter 1, section 1.3). However, Averill argues that the investigation of levels of possible emotion studies "does not imply a hierarchy, for example, with the biological more fundamental than the psychological, and the psychological more fundamental than the social" (p. 4). Rather, Averill's metatheoretical point is to describe the different possible theory-based approaches to emotion (an issue which will be examined in the next section). However, his own approach to the "structural bases" of emotion obscures Glock's point as well as the lesson from the surview account that the "linguistic data" of everyday

life surround and constitute us: we manifest emotion and person discourses repeatedly in our commitments, we contribute to supporting practices and institutions by participating in conversational activities and we also misrepresent linguistic practices through our theories.

However, it is only through a number of misconceptions that an anti-realist psychological science can be formed on the basis of Wittgenstein's argument that important features of our lives are hidden through the misrepresentation of language. For example, a conceptual-discursive surview from the position of conversational reality seems to accord with Wittgenstein's view:

> Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (PI, §126)

Although the aim here is not to use Wittgenstein's remarks to mediate between social constructionist and realist positions, there is confusion about Wittgenstein's target. It is important to remind ourselves that Wittgenstein is writing primarily about philosophy and, moreover, follows the above remark with the further point: "one might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions" (PI, §126). The interpretation of these remarks is significant because social constructionists such as Shotter (1992, 1996) have used them to argue against explanatory theories in psychology and, potentially, to social science (see chapter 3). However, there are good reasons for thinking that Wittgenstein's remarks were aimed more towards the problems of his earlier view of philosophy in the *Tractatus* rather than what are now described as different varieties of realism. Accordingly, Wittgenstein does not deny that theoretical

understanding of possibilities drive the development of further models, methods, techniques and findings in science (Hooker, 1987), but instead wants to identify specific instances where this attitude leads to conceptual entanglement (especially within psychology).

If we accepted Shotter's interpretation we would be forced back towards the broad habit, developed in the context of realism and relativism debates, of asking such questions as "is there a 'real' beyond the text, or is language and discourse all there can be?" (Burr, 1998, pp. 14-15). The latter position is deeply problematic and yet it seems to be all that is available to social constructionists if Wittgenstein is rightly taken to rule out all theoretical speculation about objects or processes beyond conversational appearances (because everything important in psychology is already open to view or at least potentially open to view by rearrangement). However, it is clear from an examination of Wittgenstein's work that philosophy can describe those areas of psychology in which scientific discoveries open up new realms of phenomena such as class conflicts and neural pathways. More specifically, reflexive work from within our "conversational reality" requires us to say something about significant aspects of our life that are, to put it crudely, not immediately obvious because they are bigger and smaller than ourselves. For this reason, the following remark by Wittgenstein resembles a different kind of reflexive approach in psychology that can survey language while still producing a challenging perspective:

> The aspects of things that are most important to us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck him.—And this means:

> we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and powerful. (PI, §129)

Without implying that Wittgenstein's philosophical method can be used to achieve the same results as a reflexive psychological inquiry, this position can be extended to a treatment of what were called social concepts in chapter 1: namely, the predicates connected with first person, second person and third person plural uses of language that suggest broader issues about the relations of individuals to collectives (and perhaps even the effects and consequences of different forms of personal reflexivity in collective terms).

A conceptual-discursive account is therefore possible of the conversational means by which judgements about broad collective phenomena are examined, understood, articulated, and expressed in everyday life (i.e., without arguing that the cultural practices and social arrangements we have "arrived at" are social constructions). An example is the notion of individual descriptions and judgements of collective phenomenon such as the "emotional climate" of a group or nation (de Rivera, 1992). While it may be relatively easy, for example, on a particular occasion to summarize a shared feeling (e.g, a specific instance of family pride), on other occasions remarks about what "we" share appear to be generalizations that are difficult to substantiate: they are broad and sweeping statements that test the limits of normal conversational practices and abilities. For example, is a protesting crowd motivated by a deep sense of national pride or is it a dangerous mob that is threatening disorder? In such cases, the judgements involved are complicated and many psychologists would cede at this point of potential explanation to the disciplines of history, sociology and anthropology. Thus one means by

which we are able to articulate and judge these broader concerns is theoretical and may involve points about the broad organization of our social lives only when particular, cultural events occur. For example, the grief surrounding Princess Diana's funeral provided a unique and revealing opportunity for many social scientists to "test" and revise generalizations about people's underlying emotions, the effects of shared feelings and ways in which collective manifestations of grief can have unpredictable features.

One of the reasons for problems with social concepts is that the individual seems to be unimportant and the effects of important events are usually intangible (i.e., an increase in group pride may have occurred for some reason without necessarily being immediate obvious to other individuals). It is important to examine the way in which this information is constructed, common means of summarizing it, how particular judgements are formed and the various positions of individuals who represent or express a common feeling (or simply are supposed to speak on behalf of the groups that they belong to). These are all conversational practices that create, articulate and extend a sense of the wider feeling of a community and the institutions that shape society. The argument here is not to project the notion of theoretical description of properties onto these broader institutions and issues, beyond a normal sense of our connection to these issues (or, for example, the function of related emotions). But this is why Oatley (1993) presumably describes a contrasting sense of social constructionism to Shotter's in which people are offered "views below the surface of our emotional interactions" and which also suggest "purposes for emotions that other approaches would find hard to accommodate" (p. 351)[12].

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[12] The aim of some of the relevant sections of Part 2 is not to talk of social structures and focus on their hidden features, but rather to represent clearly the foundations of our inquiries that

A further sense of hidden phenomena (or aspects of phenomena) from the perspective of "conversational reality" is the entirely ordinary sense of privacy in conversation. The relevant issue here is the potential of the emphasis upon hidden psychological states and mental processes to imply a realist-cognitive ontology: that is, to treat private experiences and unobservable (by normal perceptual means) changes as if they are objects with some of the properties ascribed to them by theoretical descriptions. Wittgenstein provides an ordinary sense of hidden that is applicable to another direction in which we may move from conversation and possibly, seek to represent the privacy and embodiment of our individual judgements, reactions and experiences. Although Wittgenstein offers many examples the following is relevant to the realist-cognitive emphasis on hidden processes (i.e., given the treatment of reflexive speech-acts):

> "What anyone says to himself within himself is hidden from me" might of course also mean that I can for the most part not *guess* it, nor can I read it off from, for example, the movement of his throat (which would be a possibility). (PI, IIxi, p. 221)

While Wittgenstein seems to allow the possibility of empirical studies of psychological phenomena that employ some of the "sense extending instruments" Greenwood (1991) and others argue are necessary for a science of psychology, it is also clear that he is more interested in an everyday sense in which phenomena of interest to psychologists can be hidden. What Wittgenstein therefore hints at are problems surrounding privacy and individuality that require a normative understanding through conversational engagement rather than a scientific sense of revealing

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come from participating in and potentially contributing towards pre-existing cultural and social arrangements.

hidden processes or structures (e.g., where we seek to understand the cultural and personal significance of linguistic practices such as a confession rather than the discovery of concomitant neurophysiological processes).

Wittgenstein also implies that when information about psychological phenomena becomes more distant from and less useful in our conversational reality, issues relating to the significance and meaning of those actions and reactions are more likely to be bypassed. Accordingly, social constructionism needs to provide a convincing account of how descriptions of hidden phenomena and the technology responsible for them find their way back into cultural practices and ordinary language. Although it is more interesting to explore the use of such phrases as "I just felt a surge of adrenalin" than obscure references to unperceived physiological components such as "there's probably a great deal of activity in my hypothalamus", both examples demonstrate the limits of "searching for traces of the real in the manifestations which compose the actual world as we conceive it" (Brown, Pujol & Curt, 1998, p. 79). Instead of using Wittgenstein's remarks and authority to end debate about the proper "objects" (or subjects) of psychology, reminders can be assembled about the use of technology to investigate and, in some cases, localize hidden processes. For example, when concomitant physiological measures are used to infer the "real processes" responsible for psychological phenomena, their use also confirms what Wittgenstein describes as "the fluctuation of scientific definitions: what to-day counts as an observed concomitant of a phenomenon will to-morrow be used to define it" (PI, §79).

An empirical correlation from an underlying or accompanying level to an observable action may therefore be used tentatively at first, and then, so

to speak, definitively. But in the process it is important to resist identity claims which are often the product of familiarity with a new theoretical concept and its specific criteria. For example, while technological sense-extension has added the concept of adrenalin to the everyday vocabulary for expressing emotions, it can hardly be said that the expression "I feel a burst of adrenalin" indicates that an individual's introspective abilities have been "extended" to include previously inaccessible physiological changes. This is not to deny that investigations of hidden phenomena often provide us with information that contributes towards specific practices and improved self-knowledge (e.g., knowledge that panic attacks are fuelled by overbreathing can be comforting to a client and may also provide the basis for specific psychological intervention). However, the point here has been to avoid essentialism with regard to individual psychological phenomena and to resist the argument that any useful reference to hidden processes necessarily involves a realm of real processes that underlie the "surface" of our social relations and personal activities.

To reiterate, on the Wittgensteinian view there is not semantic escape from language to a metalanguage or "down" to a reality that is not fundamentally conversational. However, the realist-cognitive view that the phenomena of real interest to psychologists are hidden is not as inimical to Wittgenstein's philosophy as social constructionists suggest. For example, Wittgenstein suggests that important aspects of phenomena are hidden from "conversational reality" because of simplicity and familiarity. Wittgenstein's grammatical approach was extended to show that the conceptual-discursive detail of many social concepts can highlight important features of the foundations of our inquiry (i.e., what might otherwise be presented as hidden social structures that are best examined through theoretical

descriptions derived from other disciplines). An ordinary sense of "hidden" thoughts and feelings, for example, also needs to be retained in the other direction away from "conversational reality" (i.e., towards hidden neurophysiological and physiological processes). In this latter case, it is also clear that a general ontology of real processes that are of more interest than social relations and personal activities can be rejected along with broad social constructionist dismissals of specific hidden aspects of phenomena.

The potential to describe possible studies and levels of psychological phenomena

Earlier remarks were made about general theories and the gestalt or whole of which particular types of theories from different disciplines seem to highlight only aspects. From the perspective of psychology, it is tempting to describe potential investigations of psychological phenomena in terms of different levels (i.e., the potential social and historical studies of emotion and personal reflexivity, psychological studies, and cognitive-biological studies). Consistent with the "gestalt" view explored in chapter 1, it may seem as if the resulting collection of theories of a particular phenomenon will provide a "'seamless' picture of reality" and its "levels" of explanation in a mutually consistent set of theories (Munro, 1992, p. 109). Although recognition of important *in principle* limits to complete theorizing in psychology have already been emphasized, it is important to see what advantages and disadvantages arise from the possibility of describing the levels of possible studies in psychology (especially when a Wittgensteinian framework is used).

A metatheoretical summary of levels of possible investigations of a psychological phenomenon is often regarded as a useful means of describing potential areas of investigation, driving possible theoretical advances and indicating likely empirical discoveries with regard to a particular psychological phenomenon. A relevant example of such a perspective is provided by Averill's (1992) account of the entire domain of possible studies of emotion and, in particular, the argument that we must examine social, psychological and biological "levels" of emotion because "any analysis that remains on only one level must . . . be incomplete" (Averill, 1992, p. 20). A Wittgensteinian position can be adopted on Averill's account which also has the benefit of extending remarks made in the previous section about hidden phenomena (i.e., the role of theories and technology in "making real" otherwise intangible or underlying properties of social and personal phenomena). In this context, a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey can be taken to represent the pretheoretical whole that emotion and personal reflexivity studies attempt to explain (or highlight "gaps" in our knowledge which seem to require the collection of more empirical information). Moreover, to continue the argument that Wittgenstein inverts the usual sense of theory and data in psychology, the levels described by Averill can be regarded as an attempt to summarize "the '*possibilities*' of phenomena" in the same sense in which we can use Wittgenstein's philosophy to "remind ourselves . . . of the *kind of statement* that we make about phenomena" (PI, §90).

The position that Averill advocates can therefore be described as similar to a surview except that the account moves in the other direction: namely, "down" to empirically-oriented attempts to represent psychological phenomena rather than "up" towards theory and metatheory (or a

philosophy in which such moves are questionable). However, Averill does imply that for a study of a particular phenomenon such as pride, it is not sufficient to examine only the social, psychological and biological levels. And in a move which is similar to the outcome of a comprehensive investigation of a psychological concept used in all pronoun forms, Averill argues that we should examine both collective and individual sense of social, psychological and biological levels. In this manner, it may seem as if Averill has described possible studies Wittgenstein may not have considered relevant to psychology. In this respect, a description of possible studies is important because it can be used to indicate novel directions for further research (thus indicating a further connection between creativity, psychological reflexivity and Wittgenstein's descriptive approach). For example, this view not only indicates how some of the more radical features of social constructionist accounts of emotions must have been "discovered" by earlier theorists, it also suggests possible combinations of levels of interest in both general and particular phenomena. An obvious example is where both collective structural variables of society (or culture) and biology (species differences) are combined to form a comprehensive account of our history, prehistory and natural history (i.e., in a manner that may be especially relevant to the development of more "intellectual" and human emotions such as hope and pride; see Part 2, chapter 5).

In addition, when talk of structures interacting at such broad collective levels is examined over time, it is difficult to disentangle important features of the potential investigation of the genesis of particular psychological phenomena. For example, the relations between cultural and biological levels may involve self-feedback or circular loops with which emerging forms of culture created further selection pressures for particular skills and

abilities in early humans (Wills, 1993; cf. Dennett, 1995 in Part 2, chapter 5). In a point which will be explained in the next chapter, studies of evolutionary processes and other broader patterns of human existence may also confront "form of life" limitations (although speculation here is close to doing work within the discipline, a point that philosophers such as Dennett (1995) are well aware of). Creative directions for research which would require evidence to be assembled about particular forms of development might include those features of individual autonomy important to the emergence of emotion and forms of personal reflexivity (i.e., where the differences between humans and other close genetic relatives are placed within a cultural-evolutionary framework along with the potential for individuals in our species' natural history to provide a point of innovation for their collective).

Interestingly, the relevance of Wittgensteinian approach even with regard to speculative theoretical work is to demonstrate the importance of clarity about any potential imposition or projection upon prehistorical investigations and inferences (i.e., what is mistakenly regarded as natural from the perspective of our current cultural practices). For Wittgenstein examined many issues related to the use of psychological concepts such as thought and emotion in their surrounding cultural practices. For example, Wittgenstein identifies a picture that seems to inform our understanding of the emergence of personal emotions in our evolutionary past. And although his remarks refer to the "evolution of the higher animals and of man, and the awakening of consciousness at a particular level" (PI, vii, p. 184), the relevant point is still the influence of the picture that "one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light" (PI, vii, p. 184).

We can extend this example to relevant instances of personal reflexivity and emotion such as self-consciousness about an emotion and

the possible significance of this for our species: "one day an individual turns his thoughts inwards and begins to try to change his or her most private feelings". Acknowledging that our language about the origin of definitively human phenomena contains this picture, Wittgensteinians turn their attention towards its use or misuse. As Wittgenstein notes:

> What is to be done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure. Quite clearly, however, it must be explored if we want to understand the sense of what we are saying. But the picture seems to spare us this work: it already points to a particular use. This is how it takes us in. (PI, vii, p. 184)

Whether one agrees with this criticism or not, it is possible to see how broad talk of the evolution of the human potential for forms of personal reflexivity and emotion could easily provide the basis for seriously misleading investigations of the collective and natural historical "level" of a psychological phenomenon.

Description of possible studies is also important because it highlights limits to the "big" theories and smaller studies that attempt to open up new research areas and potential realms of "objects". In this respect, Wittgenstein's remarks about the "foundations" of our inquiry (PI, §129) and recognition that we may confront "form of life" limitations are both relevant because creative combinations of particular levels may also seem to produce nonsense. A creative example that has already been mentioned is de Rivera's (1992) notion of "emotional climates" which could be regarded as supra-conversational "objects" with "properties" that are more easily sensed than they are accurately described. In another case, a combination of social and biological levels in relation to the study of individuals implies a field of social neurophysiology (i.e., without the sort of extra or intervening

"level" that characterizes cognitive psychology; see next section). And, *pace* Bowers' (1991) account of how cognitive science avoids reflexivity by discursive and practical manipulation of time and space, the unfolding of an emotion syndrome can be slowed down by technology and, thus re-present to us the course of emotion expressions in minute detail. The last example, however, illustrates that an extension to the "form of life" foundation of an inquiry (i.e., our normal perceptual abilities) can have both revealing and nonsensical results. The point is that when we examine the unfolding changes that contribute towards a spontaneous expression of emotion through a slowed down recording, the results reveal underlying processes while at the same time they render the emotion unrecognizable[13].

To summarize, the view that all the levels of possible emotion studies can be described approximates the notion of a surview. On the Wittgensteinian view adopted here it is similar to, but not the same as, the investigation of logical possibilities of our psychological concepts. Where the social, psychological and biological possibilities of emotion and personal reflexivity are examined in terms of individual and collective changes over time, it is possible to investigate possible new and novel combinations of types of variables in order to fill in gaps in our knowledge. The role of Wittgenstein's philosophy with respect to such novel lines of investigation is to counter any misleading pictures that inform the studies

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[13] The view that we have examined all of the logical possibilities that might, in this case, relate to possible studies of emotion and personal reflexivity also suggests a further point. Although a surview provides examples that may allow us to highlight conceptual comparisons and similarities that have disguised by our forms of language, the same activity may also reveal sites of possible interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary innovation. While it may seem as if the logical possibilities of psychological concepts can be filled out by investigations of *time* and social, psychological and biological *levels* of reality, we can also consider future changes that may further alter the domain of emotion. For example, we can imagine cultural and technological changes in the future that may render many of our present studies obsolete. This may involve considering the development and possible effects of the technologies that we have developed to control, change and alter our emotions (even though their purpose may not be represented in this fashion) as well as future evolutionary changes to our species.

involved. Moreover, it is entirely possible that speculation about future changes may indicate new research directions and possible forms of theorizing that have yet to be considered. In this respect, a further useful similarity was established between Wittgenstein's philosophy and reflexive studies in psychology that attempt to inspire creative and challenging directions for future research.

Wittgensteinian criticisms of accounts at the cognitive level: the example of emotion and reflexive cognition

An important issue connecting Wittgensteinian philosophy with actual and potential investigations of emotion and personal reflexivity is whether it is appropriate to use specific philosophical remarks to counter the prevalent discourse in psychology of a hidden level of cognitive objects. While Bowers' (1991) account of the "outsider critiques" offered by Wittgensteinians and the "insider dealing" of cognitive scientists to avoid reflexive problems by cognitive scientists has been included, a remaining issue is whether there are some Wittgensteinian points of clarification that bear on the attempt by both sides to institute their versions of the cognitive aspects of phenomena. It is important to consider this issue not only because it provides a last point of contrast between social constructionist and realist-cognitive accounts in psychology, but also because failure to offer some clarification would obscure the consideration of cognitive aspects of pride in Part 2.

In accord with the issues examined to this point, it is possible to examine the problem of theoretical descriptions that refer to hidden cognitive aspects of psychological phenomena at collective-evolutionary

and individual-biological "levels". With regard to the first issue and broad comparisons with other species, it is clear that humans have many embodied cognitive abilities and potentialities which are not shared by other animals. Although accepting this point seems to concede little, as subsequent examples will show there is considerable potential for cognitive theorists to provide a confused account of the evolution of emotion and forms of personal reflexivity. A initial critique of cognitive accounts at the evolutionary "level" can be derived from Wittgenstein's account of pictures that suggest a realm of possible objects for investigation which are not easily dismissed as nonsensical. Another reason for exploring a Wittgensteinian position with respect to the cognitive ontology is the implication that some highly theoretical explanations in psychology pose similar problems to the concepts of set theory because:

> A picture is conjured which seems to fix the sense *unambiguously.* The actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied. Here again we get the same thing as in set theory: the form of the expression we use seems to have been designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he sees into human consciousness. For us, of course, these forms of expression are like pontificals which we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective power that would give these vestments meaning and purpose (PI, §426).

The conclusion that Wittgenstein draws is, not surprisingly, that a clear representation of language or, in postmodern parlance, conversational activities, is required because "in the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side-roads" (PI, §426). Pictures that map out the research agenda for psychology (in this case exemplified by cognitive psychology) can therefore be treated as similar to the case in which "we see the straight

highway before us, but of course, we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed" (PI, §246). On this view, attempts to make the program of cognitive science work as well as to recognize its limits involve recognizing that the route (the ideal) is closed. The Wittgensteinian suggestion is therefore similar to the approach that Bowers (1991) argues has been taken towards cognitive science in general, but with one addition: the fact that cognitive psychology "may well *turn out* to be impossible" (p. 52) does not rule out the right of psychologists to pursue a nonsensical research program.

The deep appeal of the type of picture identified by Wittgenstein can be seen in theoretical descriptions of cognitive phenomena as a collective, evolutionary development. This issue is important because it suggests the relevance of alternative connections between culture, language, identity and emotion emphasized by social constructionists. Mandler (1992), for example, clearly allies himself with the picture that supports the cognitive ontology with his argument that the evolution of cognitive abilities underlying distinctly human forms of emotion and personal reflexivity "took place before the emergence of verbal language and its particularly powerful ability to encode and communicate evaluations and values" (p. 105). Mandler also fills out the details of the picture with speculation about the next crucial development towards humanity after that of specific response tendencies and action syndromes: "the next evolutionary step was probably the emergence of mental representations of these actions, what are the 'affective', cognitive evaluation of actions and situations" (p. 105).

For the present purposes, it is not essential that we determine whether these remarks are correct or incorrect since some theorists are content to think "cognition" can be taken to mean an ontologically neutral

sense of representation (e.g., Greenwood's (1991) treatment of mental representation does not make any claims about the real nature of the properties described). Instead, the main target is the picture of a preceding level of cognitive changes and the critical treatment of it is a combination of Wittgenstein's remarks and an extension of Harré's (1989) Wittgenstein-inspired presentation of an alternative dual ontology. Harré's account is relevant because even with collective human developments, describing a biological change as a cognitive difference has unnecessary ontological implications; indeed, as shall be demonstrated below, such an account of phylogenetic development may recapitulate similar arguments about the ontogeny of individual pride and self-evaluative properties or abilities. But is it reasonable to attack a cognitive account of the complicated biological changes that ground human language use in this fashion?

An indication that this extended form of realist-cognitive account is problematic is provided by other accounts of the embodiment of psychological phenomena. For example, Dennett's (1995) account of the evolution of individual representation seems very similar to social constructionist accounts of personal reflexive abilities as internalized conversation. Harré's (1989) dual ontology is also useful in this regard because of its implied criticism of an intervening level of cognitive phenomena between cultural practices such as the family and the supposedly universal biological prerequisites which provide the basis for specifically human and individual psychological phenomena. Wittgenstein-inspired alternatives such as distinguishing between language and proto-linguistic behaviour can be explored (i.e., instead of focusing on crucial cognitive developments when reconstructing the evolution of differences between humans and other animals; see Part 2, chapter 5). More specific

accounts of the development of distinctly human phenomena such as Weisfeld and Beresford's (1982) account of the biological bases of pride and shame may then put into context:

> If man's capacity for pride and shame—his concern about his social status in the broadest sense—evolved from primate dominance and submission behaviours, respectively, then perhaps homologies in the neural bases of these behaviours can be demonstrated (p. 126)

However disagreeable Weisfeld and Beresford's (1982) talk of a biological basis for self-evaluative emotions is, it is preferable to invoking a cognitive explanatory level. Of course, inferred cognitive processes could be regarded as overlaid on existing neurophysiological structures thus providing a form of description capable of empirical confirmation (except where the issue is the natural history of emotions such as pride provided by anthropological studies; see chapter 5, section 5.4). It is theoretically possible that an account could be offered of the neurophysiological developments that have made the development of culture-specific and language-dependent forms of emotion and personal reflexivity possible (i.e., the way in which changes in brain structure and function have "built up", therefore making further forms of evolution possible and contrasting forms of emotional expression and display less likely).

However, it is usually when examining the relations between psychological and biological "levels" that problems arise with an ontology of real intermediary cognitive processes. At this point, consideration of a social constructionist alternative is important, because if Harré's (1989) dual ontology is, so to speak, grammatically ratified and theoretically neutral, many conversation-based skills and dispositions can be said to be

biologically grounded without ignoring their conventional aspects. And, more specifically, theories that encourage investigations of an intervening (or overlaid) cognitive "level" in order to render intelligible the relation between the physiology of the brain can be redescribed in terms of individually realized, autonomous and potentially private conversational skills. The resulting account should provide the basis for specific attempts within psychology to explain the ontogenetic transformation that allows "basically organismic emotions" (Rosenberg, 1990) such as happiness to be refined into more refined and complicated adult emotional forms.

The ontology of a cognitive "level" can be seen as an extension of the everyday nature of theoretical descriptions of hidden psychological phenomena (e.g., as indicated by Greenwood's account of an ascription of shame as a theoretical description). But Kaplan (1986) demonstrates how positing hidden processes can be conflated with everyday talk of conventionally private thoughts and feelings when he remarks self-evidently: "others do not directly perceive the subject's self-conceiving and self-feeling activities" (p. 3). In order to offset the slide towards positing cognitive "objects", it is crucial to clarify how privacy is created and maintained with respect to a phenomenon such as pride (i.e., when people guess the thoughts and feelings of others they do not adopt an ontology of hidden objects or intervening processes (PI, IIxi, p. 223)). Wertsch (1993) is an example of another psychologist who argues that very little is lost by resisting the use of such expressions as "internalizing a skill", "structure", or "concept" (p. 169). It is crucial to avoid the picture that accompanies internalization accounts in which an increasingly complicated "level" of internal processes is used to explain many context-specific and language-related developmental changes. Accordingly, when armed with a

conceptual-discursive means of countering the "pitfalls encouraged by the metaphor of internalization" (Wertsch, 1993, p. 169), it is possible to reinterpret cognitive accounts of psychological changes that do occur in connection with such highly conceptual and linguistic forms of emotion and personal reflexivity.

However, we still need to determine the significance of empirical work in psychology that aims to reveal facts about the individual embodiment and neurophysiological limits of many psychological and reflexive abilities (e.g., such as the limits of self-control or self-consciousness). Interestingly, Mandler (1992) also suggests that an important 20th century attitude in psychology which is exemplified by the field of emotion has been to show how "unitary subjective experiences" are "the result of specific underlying (usually unconscious) mechanisms and processes" (p. 98). As a result, the investigation of a phenomenon like pride may only seem to be appropriately explained by a theoretical inference of self-evaluative processes and mechanisms (i.e., because theorists such as Kaplan (1986) claim to provide a cognitive scientific extension of the commonsense view that emotions are the result of a stimulus-interpretation-affect-behaviour sequence). The notion that progress in our understanding of emotion is most likely to occur on the basis of revealing more hidden detail is evident in a remark by Ellsworth (1991) that is directed towards the earlier approach of Kaplan and others:

> . . . appraisal theories, by breaking down the interpretation process into components, suggest that the stages implied by these theories are far too global. (p. 157)

Accordingly, while it is important not to deny that there are psychological

changes in the individual that occur when skills, techniques and concepts are mastered (as well as changes in facial expression and bodily responses that we are not aware of), there seems to be no advantage in adopting an realist-cognitive ontology.

However, if many forms of personal reflexivity can be described as cognitive phenomena, this may seem to create a problem about their appropriate treatment. For example, can cases of pride be distinguished from those of joy because they rely on different (and perhaps discretely embodied) cognitive processes? One conceptual approach to this ontological problem is provided by an extension of Wittgenstein's analogous interest in the differences between a practised and an unpractised reader. For Wittgenstein considers the temptation to think that when there is "no difference in what they happen to be conscious of", we must instead investigate a difference:

> . . . in the unconscious workings of their mind, or, again, in the brain.—So we should like to say: There are at all events two different mechanisms at work here. And what goes on in them must distinguish reading from not reading. (PI, §156)

However, Wittgenstein's reply is to note that "these mechanisms are only hypotheses, models designed to explain, to sum up, what you observe" (PI, §156). The need to provide a form of representation to sum up the detail that has discovered should not be taken as evidence for a whole new level of mysterious psychological objects. Obviously, cognitive changes are often posited to explain changes in social behaviour and its biological underpinnings (especially where development suggests an ontogenetic equivalent of the phylogenetic argument examined above). For example, Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic (1992) use the occurrence of people's

emotional behaviour to infer, study and even "see" the underlying cognitive processes. However, whether the phenomenon of interest is reading skills or different emotions, the danger in both cases is that the use of emotions or "emotional behaviour" such as pride to infer cognitive processes and explore the "real process" of self-evaluation (Lewis, 1993, p. 86) may eventually become more important than the phenomenon we set out to study. In other words, by the time these forms of theoretical sense-extension and description of detail have been exhausted, the result is often that the phenomenon that was initially of interest is no longer recognizable[14].

To reiterate, from a Wittgensteinian perspective it is easy to misrepresent the nature and significance of statements about levels of real cognitive intermediaries, changes and prerequisites, especially in relation to the phylogeny and ontogeny of distinctly human psychological phenomena. An initial Wittgensteinian criticism centred on pictures that inform the temptation to posit collective cognitive developments as crucial to our species' forms of emotion and personal reflexivity. After advocating a careful focus on cultural, linguistic and biological evolutionary changes, a similar position was adopted towards psychological accounts of individual development. Accordingly, the development of emotions such as pride and shame can be viewed in terms of conversation-based skills and grounded in embodied dispositions. Moreover, Wittgenstein's remarks and Harré's dual

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[14] In other cases it is an empirical matter as to whether more precise information about particular areas of brain activity and function could be used to erode privacy or gain control over these processes (see section 2.3.3). But it is important to recognize the conventional nature of the limits on psychologists' attempts to discover the manner in which underlying physiological processes provide the basis for conversation-based abilities (i.e., such as those of personal reflexivity). For example, Scherer (1992) notes that expanding "our knowledge of the substratum, particularly the localization, of cognitive processing" will provide "important insights into the nature and temporal unfolding of these processes" (p. 140). But this enthusiasm is qualified by the fact that the provision of more detail only has a one-way use. Thus it seems that "even the most fine-grained analysis of regional blood flow or electrochemical activity in the brain is unlikely to provide detailed information about the content and the context of the cognitive processes under study" (p. 140).

ontology were used to show why we should not feel compelled to produce additional summaries of significant psychological changes either in terms of a cognitive "overlaying" of "basically organismic foundations" or as the result of different mechanisms in the "unconscious workings" of the mind or brain.

Summary

In chapter 2 several complicated issues which surround discussions of psychological reflexivity and distinguish social constructionists from their realist-cognitive opponents were examined. The first issue to be addressed was the difficulty of representing "grammar" from within when our language can be regarded as both arbitary and autonomous. The latter point was illustrated by Wittgenstein's treatment of the difficulties of introducing new psychological concepts in the remarks that constitute the "Private Language Argument". While attempts by psychologists to achieve a surview of a part of grammar seem to depend upon their ability to be reflexive, this simply means that they should represent all of the relevant forms of discourse that can be found the linguistic practices available within their culture. This approach does not entail that Wittgenstein's philosophical means of achieving a surview of psychological concepts provides a new method for psychologists since Wittgenstein's own remarks highlight the limits of conceptual-discursive investigation. Although an examination of concepts does not substitute for a practical mastery of the practices in which those concepts are used, a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey may still resemble reflexive studies in psychology because it highlights features of our discursive practices that would otherwise be ignored. Thus

Wittgenstein's philosophical method can assemble useful and challenging reminders of everyday discourse for psychologists without necessitating the adoption of this method within psychology as a poor substitute for empirical investigation and further theory construction.

The Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity was then strengthened by an examination of the view that the truth about psychological phenomena is "independent of whether we human beings know it or not". When applied to psychology, Wittgenstein's analysis suggested that talk of objectivity as a social "construct" should instead be viewed as practices we have "arrived at". Also it is possible that our cultural and linguistic practices may change so that previous descriptions of psychological phenomena are no longer useful (i.e., rather than "less objective"). While this Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity seemed to support a realist account, Greenwood's account of "linguistic objectivity" as approaching psychological phenomena from a legitimately fashioned "distance" was criticized. Greenwood's realist attack on reflexivity and linguistic interdependence is based on an argument that participant's accounts are only important where they agree with theoretical descriptions offered by psychologists. More specifically, linguistic objectivity involves two contestable forms of distancing: psychologists' use of terms that "isolated" research participants need not understand and theoretical descriptions which refer to objects that occupy a different time or space to that of the researcher. Both approaches presuppose the intelligibility of abilities which, although dependent on a linguistic community, can persist in an embodied fashion during periods of social and physical isolation. However, Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks do not support the view that all psychological phenomena *must* be the products of discursive and

conversational activities. Thus the dependence or independence of particular forms of personal reflexivity and emotion, for example, on the conversational practices of a linguistic community should be decided within psychology.

A critical account was then provided of problems with the social constructionist ontology focusing on conversation as the "primary human reality" and attempts to examine "levels" of phenomena beyond what is regarded as conversational/psychological reality. Examples of collective and individual aspects of phenomena were explored in order to demonstrate why it is important even for a conceptual-discursive approach to explore statements and judgements about processes and structures that are, to put it simply, bigger and smaller than individuals. It is therefore not enough to use Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" remark in philosophy to avoid the issue of "sense-extension" to other levels of psychological phenomena. However, when an exhaustive account of possible levels of investigation is provided with the additional "dimension" of time, it may resemble a Wittgenstein investigation of the "possibilities of phenomena" (i.e., without identifying "gaps" in our knowledge or suggesting creative combinations of variables from otherwise different "levels"). It is also possible to provide Wittgensteinian criticisms of realist-cognitive approaches to the phylogeny and ontogeny of distinctly human psychological phenomena. Accordingly, Harré's dual ontology was extended to counter the view that a level of real cognitive objects or structures underlies significant developments of our species. Collective evolutionary changes responsible for the development of conversation-based forms of emotion and personal reflexivity can be therefore described as biologically grounded without recourse to a mediating level of cognitive objects. Individual

cognitive accounts of the development of emotions such as pride and improvement of socially important skills were similarly reconsidered in Wittgensteinian terms. The results suggest we can examine the empirical detail of psychological changes without feeling compelled to accept that real cognitive processes and mechanisms have been (or will eventually be) found in the "unconscious workings" of the mind or brain.

CHAPTER 3: Wittgensteinian description and its potential to augment existing self-critical psychological positions

Introduction

To this point, the consequences and limits of psychological reflexivity have been examined in terms of the following specific issues: the relations between Wittgensteinian philosophy and psychology, the role of conceptual-discursive investigations, problems with pictures of objectivity, and the need to clarify the contribution of studies of hidden levels of psychological phenomena. In this chapter, psychological reflexivity again provides the conceptual impetus to examine a further range of problems centred on explanation. Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophical remarks are used to criticize and, potentially, to augment social constructionist alternatives. The issues to be examined include: criticisms of broad explanations in psychology, the importance of highlighting and challenging the assumptions of explanatory systems, critical work on the role of causal explanations in psychology, the possibility of using Wittgenstein's philosophy to train psychologists towards "greater reflexivity", and the relations between psychological explanations and everyday practices.

The Wittgensteinian account of psychological reflexivity and relevant issues about explanation and explanatory systems in psychology will take the following form. Section 3.1 provides a Wittgensteinian account of why reflexive work within psychology should not necessarily lead to broad forms of general, theoretical and causal explanation. Some of Wittgenstein's remarks from *On Certainty* are explored in order to show why background and theory in psychology can be described as asymmetrical. Section 3.2

examines the limits that Wittgensteinian description places on reflexive, revealing and challenging forms of theoretical and explanatory work within psychology. Specific examples are provided of the way in which causal explanations of collective and individual phenomena themselves produce conceptual obfuscation. This section also explores difficulties facing any attempt to incorporate Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks and methods in the training of a "more reflexive" psychology (i.e., especially early in a psychological researcher's "reflexive career"). Section 3.3 examines the issue of psychological explanations and their relation to everyday concepts and practices. The analysis centres on useful alternatives to theoretical explanation proposed by social constructionists. As with many of these other sections, the aim is to highlight problems to be avoided in the critical study of emotion and personal reflexivity to be undertaken in Part 2.

3.1 Wittgenstein's form of descriptive philosophy and self-critical work in psychology

One of the problems with reflexive work in psychology is that it may lead psychologists to philosophy in order to provide "an account of and foundations for the relationship between mind, language, and the world" (Stein, 1993, p. 182). But the need to produce such an account especially in the form of an abstract, broad and general explanatory theory can be challenged. More specifically, issues suggested by the need to be reflexive about explanation and explanatory systems in psychology can be used to demonstrate the utility of remarks from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty* (i.e., parts of Wittgenstein's philosophy which have, until recently, been overlooked by social constructionists,

realists and critical psychologists). The result should demonstrate the potential of Wittgensteinian approach to describe the background of cultural-linguistic practices *and* the limits of comprehensive forms of theoretical explanation in psychology.

Wittgenstein on "world-pictures" and the limits of general, theoretical explanation

An example of one of Wittgenstein's synoptic analogies that is at odds with an interest in the construction of general theories is the way in which forms of representation may lead to a shift in what he describes as the "river-bed of thoughts" (OC, §97). In other words, we must distinguish a theory that is so broad that it includes ourselves and our practices from the inalterable "hard rock" of the "river-bank" on which it rests (OC, §99). More specifically, the "river-bank" can be taken to mean the foundation for "our" practices that provides a complicated background of actions, activities, proclivities and customs that we act against. An example of a theory that attempts to describe the relation between science and this "river-bank" while also suggesting a broad aim for reflexive, social scientific work is provided by Hooker (1987). Hooker's account is worth examining because he claims that his evolutionary naturalistic realism is an "emerging scientific theory of human kind, the evolutionary theory of self-organizing systems" (p. 174). The questions we must consider are whether Wittgenstein's position is subsumed by Hooker's account and, more importantly, what criticisms of this type of theory are available to reflexive social scientists?

The example of Hooker's (1987) attempt to describe the background of our practices and, more specifically, the success of science suggests that

the achievement of a general theoretical explanation should be a goal for reflexive social scientific work. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, however, Hooker can be described as producing a general evolutionary theory that resembles what Wittgenstein described as a "world-picture" (OC, §95). Wittgenstein's point about such a "world-picture" is that it is so broad that it may even become the basis for our everyday reasoning. However, we should not aspire to produce "world-pictures" through theory construction because, as Baker and Hacker (1985) note, "when it misfires, it is prone to create scientific mythology" (p. 540). An example in psychology is psychoanalytic theory and, perhaps, any other approach that similarly views much of our behaviour as determined by unconscious forces. Reflexive work that begins within psychology should challenge theories that include psychology and aim to achieve such a comprehensive global view. One possible Wittgensteinian criticism, if Hooker's comprehensive account is indeed a world-picture, is that it should not be extended beyond its scientific use. In other words, it is important that accounts such as Hooker's should not be regarded as so comprehensive that they can provide a new background to our scientific *and* everyday reasoning (OC, §95).

Wittgenstein does not rule out the possibility of broad forms of theory construction, theory-inspired change in everyday practices, or evolutionary accounts of human behaviour. Reflexive work in psychology seems to establish a connection with Wittgenstein's work where his remarks can be used to counter an impulse to construct or contribute towards positions that are so comprehensive they can be described as creating a "world-picture". Wittgenstein's alternative is to examine the type of question that tempts us towards a very broad theoretical explanation. For example, an explanation of the sort that might not necessarily change our everyday reasoning but

may nevertheless demonstrate the importance of explaining the relations between language and the world:

> If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? (PI, xii, p. 230)

The reply to this self-posed question is revealing because it suggests the appeal of general theories and world-pictures (especially where the latter includes us as researchers and as people or what Stein (1993) refers to as "mind" in the explanandum of "mind, language, and the world"):

> Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history—since we also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes (PI, xii, p. 230).

The relevant philosophical task is not to provide comprehensive pictures of our concepts and practices or, more specifically, to condone the application of evolutionary thinking to every problem. Instead, Wittgenstein suggests that it is important for philosophy to assemble revealing descriptive remarks in a manner that differs from the organization of observations and facts into a broad theory.

Wittgenstein's remarks are also interesting because his reasoning mimics the different kind of revealing account offered by individuals adopting a reflexive orientation towards the background of our practices. He implies that general theories hide the fact that it is possible and often useful to imagine circumstances in which many of the concepts of our linguistic community would no longer be useful. Accordingly, Wittgenstein

clarifies his aim:

> I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him. (PI, xii, p. 230e)

In particular, we could imagine examples from other cultures that were analogous to situations in which we apply our social and psychological concepts. More simply, cases of contact with other cultures could be assembled, especially those in which we were struck by activities that resemble ours only to reveal a fundamental difference upon subsequent investigation (LFM, XXI, p. 203; see chapter 5, section 5.1 for examples). The aim of this assembling of reminders is for psychologists engaging in critical work to discover that they do not feel compelled to explain — in the sense of offering hypotheses — why a particular culture does not have concepts that are analogous to those of Western culture (or science). For example, there is no compulsion to explain by way of theory why another culture has arrived at nothing comparable to many of our psychological concepts and expressions.

A Wittgensteinian philosophical approach to the cultural and linguistic practices of "mankind" is capable of drawing on the sort of imaginary examples and intermediate cases that plausible novels and accurate autobiographies may provide. Wittgenstein also offers more specific remarks about what it is that philosophy can reveal about psychological phenomena in their cultural and linguistic surroundings:

> What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes. (PI, §415)

But it is difficult to know which criteria would help us to distinguish between "curiosities" and more important examples that we might be "struck by" (Shotter & Katz, 1996).

One answer is that examples of greater importance will provide a basis for further exploration and investigation especially where the variation is not trivial. For example, Wittgenstein imagines the possible outcome if we met "the people of a tribe [who] were brought up from early youth to give no expression of feeling *of any kind*" (Z, §383). It would obviously be ridiculous to say that these people did not have the potential for emotions or, at some stage perhaps, the need to control or express their feelings (e.g., as infants). Nevertheless a difficulty for us would be that they would "have nothing human about them" (Z, §390) in many of the respects that we regard as important. Thus while they would be a collective "who in other respects were human", still it is probable that "we could not possibly make ourselves understood to them" (Z, §390).

One point to emerge from these considerations is that we begin to see part of the background of our present psychological concepts and practices. For example, with regard to the categories of emotion and personal reflexivity and emotion, we find that the reflexive processes regarded by Rosenberg (1990) as important to emotional identification, display and experience are not universal features of human existence. This issue is also obvious in relation to the cluster of concepts surrounding pride because although there seem to be many cross-cultural similarities, there are also

vast differences that make us reluctant to think that our clusters of concepts could be projected wholesale onto other groups. Of course, the aim of a Wittgensteinian approach is not to encourage armchair anthropology, but Wittgenstein suggest a problem that Oatley (1993) entertains in more explicit and practical terms:

> . . . the extent to which we can understand another culture by becoming part of it in imagination or in fact is always partial and open to question. (p. 346)

Here the role of imagination at least helps us to consider the possibility that quite different linguistic distinctions may be made in other cultures for reasons that may be obscure. And, as noted, it is important to be sceptical of theories that supposedly highlight the "foundation" upon which we may understand and misunderstand the practices and individuals of other cultures. Faced with these problems, one practical measure is to examine the texts and accounts of people from "outside" who have come into our culture or, in other cases, translations of the individuals who have had contact with it (or its predecessors). However, this approach contains an unexamined assumption that there are few barriers to prevent us from accessing the discourse of "outsiders" to what can be regarded as "our culture" (hence the need to address this issue in chapter 4).

In summary, more detail was added to Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as description and its relevance to forms of psychological reflexivity. The argument adopted was that psychological reflexivity should not lead to attempts to produce broad, general theories that might seem capable of explaining the background relations between mind, language and the world. A brief account was offered of "world-pictures" which can be

regarded as theories or pictures provided by science that are so broad they may seem to inform both scientific *and* everyday reasoning. In response to the potential for scientific theorizing to lead to world-pictures or myths, some specific Wittgensteinian remarks were used to indicate why we should not seek to explain the grammar of our concepts in relation to facts of nature. Instead, we should attempt to highlight aspects of our natural history that might prevent us from describing important similarities and differences with other cultures. Moreover, although the remarks that help us to see what we have overlooked may rely on imagining other possibilities, it is also important to examine the accounts of "outsiders" with respect to our forms of emotional identification, display and experience.

Psychological reflexivity and crossing from explanation to description

As noted earlier, Wittgenstein's later rejection of the view that philosophy is explanatory and highlights what is hidden (PI, §126; PI, §89) owes more to recognition of the philosophical errors of the earlier *Tractatus* than any desire to find a replacement for scientific explanation. Wittgenstein himself remarked that the philosophical mistakes of the *Tractatus* arose "not from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connexions" (PI, §89). Nevertheless, it is easy to take parts of Wittgenstein's philosophy in isolation from the whole framework when crossing, so to speak, from the explanatory work of particular disciplines with the aim of forming useful connections. A particular example of a reflexive approach which attempts to connect with Wittgenstein's rejection of explanation in philosophy is the view that Wittgenstein offers a method of "social poetics" for psychology (Shotter,

1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). While the "social poetics" account challenges the view that Wittgenstein merely offers a form of philosophical description, it nevertheless creates confusion about the relations between philosophy and psychology that needs to be clarified (e.g, such as how Wittgenstein can criticize theoretical explanations in psychology).

An important distinction between philosophy and psychology has been maintained to this point based on Wittgenstein's philosophical remark that "we must do away with all *explanation,* and description alone must take its place" (PI, §109). However, this remark has created confusion in psychology about the extent to which it includes or excludes social scientists. In contrast to Wittgenstein's comments about the problems of psychology and his use of "us" to describe a kind of general faith in psychology as a source of insight and knowledge (see chapter 1, section 1.1), many psychologists generalize the attack on theory in philosophy to psychology. But should Wittgenstein's use of "we" be taken to indicate that description is a replacement for particular forms of theoretical explanation and empirical investigation?

Shotter (1992a, 1996) says yes and can see no objections to the use of Wittgenstein's philosophical methods within psychology to compete against empirical methods and complement hermeneutic approaches[15]. Shotter also suggests that Wittgenstein's methods achieve many of the same ends as theory construction and empirical work in psychology but without conceptual obfuscation and abstraction from our everyday,

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[15] Support for the latter connection presumably comes from Wittgenstein's remark:

> We want to *understand* something that is already in plain view. For *this* is what we seem in some sense not to understand. (PI, §89)

relational-responsive practices (see section 3.3 for a more detailed treatment of the use of Wittgenstein's non-theoretical methods within psychology). Building upon these arguments, Shotter and Katz (1996) maintain Wittgenstein's philosophy is relevant to psychology because it shows that understanding and an ordinary sense of explanation must not always proceed through a theory (or theories). Wittgenstein's philosophy can therefore be used to show that theoretical explanations are "beside the point, in that they hide from us the actual forms of life from within which our talk makes sense" (p. 229). Moreover, they also claim that theories:

> . . . divert our attention away from those fleeting moments in which the essentially ethical and political struggles are (or would be) at work in their initial formation — struggles that are not prelinguistic, by the way, but that have to do with establishing new forms of life within old forms. (pp. 229-230)

In the position developed to this point, there are many similarities with Shotter and Katz's general position (e.g., a similar argument is explored which provides a criticism against Wittgenstein in chapter 4 and also some of the examples of pride and political issues in Part 2, chapter 5 support this view). With regard to Wittgenstein, however, it would appear that his aim was to describe such changes from a philosophical perspective and pursue what he thought to be a good life, rather than to struggle for political and ethical change (Monk, 1990).

While the work of Shotter and Katz clearly provides a richer account of Wittgenstein's method (or methods) than the phrase "philosophical description" suggests, their account raises some difficult problems. For example, if the interpretation of explanation does refer to a scientific rather than a philosophical or everyday sense of theorizing, then the following

remark in *On Certainty* suggests a descriptive end to explanatory work within a discipline: "at some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description" (OC, §189). Wittgenstein's remark could therefore be extended to cover critical reflexive work in psychology in a manner that is more consistent with the whole philosophy than Shotter's interpretation of Wittgenstein's methods replacing theoretical explanations. Further support also comes from a similar statement made by Smedslund (1985): that is, for psychology a focus on description is "a reasonable first step since explanation, prediction, intervention, and criticism all presuppose description" (p. 75). Thus despite problems with the detail of Smedslund's "psycho-logic" project, his general remarks are consistent with this Wittgensteinian position on the relevance and limits of philosophy to critical, reflexive work in psychology: "consideration of reflexivity and its implications leads directly to recognition of the role of that which is *presupposed* in psychology, namely culture and language" (p. 76; the issue of whether Wittgenstein's philosophical description adequately addresses cultural issues, however, will be examined in chapter 4).

On Smedslund's view the end product of a consideration of reflexivity in psychology can be described as "the science of descriptions of behaviour and the science of criticisms of descriptions of behaviour" (p. 74). However, philosophy seems to play no role in this account as much of the reflexive work is argued to be a "scientific/professional activity within psychology" (p. 74). More specifically, Smedslund argues that to state "psychology is reflexive" is "to say that if something is a scientific/professional activity within psychology with a subject matter, then it follows that this activity *can* itself be the subject matter of a scientific/professional activity within psychology" (p. 74). Smedslund therefore notes that since the term "scientific/professional

activity within psychology includes such categories as psychological description, explanation, prediction and intervention" it is possible to say that each of these categories can itself "be the possible subject matter of psychological description, explanation, prediction, and intervention" (p. 74). The relevant point is that if we restrict Smedlund's remarks to the topic of being reflexive about explanations in psychology, he implies that there is no need to pass, at some stage, from explanation to *description by philosophy.*

Similar problems about the role of philosophy conceived in descriptive terms also occur with Shotter and Katz's (1996) view of the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. Their interest in potential uses of Wittgenstein's remarks and methods within psychology is stated as "whether what Wittgenstein has to say, can be of any help [to] us in grasping how we might develop new professional practices from within the context of our old ones" (p. 224). But as already noted, a Wittgensteinian perspective involves describing the relations between the descriptions, explanations, predictions, and interventions of psychology and its subjects. Any additional interest in using Wittgenstein's philosophy to inspire particular changes in psychology is a possible activity, but only in the sense that psychologists could take the ideas of any philosopher and develop them in ways that could not be envisaged or condoned in philosophy.

The irnportance of retaining an outsider perspective on psychology and knowing that at some stage we must pass from explanation to description is indicated by the meaning that some psychologists and social scientists take from Wittgenstein's concepts of language-games and forms of life (i.e., the potential for these concepts to be viewed as rudimentary theories). The attempt to work within a "form of life", of course, can be described as part of the recognition that there is "no way to step outside the

various vocabularies we have employed and find a metavocabulary which somehow takes account of *all possible* vocabularies, all possible ways of judging and feeling" (Rorty, 1989, p. xvi). But it is tempting to adopt a perspective where the word "form" in the expression "form of life" suggests the search for underlying, universal structures should be redescribed. Although Rorty's alternative solidarity-oriented account will not be examined, a further remark is relevant to this potential misunderstanding: "much of the rhetoric of contemporary intellectual life takes for granted that the goal of scientific inquiry into man is to understand 'underlying structures', or 'culturally invariant factors', or 'biologically determined patterns'" (p. 22). Even if we consider the notion of form of life more broadly, it is still important to recognize that "the one mistake we must not make is to try to squeeze the form of life concept into such terms as *culture, biology,* or *history*" (Finch, 1995, p. 53).

Wittgenstein's point is that we start understanding cultures and their ways of judging, feeling, thinking, and talking from our current practices before any more specific theories can be offered. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that "commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (PI, §25). These activities form the "common behaviour of mankind" and the "system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (PI, §206). Wittgenstein's view is that it is important to describe this common behaviour through considerations such as the following:

> Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (PI, i, p. 174)

All that "form of life" describes here is the fact that "'grief'" describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life" (PI, i, p. 174). Wittgenstein is not, therefore, offering an explanation of the universality of grief or evaluating the proposition that "some of the symptoms of grief appear to be universal in the human species" (Averill, 1979, p. 343). This is evident in the fact that Wittgenstein prefers to imagine other possible forms of life that we could not understand, let alone explain:

> If a man's bodily expression of sorrow and of joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock, here we should not have the characteristic formation of the pattern or sorrow or of the pattern of joy. (PI, i, p. 174)

In such a case there would not seem to be enough similarities with grief as it is manifest in our form of life even to project talk of private thoughts and feelings onto this person (i.e., aspects of grief that we might subsequently want to explain).

In summary, Wittgenstein's remarks against explanation and the emphasis on description in philosophy were introduced. In contrast to Shotter and Katz's position, it was argued that reflexivity should lead us to cross from explanation in psychology to description by philosophy (i.e., rather than replacement of explanations in psychology with Wittgenstein's methods and remarks). This interpretation of Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology was supported by Smedslund's argument that reflexivity in psychology should lead to descriptions of language and culture (although Smedslund seems to allow no role for philosophy as this practice is presented as a professional/scientific activity within psychology). Similarly, while Shotter and Katz show that "philosophical description" is an inadequate account of the remarks and methods that constitute

Wittgenstein's later philosophy, their main aim is to use these remarks and methods to do the work of psychology (i.e., to change its practices). The section concluded with a brief examination of the importance of describing our "form of life" in relation to others.

Psychology and the asymmetry of theory and background

One of Wittgenstein's most important realizations in the later philosophy is the fundamental contrast between the practices in which theoretical explanations are produced and the background to those practices. The latter, of course, is what Wittgenstein attempted to summarize with the notions of language-game and forms of life (and the former can go too far when it produces world-pictures or a scientific mythology). However, the important point for psychologists to recognize is that theory and background are *asymmetrical.* For example, concepts such as explanation, justification, causation, choice and construction cannot be equally applied within a practice *and* at the further "level" of remarks about that practice. While this point is likely to be accepted for causal explanations, it is worth exploring the broader sense in which reflexive work calls on psychologists to "explain themselves".

The power of the descriptive approach rests with the recognition that many of the concepts used in a practice or system cannot be equally applied to the background of that practice or system. Wittgenstein's descriptive approach does not allow him to contradict ordinary language and practices by imposing "a conceptual model upon human behaviour and communication" (Strom, 1994, p. 146). As already noted, Wittgenstein's

notions of form of life and language-games are not explanations of what our linguistic community must have in common with other linguistic communities in order to understand them. A form of life instead describes "part of the framework within which our language-games are played, not parts of the games themselves" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 229). As Monk (1990) notes:

> . . . we cannot make sense of anything without some sort of framework, and with any particular framework there has to be a distinction between propositions that, using that framework, describe the world, and those that describe the framework itself, though this distinction is not fixed at the same place for ever (p. 571).

Thus although reflexive work of the social sciences can connect with Wittgenstein's form of philosophical description, it is important to recognize the nature and limits of Wittgenstein's approach.

Wittgenstein's position therefore seems to correspond with the spirit of one of the earliest remarks on reflexivity in psychology (i.e., that at least used the word reflexivity):

> It is not that every psychologist theorize about these things, or investigate all of them directly, but that he *remind* himself from time to time that whatever makes it possible for him to engage in scientific activity is part of his ultimate subject matter. (Oliver & Landfield, 1962, p. 121)

But how far, according to a Wittgensteinian account, should psychologists and other social scientists go in their attempts to "explain themselves"? While Smedslund (1985) argues that "any adequate psychology must account for itself" (p. 73), a less theoretical and more ordinary sense of explanation seems to be required (a point which is not inconsistent with the treatment of Shotter in the previous section). Thus, the unrealistically high

requirement that a complete form of explanation in psychology *must* include an account of its own origin can be replaced with recognition of the occasional need to engage in philosophical description.

These considerations lead to the issue of social constructionism and whether attempts by psychologists to account in a reflexive manner for their own behaviour are consistent with a Wittgensteinian position? Gergen (1985), for example, suggests that a result of taking a reflexive approach in psychology is that "the study of social process could become generic for understanding the nature of knowledge itself" (p. 266). Interestingly, this position also seems to be consistent with Wittgenstein's descriptive approach because "epistemological inquiry along with the philosophy of science could both give way, or become subsumed by, social inquiry" (p. 266). Psychology should be able to account for the knowledge it produces by social inquiry presumably without worrying about potential Wittgensteinian criticisms. For example, the third part of section 3.2 provides a Wittgensteinian treatment of becoming a "more reflexive" researcher which closely resembles social constructionist accounts of teaching and training in explanatory systems.

However, until recently, many of Wittgenstein's remarks from *On Certainty* have been ignored despite the fact that they provide a consistent extension of Wittgenstein's earlier position that "the theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology" (T, §4.1121). Although Wittgenstein subsequently rejected any form of theorizing the remarks contained in *On Certainty* still address epistemological themes, admittedly in a novel and challenging manner. Whether it is appropriate to describe Wittgenstein's work as the study of social processes will, of course, be addressed in another section. It is interesting that Greenwood (1992), Harré (1989) and

Shotter (1992, 1996) have all attempted to work through the details of Wittgenstein's later remarks with varying degrees of success. Shotter's (1993b) remarks are perhaps the most useful in this context because he articulates some of the different ways is which the background of our theories may be understood :

> . . . there is a 'basis' for our talk, a 'background' from within which we make sense of our lives, a realm of knowledgeable activity which is sustained, not simply by a form of practical-technical knowledge, nor by a form of theoretical-conceptual knowledge, but a third kind of practical-moral knowledge of the non-conceptual kind. (p. 477)

The barest beginnings of an attempt to detail in full the relevance of Wittgenstein's remarks from *On Certainty* — as well as to extend its style of analysis to contemporary interest in a non-theoretical reflexive work — will be attempted here. Some of these remarks, initially, will be applied to the understanding of the background of psychology that Gergen's version of social constructionism and radical reflexivity implies before aspects of the other variations are also examined.

The application to Gergen's (1985) attempt to account for his own work does not lead from causal explanation or hermeneutic interpretation within psychology to philosophical description, but instead to doubt. In particular, Gergen's version of social constructionism offers a form of reflexivity that involves a "radical doubt in the taken-for-granted world — whether in the sciences or daily life — and in a specialized way acts as a form of social criticism" (p. 267). Gergen's position therefore exemplifies the asymmetry of theory and background because although it is important to be critical of both ordinary and scientific forms of explanation (amongst other aspects of psychology), the result need not be extreme uncertainty. The

problem with Gergen's description of psychologist's attempts to provide an account of their activities is its failure to recognize that "it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *in deed* not doubted" (OC, §342). Thus Gergen's criticism of psychology does not offer a path from explanations of our actions as psychologists to a clear description of our activities.

Moreover, by equating a reflexive approach in psychology with a form of sceptical social inquiry, Gergen's early version of social constructionism is revealing in an unexpected manner. In particular, Gergen's radical doubt in psychology can be regarded as a presuppositional paradox because it:

> . . . involves some sort of tension or incompatibility between what is presupposed as background information when a statement is made and what is explicitly asserted by the statement. (Strom, 1994, p. 13)

Such a presuppositional paradox is closely connected with reflexive work that requires a philosophical response; in this case, the conceptual correction that Wittgenstein provides is that legitimate doubts within a scientific practice should not be so widespread as to undermine that practice.

The challenge of responding to Gergen's account is also that it suggests the status of the social process of making explicit the presuppositions of psychological practices. The aim could either be to avoid contradicting a presupposition that has not been made explicit in a theoretical explanation or to engage in part of the social process of creative work. Interestingly, a further example is available in Wittgenstein's work that highlights this theme of requiring good reasons to doubt what a description, in this case of a psychological experiment, "presupposes":

> I describe a psychological experiment: the apparatus, the questions of the experimenter, the actions and replies of the subject—and then I say that it is a scene in a play.—Now everything is different. So it will be said: If this experiment were described in the same way in a book on psychology, then the behaviour described would be understood as the expression of something mental just because it is *presupposed* that the subject is not taking us in, hasn't learnt the replies by heart, and other things of the kind.—So we are making a presupposition? (PI, liv, p. 180e)

Wittgenstein's point is to challenge the view that "what we do in our language-game always rests on a tacit presupposition" (PI, liv, p. 179e). Its relevance to psychology is that is reduces any compulsion to feel that we must always be able to articulate the basis for our practices (i.e, either in theoretical or more ordinary terms). Wittgenstein therefore asks "doesn't a presupposition imply a doubt?" and answers that "doubt may be entirely lacking. Doubting has an end" (PI, liv, p. 180e).

Social constructionism is clearly committed to challenging the unstated assumptions of mainstream, empirical psychology and to exploiting in a creative manner any alternative, radical viewpoints. Gergen's (1985) version of social constructionism challenges the ubiquity of psychological experiments and related forms of theoretical explanation by regarding the social situation of a psychological experiment as similar to acting out rehearsed roles in a play. In this sense, it is interesting to find that Wittgenstein did not envisage the direction that psychological research has taken even though these new directions are often explicitly connected with his remarks. For example, Parker (1994b) describes the results of early critiques in the following manner:

> . . . the linguistic turn and then the reflexive turn in social

> psychology are part of an understandable humanist response to the traditional 'old paradigm' methods in which people were not treated as if they were human beings. (p. 528)

It is also worth noting that because subjects in psychological experiments are perfectly capable of deception, it is important that people's explanations for their own actions are understood as part of the social process of gaining useful results from a social scientific investigation. However, Wittgenstein's overall point is that when explanations can no longer be offered "the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting" (OC, §110). Explanations therefore reach an end in agreement in action and judgements that need to be described (PI, §242), rather than further statements that seem to provide the foundation for our actions. The implication for social constructionism is that although we should not doubt everything, presenting a rival to mainstream forms of experimentation and explanation does not merely lead to a new, theoretically articulated presupposition. Instead, it leads us, as psychologists, to view subjects in psychological research in a manner that makes us talk and act differently toward them (i.e., a creative response that Wittgenstein did not seem to anticipate).

In this section, Wittgenstein's important realization that theory and background are asymmetrical was described from the perspective of reflexive work in psychology. Concepts used with psychology should not also be employed to describe the foundation or background on which those practices are based. But it still seems appropriate to social constructionists such as Smedslund and Gergen that psychologists should "explain themselves" through an account of social processes. However, Gergen's social criticism contradicts the type of practical-moral basis to our practices

that Wittgenstein and Shotter describe. Remarks from *On Certainty* were used to show that explanations come to an end in the kind of foundation that can be described as "ungrounded action". These remarks were backed up by further detail from Wittgenstein's treatment of the view that psychological experiments need not rest on tacit presuppositions (e.g., that an experiment is not like a play). Although Gergen's form of social constructionism does view experiments in psychology as similar to the enactment of a play, this view need not be described as contradicting a tacit presupposition (i.e., which provides the basis for a psychological experiment). Instead, a view is presented of the potential of human activity which, in the process, makes us act differently towards subjects in psychological research.

3.2 Wittgensteinian remarks on explanation, theories and training in psychology

Asking critical, reflexive questions about explanations in psychology leads to more specific considerations about the potential of Wittgenstein's philosophy to augment social constructionist alternatives. For example, where general explanations of complicated psychological phenomena can be regarded as rules that form only the fragments of a system, a Wittgenstein question emerges: is there any gap between the rules and their application as described by Wittgenstein's philosophy? The answer, to extend the game analogy, is that where a "gap" seems to exist between rules in psychology and their application, it is training and an ordinary sense of explanation that provides the appropriate "bridge" (Baker & Hacker, 1983, p. 51). In this section, further Wittgensteinian remarks will be used to

supplement critical, reflexive and social constructionist accounts of psychology with the following: a description of Wittgensteinian challenges to explanatory systems in psychology, a brief critical account of causal explanation and some Wittgensteinian remarks about the potential for psychologists to be trained to be "more reflexive".

Wittgensteinian challenges to the reflexively revealed assumptions of systems of explanation

To this point a number of Wittgensteinian challenges to explanatory systems have been examined. These include the attempt to produce complete theories of psychological phenomena and to view Wittgensteinian remarks as part of a "new paradigm" of less theory-oriented research. The previous sections established that Wittgenstein was not against all forms of explanation in psychology and could even be taken to suggest that reflexivity involves a to and fro movement between forms of explanation in psychology and philosophical description. In this section, it is important to examine whether more Wittgensteinian comments may augment social constructionist criticisms of explanatory systems and any of their reflexively-revealed assumptions.

An emphasis on historical and metatheoretical reflection in the social sciences has been accompanied by a greater interest in challenging accounts of psychology's current context and previous history. For example, Ash (1993) suggests that the renaissance in the historiography of psychology has produced research programs "all of which have in common the conversion of formerly unqueried textbook generalities into questions for research" (p. 49). In particular, he suggests two aspects of this research

"might be called the critical contextualizing and reflexivity approaches" (p. 49). Ash argues that the former is pursued by historians and sociologists of science in order to emphasize "the historical rootedness of psychological concepts, research priorities, and institutions in specific societal and cultural settings" (p. 49). Thus although the reflexivity approach is "pursued almost entirely by psychologists by also relying on sophisticated archival research and other historians' methods", it is different because its practitioners regard "contextualizing not as an end, but as a means of encouraging psychologists to reconsider present disciplinary structures and practices" (p. 49).

The use of Kuhn's (1970) notion of a paradigm within psychology demonstrates both the benefits and problems of a reflexive, contextualizing approach. Parker (1989) states, for example, that much of the work in social psychology that emerged out of its "identity crisis" was self-consciously couched in the terms "old paradigm", "new paradigm" and "paradigm shift" (see chapter 1, section 1.3). This "rhetorical construction" still exists as social constructionists such as Harré (1989) and Shotter (1996) lead other psychologists to assume that contributing toward new paradigm work is an appropriate goal. More specifically, Harré, Shotter, Gergen and others also seek to assert that continuity of thought exists with Vygotsky's (1986) and Mead's (1934) seminal social and linguistic studies. This continuity strengthens the case for social constructionism as an interdisciplinary approach and also invites an account of how mainstream, empirical studies have continued to dominate psychology. However, concepts such as "paradigm" derived from philosophy of science do not necessarily achieve a clear view of psychology even though they help to reconstruct the discipline's history. Ash's account of a reflexivity approach can be extended

to accounts of changes in the explanatory systems or theories of psychology. The most important feature of historical accounts of psychology, therefore, is that they help psychologists to avoid making the same mistakes, assumptions and oversights that can be identified in the history of the discipline.

One difficulty with the attempt to avoid past mistakes, or future errors, is that the wider values in which society operates are not considered (i.e., what Parker (1989) described as wider constraints on a "gestalt switch" that might occur with a change in theories or paradigms). Howard (1985) notes, for example, that:

> . . . any discussion of human reflexivity begins with a consideration of language as the mechanism underlying the operation of the phenomenon and ends with the role of values in steering reflexive human action. These steering values are often embedded in one's culture and influence not only individuals' everyday actions, but science as well. (p. 261)

The increasing value placed on reflexive research suggests the potential to provide accounts of the manner in which specific evaluative criteria in psychology are informed by practical-moral concerns. In other words, the point is not to argue that specific epistemic and theoretical values such as the coherence, unity and simplicity of an explanatory theory are determined by a broader moral-practical changes. Rather it is to note that one of the reasons for an increase in reflexive research is that we are no longer prepared to overlook many of the political and cultural factors that led many legitimate subject areas to be excluded from psychological research in the past. For example, White (1993) and other theorists therefore suggest that "in line with the increasingly reflexive stance of social theory today, the anthropological critique of emotion theory turns the interpretative spotlight

back upon assumptions that guide research" (p. 30). With respect to Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory, it can be criticized as an individualistic and apolitical position which has little interest in engaging with the detail of our own and others' cultural and linguistic practices (see chapter 4, section 4.2).

The importance attached to revealing cultural, moral-practical and language-based assumptions seems to stem from what Wittgenstein described as the importance of attaining a knowledge of the diversity of human forms of life (i.e., social arrangements, practices, institutions, types of personhood, etc.). A Wittgensteinian challenge to approaches that assume a narrow perspective on humanity is therefore possible in a manner that augments social constructionist criticisms. Evolutionary psychology, in particular, provides a good example of the way in which a position can be built upon striking similarities between different peoples as well as between people and animals (Oatley, 1993; cf. Shotter & Katz (1996) in section 3.3). Further examples could be offered of explanatory systems that psychologists could be trained in (or seek only to contribute towards) that result in blindness to other possible forms of life. But the most important general point to emerge from this Wittgensteinian treatment is that psychology must "construct a science of humans built upon an image of humanity that reflects and reveres human nature in all its diversity, complexity, and subtlety" (Howard, 1985, p. 264).

Wittgenstein's philosophy is also relevant to explanatory systems that are based on pictures deeply wedded to the use of particular concepts and expressions. Shanker (1991) notes, for example, that one of the more difficult conceptual problems for cognitive scientists to overcome is to dismiss the "picture" of "determined behaviour" from investigations of

psychological phenomena. By challenging the language that is associated with, for example, a mechanistic picture of particular psychological phenomena, Wittgenstein is able to prevent making "determinism a property of the system of explanations of behaviour" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 17). It is simplistic, of course, to dismiss cognitive science as offering a diminished picture of human possibilities through mechanistic pictures which, in turn, create the conditions in which causal accounts are easier to apply. Instead, the main point is that such a potential criticism of an explanatory system should not be limited to cognitive science.

A Wittgensteinian position should be able to criticize any position that allows conceptual distortion to occur through its pictures, statements or slogans. This is why it is possible to imagine that a moral-practical position that favoured people's accounts over causal explanations might also allow a form of dogmatism to become a property of its psychological approach. For example, it is hoped that a Wittgensteinian challenge would connect with critical work in psychology if a rule such as the following were used to guide research practice: "Every thing's (sic.) got a moral, if only you can find it" (Carroll, 1865/1973, p. 141). We must therefore continue to be very careful about how rigorously we use philosophy to explore alternatives to existing explanatory systems since the imagined form of moral-practical psychology based on the statement from *Alice in Wonderland* would not seem to be just another case of "anything goes" social constructionist work (i.e., the position Gergen (1985) supposedly argues for by widening the evaluative criteria of psychological studies).

The Wittgensteinian argument in the face of potentially restrictive explanations of human action from evolutionary psychology, cognitive science or any other area of psychology is to note that there is considerable

continuity in the use and misuse of psychological concepts (CV, p. 15). For example, explanations based on metaphors that favour mechanistic accounts and computer simulations of the properties of individuals hide the fact that a clear view has not been achieved of existing psychological concepts and practices (Shanker, 1991). Hacker (1996) similarly addresses this point in terms of our temptation to think that new concepts from a variety of sources may solve our problems:

> No conceptual confusion can be resolved by the substitution of new concepts for existing ones—at best, the conceptual confusion will be swept under the carpet by such manoeuvres, and there can be no guarantee that it will not emerge later to wreak more havoc. (p. 409)

In this respect, social constructionism attempts to connect with Wittgenstein's interest in enduring conceptual problems, rather than pursue issues in psychology that could eventually appear temporal, dated, or bound up in particular theoretical fashions.

Wittgensteinians and social constructionists therefore argue that there is no guarantee that theories, models, and concepts from "new paradigms of science" in physics, computer science and engineering will continue to provide fruitful theories for psychology (Lewis & Haviland, 1993, p. ix; cf. chapter 2, section 2.3 and the topic of "sense-extension"). For example, chaos theory, systems theory and cybernetic models may provide some insights into the details of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition relevant to emotion. But they may also provide other misleading parallels, especially when we are regarded as beset by mechanistic emotions or regarded as individual systems rather than people. An indication of Wittgenstein's point on such importation of concepts can be extrapolated from his statement that

it is easier to attain a surview of the terms of mechanics than our use of psychological concepts (RPP II, §20). The importation of concepts from other explanatory systems and sciences should therefore be challenged where projection onto psychological phenomena occurs without appropriate screening for conceptual baggage.

In summary, further Wittgensteinian remarks were presented to augment social constructionist accounts and criticisms of explanatory systems. The section began with the view that contextualizing psychology is used to provide a history for psychology as well as to inform its present practices. The notion that social constructionism offers a new paradigm for psychology establishes continuity with similar early theoretical perspectives and, more importantly, actively seeks to avoid the oversights, assumptions and errors of other explanatory systems. The rising interest in reflexive work is also potentially explicable as reflecting wider concerns with cultural differences and the possibilities of human action. However, while pictures that accompany the language of causal explanation can make determinism a property of a system of explanations, it is also important to realize that moral-practical alternatives might be similarly dogmatic. The relevance of a Wittgensteinian perspective was also demonstrated by the example of conceptual confusions that continue to arise when theories, models and concepts from other scientific explanatory systems are imported into psychology and projected onto particular phenomena.

A critical account of the roles of causal explanation and theoretical description in psychology

One of the enduring problems for psychologists interested in challenging

mainstream psychological practices is how to challenge the notion and ideal of causal explanation? More specifically, how can Wittgenstein's philosophy be used to challenge the ubiquity of causal explanations in psychology? Wittgenstein's descriptive approach is relevant where it shows how causal explanations obscure and misrepresent internal relations between concepts. However, the point about internal conceptual relations is not necessarily to argue that *all* psychological concepts are "internally related" to institutions or social context (Harré, 1993, p. 39; Jost, 1995, p. 9; Trigg, 1991, p. 217; i.e., since, as already noted, such broad accounts have the potential to produce conceptual distortion despite their "steering values"). Instead, in this section specific Wittgensteinian remarks are presented in order to counter the view that causal explanation is always an important goal for psychology. As with other sections, examples of personal reflexivity and emotion are examined although here the purpose is to demonstrate how a continuing emphasis on causal explanation needs to be "upset" (RPP I, §905).

An important feature of science is not merely to describe phenomena but to create concepts that have the potential to unify a domain of observation. As Baker and Hacker (1985) note:

> . . . in the case of science, whether at the early classificatory stage or at the stage of explanation and discovery, a paradigmatic schema or model may, by *creating* internal relations, afford such insights as will yield a surview and hence a fruitful morphological, explanatory, or predictive theory. (p. 540)

This point builds on remarks already examined about the role of a conceptual-discursive surview and the view that reflexive research should not be aiming just to produce another theory. Two particular Wittgensteinian

targets identified by Baker and Hacker (1985) have the potential to connect with critical psychological studies:

> Wittgenstein emphasized that he was trying to effect a change in style of thought. It is plausible to take this as a pointer to the significance of analogical thinking, produced by comprehensive survey of similarities (and dissimilarities), and a repudiation of the ubiquity of causal or genetic explanation. (p. 540)

Accordingly, Wittgenstein cannot be taken to deny causal explanations, for example, in psychology or an interest in the genesis of a particular phenomenon. Instead, it is more important to challenge the "ubiquitous applicability to all questions" (p. 540) of both types of explanation and, in this particular section, the continuing importance attached to causal explanation.

On Wittgenstein's view, an understanding of the internal relations between concepts should not be confused with the identification of external, causal relations between objects or levels of phenomena. The internal relations between concepts are drawn out by conceptual investigation although they may also, in some everyday and scientific sense, be created by a theory or type of comparison (see Baker & Hacker (1985) above). Use of a proposition to assert a relation between two parts or "levels" of a psychological phenomenon is therefore "not describing objects but constructing concepts" (LFM, VII, p. 73). Accordingly, where a particular theory exploits a causal similarity, for example, between pride and another emotion as the basis for potential empirical investigation, it may be reasonable to claim that the "dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects" (PI, p. 212). For example, Lewis (1993) claims that pride, shame and guilt are reflexive

emotions because their common cause is an "internal comparison" between an individual's actions and the representation of a rule, standard or goal. If this case represents other causal explanations in psychology, such theoretical propositions that seem to highlight fundamental similarities are perhaps not the discovery "of a true theory, but of a fruitful new aspect" (Baker and Hacker, 1985, p. 536).

The utility of a conceptual investigation of the internal relations between concepts in relation to the problems of causal explanation is also apparent in many of Wittgenstein's remarks on rules and rule-following. The remarks that precede the "Private Language Argument" in the *Philosophical Investigations* draw out the pictures and philosophical prejudices that inform views such as Lewis' cognitive theory of pride, shame and guilt. Wittgenstein provides several examples of the internal relation between understanding a rule — what might be called its cognitive aspects — and his preference for showing how this understanding is manifest in subsequent actions and reactions. An example of how an internal relation occurs in everyday life is where a person claims to understand a rule but then subsequently acts against it. There are various reasons (or perhaps causes) that explain why a person does not accord with a rule, but the important philosophical point to emerge from such a case is that any statement by the person about understanding the rule would become meaningless if their actions and reactions did not also accord.

However, the intention here is not to provide an account of rules and rule-following to counteract the emphasis on causal explanation in psychology. It would be possible to establish many conceptual connections between Wittgenstein's account of rule-following and Rosenberg's (1990) interest in reflexive agency, reflexive cognition and emotion. This task might

even establish internal relations between these concepts so that it would be important to explain, for example, all the connections between remarks on rule-following and attempts to understand, control, identify and cope with personal emotions. But the type of problem that is more relevant to a critical study of personal reflexivity and emotion is the role of remarks such as the following: "if a person *knows* a rule and *decides* to follow it, these mental states become causes of her action" (Gadenne, 1989, p. 460). Gadenne speculates that "this is perhaps what social scientists mean when they speak of rules as causes" (p. 460) and the example is relevant because we want to know how participating in normative cultural and linguistic practices, voluntarily according with rules and actively pursuing standards and goals may "generate" particular emotions (i.e., emotions that may then need to be controlled, embellished or understood).

Moreover, it is worth examining the wider surroundings of emotions in relation to the issue of causation. Is it always the case, for example, that an absence of reflexive agency or cognition can be regarded as a causally determined action? More specifically, is the problem with emotions — and therefore our failure to understand the limits of causal accounts of emotion — that people "adopt the strategy of attempting to control the *causes* of these experiences" (p. 11). In other words, apart from the limitations of Rosenberg's view that these causes are found in the mind and in the body, it is important to examine the limits of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition with respect to emotion. Although Rosenberg would probably argue the more general point along with Greenwood (1991) that some of the "(human) powers that are referenced in causal explanations of human action may be under the control of some (human) agents" (p. 5), we need to know which powers, when and what their limits are.

In the present circumstances we want to begin to examine this issue in a manner that does not produce conceptual distortion: hence, it is important to provide some Wittgensteinian remarks on the problems of causal explanations as they relate to both the collective and individual limits on forms of reflexive agency and cognition. With regard to the issue of collective limits we need to see whether a conceptual account can be used to counter causal explanations, which Harré (1993) argues occur when collectivist points of view treat the relations between people and social structures in external, causal terms. One example is where a particular individual becomes an object of pride for a group and can therefore be said to have caused an increase in the positive feelings within that group. Moreover, the collective effect of these individual experiences and expressions may have unique and unpredictable consequences within a culture (e.g., sales of national flags increase, etc.). Even this specific example demonstrates that aspects of cultural surroundings and people's relations to them "become what they are partly because of numerous coincidences" (Smedslund, 1985, p. 80). Smedslund's point is worth noting because studying closely the conceptual-discursive detail of the relations between individuals and collectives admits further subtleties: for instance, "both the particular life situations encountered by each individual and the features of the surrounding culture are *historical* events" (p. 80). An important feature of these events is that they are "resistant to explanation and prediction in terms of general theory" because they are "the confluence of mutually independent casual chains" (p. 80). Thus even ostensibly external and causal aspects of people's lives can be revealed in a less deterministic light by a conceptual-discursive survey (see also Harré's (1993) discussion of how we often create a coherent, purposeful history out

of the chaotic events we live through).

A similar point about the importance of representing conceptual relations is indicated by the fact that understanding emotional reactions such as an increase in a nation's pride would be distorted if it were regarded as a product of "economic causation" (Stearns, 1993). For example, Rose (1984) argues that after an international humiliation or defeat one of the best means of "causing" an increase in pride is economic success. Again, such a complicated confluence of events should not be taken to undermine a conceptual-discursive investigation and the fact that it can indicate other occasions in which national pride is spontaneously expressed and collectively manifested. Recovery of national pride may occur, for example, in conjunction with economic recovery but should not necessarily be regarded as causally determined by economic changes (Rose, 1984, p. 23). For an analysis may also include changes in standards and values that seem to compel quite different assessments of appropriate statements, expressions and actions by individuals with regard to the mood of a group, region, or nation. Although it may be difficult for individuals to account for such broad changes without being tempted to produce some form of rudimentary social theory, a closer examination of the circumstances in which such statements are made and the basis for them may still reveal that any use of the word "because" in them is still "not the 'because' of causation" (Harré, 1993, p. 41).

And there are further examples of the potential for a Wittgensteinian conceptual-discursive surview to prevent a focus on causal explanation from providing distorted accounts of psychological phenomena. For instance, the event that "caused" a particular emotion (or emotion-related response such as excessive pride or a jealous rage) is seen in its context so

that the object of that emotion is not misunderstood (i.e., who that rage is directed towards or how it is expressed). Attending carefully to the reactions and responses of people in everyday life therefore prevents the kind of error (and partial self-correction) that can occur particularly with social transgressions such as where we might be tempted to state, as Polonius did of Hamlet: "Mad let us grant him, then: And now remains. That we find out the cause of this effect. Or rather say, the cause of this defect" (Shakespeare, n.d./1992, p. 798). The internal relation between transgressing actions and their context is hidden by the attempt to find the cause or causal prerequisites of the "effect". Thus by focusing too closely on the causal explanation of particular actions, it is possible to bypass the fact that we are explaining cases of individuals breaking rules rather than according with them (and also not examining the type of highly conceptual and often social means by which judgements about transgressions are formed).

The fact that there may be no effect of a transgression without the "uptake" of others also helps us to understand cases where it is tempting to highlight problems that occur with individual experiences of social confirmation or approbation. For example, when a child is said to be proud because she was the "cause" of her own success this can be taken to mean that she was responsible for it. However, attribution theorists such as Weiner (1986) are often misled by the picture that the individual concerned has mysteriously produced her own emotion by way of an internalized judgement. As Weiner suggests in a rather muddled account of attribution theory, it is the child's cognitive recognition that she was the cause of her own success (or failure) that then causes (or at least augments) an affective reaction. If we were captured by this emphasis on causes and causal

explanation it might suggest further research about the way in which such occasions become incorporated and represented in the long-term emotional dispositions and attribution-style of a particular individual. But it is more important to represent the detail and surroundings of individual experiences and expressions of such emotions with regard to tests, refinements and confirmations of various abilities, skills and attributes in culturally specific situations.

However, Weiner's account does raise a point that Gadenne, Greenwood, Rosenberg and Hochschild also regard as important to understanding the limits of reflexive agency and cognition: underlying and developmentally earlier cognitive abilities such as memory, attention, evaluation, and other processes need to be present *before* they can then "be brought to bear upon the self as an object" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 3). Accordingly, we might focus on underlying, embodied changes that produce unpredictable and sometimes uncontrollable emotional effects even when individuals are participating freely in an activity. When such reactions occur in social situations, it is tempting to describe the causal relation between an object or person in the world and the effect on the brain and body as cognitively mediated. Moreover, if this event persists for some reason in the life of the individual it is possible for a conceptual interest in the role of memory, attention, evaluation, analysis and so on to slide quickly to talk of the internal cognitive components necessary for particular emotions (Rosenberg, 1990). Thus cognitive psychologists are tempted to argue that "global events like speech acts or other social actions presuppose cognitive mechanisms specified by general causal hypotheses" (Gadenne, 1989, p. 459).

It is obviously important that some account of the neurophysiological

grounding of many speech-acts (and reflexive speech-acts) is provided (perhaps as localized by different forms of "sense-extension" technology; see chapter 2, section 2.3)). But we still need to know what Wittgensteinian criticisms there are, if any, of such causal accounts of emotion and personal reflexivity. One possibility is that we should examine how emotions, for example, can be described as "colouring" particular thoughts (RPP II, §160) because this position contrasts with general hypotheses about how reflexive agency and reflexive cognition "work over" an internal state of arousal (i.e., so that "the emotion comes to be mixed with elements that are separate from the physiological experience" (Rosenberg, 1990, pp. 3-4)). A further response is also to recognize that mediating cognitive events and "unconscious mental events . . . are introduced because we wish to say that there *must* be causes of human action" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 17; see previous section for other pictures and assumptions that support causal explanations in psychology). It is important that we examine closely how people "cause themselves" to have particular emotions or, in Rosenberg's equally dubious terms, try to control *in an indirect manner* the "causes" of their emotions. But the overall point is that searching for the causes of emotions in every case may obscure occasions when genuinely spontaneous responses become personally and socially significant.

Wittgenstein also inspires a critical treatment of other cases where conceptualizing the relations between cognition and emotion in causal terms is problematic (e.g., such as where a child feels proud of some activity he has completed or skill he has demonstrated while isolated from others; see chapter 8 for further detail). As noted above, it often seems reasonable to think that speech-acts presuppose more specific, neurophysiologically grounded "abilities" of memory, attention and consciousness. For example,

Ellsworth (1991) provides an account of cognition and emotion that moves from a description of the dimensions of appraisal that differentiate emotional experiences to the conclusion:

> . . . there is general agreement that the emotions . . . can be broken down into smaller appraisal components, and that many of these components correspond to cognitive appraisals. (p. 145)

However, Shanker (1993) argues from a Wittgensteinian perspective that such an explanation is:

> . . . a confusion born from an inappropriate causal picture: from the feeling that we can only predict his behaviour so accurately because we have broken down parts of the machine, can see why *x* causes *y* causes *z*. (p. 225)

Even though Ellsworth's approach appears to be rigorous, the concern here is instead to focus on how we spontaneously create such possibilities by active participation in cultural and linguistic practices. Thus if a conceptual-discursive surview assembles detail about our use of psychological concepts that "upsets our concepts of causality" (RPP I, §905) it seems reasonable to also concur with Wittgenstein's conclusion: "then it is high time they were upset" (*loc. cit.*).

To summarize, explanations of psychology that focus on the possible causes of psychological phenomena set a standard which can, in the process of its pursuit, distort the internal relations between concepts. Problems with causal accounts of personal reflexivity and emotion should reject any view that the phenomena explained are causally determined. The importance of examining the internal relations between concepts was further illustrated with examples of the relations between collectives and

individuals, the potential obfuscation of social transgressions, the importance of concepts such as responsibility and spontaneity, as well as the need to be careful about people's attempts to control or change the causes of emotion in their minds or bodies. It was concluded that when attempts to represent the internal relations between concepts provide important and relevant details, it is reasonable to "upset" psychology's enduring conceptions of causality and causal explanation.

Can psychologists be trained to carry out reflexive, anti-theoretical, non-explanatory work?

An important point mentioned by Wittgenstein which can include our concerns with reflexivity in psychology is "any explanation has its foundation in training" (RPP II, §327). The issue raised by considerations of psychological reflexivity in this context is not whether a causal account of training in psychology is valid[16]. Nor is it to ask if psychologists' preferences for particular types of explanatory approach can themselves be explained in terms of their training. Instead, it is more important to determine when and how psychologists begin to question that training and freely pursue a more reflective and reflexive stance. This issue is relevant to a reconsideration of the links between Wittgenstein's philosophy and psychological reflexivity because it is not obvious that psychologists can be trained (or systematically taught) to adopt a critical, reflexive attitude towards theories, explanations and explanatory systems. Thus where social constructionists have attempted to make psychologists "more reflexive" it is important to examine

[16] For a Wittgensteinian criticism of a causal explanation of learning and understanding music that could easily be extended to training and teaching in psychology see Schulte (1993, p. 43).

whether Wittgensteinian methods and remarks can provide more material for training in the discipline.

The growing value placed on reflexive research in psychology suggests a further problem about the nature of achieving a critical perspective. Critical perspectives on psychology can obviously come from outside the discipline, as the enduring relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy indicates. But there is also the potential for confusion to arise about the appropriate point at which psychologists might begin to become more reflexive. For example, social constructionists have argued that Wittgenstein's remarks and methods may be inserted into the practice of psychology in order to provide alternatives to theory construction. Does it make sense, therefore, to say that psychologists can be trained to be more reflexive? Moreover, could this training appropriately be described as Wittgensteinian if it is to be used within psychology?

As we have seen, philosophy and psychology are quite different tasks on Wittgenstein's view. While the concern has mainly been with reflexive work within psychology that connects with Wittgenstein's philosophy, the extent to which an individual may master and participate in both practices is an open question. Clearly, it is important to recognize disciplinary, institutional and social constraints that contribute towards the specialization that an individual may choose. It is also possible that philosophical problems may come to dominate the thoughts of a reflexive psychologist or, in contrast, a philosopher may become too concerned with the aims and activities of psychological practice. The point is not to identify an *in principle* objection to the possibility that a Wittgensteinian approach can be self-exemplifying in crossing between philosophy and psychology (i.e., since achieving a surview seems to provide the most appropriate crossing point).

However, there are good reasons for thinking that Wittgenstein's philosophy cannot easily become part of the training of psychology. For example, there is an important sense in which a student cannot be trained to see the value of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to psychology. This is simply because such training would, paradoxically, undermine the freedom that leads psychologists to view many of the conceptual problems identified by Wittgenstein as their own. Moreover, it is only after students have mastered many of the concepts and methods of psychology that they begin to be truly critical of them. Mastering the complicated language-game of talking about paradigms, for example, does not substitute for the skills and insights that can come from working within the "new paradigm" to explore other possible research methods and subjects. Rather, it is only later in what can be called a psychologist's "reflexive career" that it is possible to see a connection with Wittgenstein's philosophy.

However, this account differs markedly from the "social poetics" account of the use of Wittgenstein's methods to develop a reflective practice from within and counter theory-based training in psychology (Katz & Shotter, 1996; Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). The central argument of the "social poetics" account is that understanding should not proceed through theories because this approach bypasses much of the ordinary conceptual-discursive detail provided by our moral-practical participation in everyday life. It should be noted that Shotter and Katz remain open to the possibility that the results of a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview might eventually afford limited theory-based organization and explanation. Nevertheless, this is one of a number of activities they list as occurring later rather than earlier in a psychologist's training:

> To send messages; to fully understand each other; to think conceptually; to discourse routinely and skillfully upon a subject; to be able to 'reach out,' so to speak, from within a language-game and talk about the 'contacts' one has made, and to formulate 'theories' about the nature of what is 'out there' — all these and more are abilities that are, or can be, later developments. (p. 227)

Since these theory-oriented and "traditional" ways of pursuing reflexive work in psychology are bypassed by Shotter and Katz, the only other way of connecting with Wittgenstein's philosophy is to use his methods within psychology.

Not surprisingly, there are several problems with Shotter and Katz's presentation as it pertains to the achievement of a reflexive perspective on psychology. One major problem is that the social poetics account does not involve an account of the need for a to and fro movement between philosophy and psychology. Instead, Wittgenstein's methods are presented in a manner that removes the need for psychologists to engage with Wittgenstein's philosophy and to work out particular conceptual problems for themselves. In this manner, it not only presents a version of Wittgenstein's philosophy that makes it possible to train others in his methods, but more problematically seems to counteract one of Wittgenstein's major concerns about readings of his philosophy:

> I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. (PI, p. vi)

It may seem odd that Shotter and Katz are being criticized for disseminating an account of Wittgenstein that is close to the letter and spirit of Wittgenstein's methods and remarks. However, while Shotter and Katz could be argued to present a laudable view that much of the teaching and

training of psychology should not be theory-first, nevertheless there are important reasons why theory should not be bypassed or left until much later in the reflexive career of psychologists. The main reason is that the *freedom* to create theories and lines of investigation that may lead to new advances *or* conceptual entanglement in psychology would be undermined by including Wittgenstein's methods within the training of psychology.

A further problem is that the training psychologists receive in particular concepts, methods, types of explanatory theories and systems provides the basis *both* to adopt the pictures of an obfuscating theoretical-linguistic practice and *also* to use philosophy to remove the resulting "knots in our thinking" (PR, I, §2)[17]. To put this issue in another way, it is only when other perspectives seem to be closed to a psychologist within a particular explanatory system that it is possible to be reacquainted with the detail and variation of possible human activities (and thus to break the hold of a particular theory). This includes the potential also to be critical of many aspects of the discipline in a useful way that removes conceptual confusions, highlights the narrow preoccupation with data and measurement in empirical studies and assembles reminders of the conceptual-discursive detail of phenomena. By presenting an account of Wittgenstein's methods and remarks that can be used in the practices of psychology, Shotter and Katz may prevent psychologists from being trained in the sort of perspectives from which free engagement with Wittgenstein's philosophy will prove to be most profitable and rewarding.

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[17] The whole of Wittgenstein's remark — which is provided because it contrasts with Shotter and Katz's (1996) interpretation of Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology — is:

> Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking which we have tangled up in an absurd way; but to do that it must make movements which are just as complicated as the knots. Although the *result* of philosophy is simple, its methods for arriving there cannot be so. (PR, I, §2)

A problem identified by Ash (1993) is also relevant to this Wittgensteinian consideration of Shotter and Katz's view that Wittgenstein's methods and remarks provide the appropriate approach for anyone concerned with conducting reflexive research:

> . . . asking all psychologists to perform such reflexive moves . . . means asking them to jump over their own shadows — to question the institutionalized presuppositions on which their careers appear to depend, perhaps even before those careers have even begun. (p. 54)

Ash's remark is relevant because it points to the dilemma of wanting to encourage reflexive work in psychology but also realizing that many psychologists will not attempt to make themselves familiar with the detail of Wittgenstein's work (i.e., especially in regard to other areas of traditional and postmodern philosophy). The danger is that by suggesting this alternative without allowing those students of psychology the opportunity to find themselves entangled in similar problems, the psychologists produced by this training will not have learnt for themselves how to stop pursuing a particular line of confused thought and to reveal disguised nonsense.

An indication of this problem is provided by an imaginary example of a sceptical student who uses Wittgenstein's philosophy to adopt what seems to be a reflexive perspective in psychology. The example is an extension of Wittgenstein's case of a pupil who refuses to believe a particular mathematical proposition. Wittgenstein notes of the student's doubt that "we should say he had no grounds for this suspicion" (OC, §322). Extending this example to psychology, we might imagine a student who expresses scepticism that previous generations of humans beyond, for example, 10,000 years had emotions that are as complicated as ours. In this case, it

the proposition they were contradicting formed an explicit part of the student's training in psychology, it could be regarded as what describes as a "hinge proposition":

> That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. (OC, 341)

While the student's contradiction of this proposition might possibly prefigure an important discovery, the point is that unless this contradiction of a hinge proposition is backed up by a whole alternative system or rival theory it could not be exploited in a creative manner[18].

However, the contrast drawn between a psychologist or other relevant practitioner who is advanced in his or her "reflexive career" and a sceptical student helps to introduce the notion of reflexivity that was examined in terms of psychologist's attempts to "explain themselves". In particular, Gergen (1985) argued that an examination of social processes (or social inquiry) could provide an account of psychology's knowledge practices. It seems reasonable to think that Gergen's account could be extended towards the possibility that psychologists could become "more reflexive" of what is presently regarded as the discipline's knowledge[19]. In other words,

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[18] It is a general point that any psychologist must have grounds to create scientific doubt — rather than the sort of doubt that requires philosophical treatment — and provide an appropriate challenge to the assumptions of a particular explanatory system. Interestingly, the example of contradicting a hinge proposition does highlight an issue of relevance to Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity: it suggests that asking what appear to be reflexive questions may, in a strange sense, complete an individual's training in psychology. That is, by asking particular questions it may promote mastery of a psychological theory and the internal relations between its concepts in a manner that does not necessarily require philosophical clarification.

[19] It is interesting to note that Jenkins (1995) provides an account of the attempt to encourage "greater reflexivity" in sociology that is applicable to psychology. According to Jenkins, reflexivity involves training in social skills that researchers may use to overcome biases and oversights that occur mostly in the interaction between researcher and subject(s). Jenkins also provides good epistemological reasons for generic training in reflexivity which

the social process view seems to have the potential to connect with some of Wittgenstein's remarks. But why should the resulting combination augment social constructionist accounts of how it is that psychologists advance in their "reflexive careers"?

One answer is provided by giving more detail of the notion of a "reflexive career" in contrast to the notion that psychologists should provide an account of how they can become more reflective. Bruffee (1993), for example, uses a social constructionist account to show that adopting a critical perspective in disciplines such as psychology is a collaborative achievement. The position agrees with Katz and Shotter's (1996) attempt to provide detail about the use of Wittgenstein's methods to establish a kind of reflective practice. The benefit of this account is its focus on the development of the skills of a reflexive researcher and its avoidance of the view that achieving a reflexive perspective is a private, individual achievement. Reflexivity about the systems of explanation in which we have all, at some stage, been trained is only achieved through conversation with others at particular points in a reflexive career. Although Bruffee unfortunately adopts the simplistic view that thought is internalized conversation, his remarks provide an important contrast with cognitive attempts to explain how psychologists become more reflexive. Thus Bruffee provides an account of how psychologists might adopt a critical reflexive stance on, for example, a particular explanation without adopting the sort of picture that is evident in cognitive accounts of successively general abstraction and the refinement of a largely private, individual and

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should include specific conversation-based "sending" and "receiving" skills. However, it is also important to note that Jenkins does not answer the broader issue raised by the self-posed question: is this "teaching reflexivity?" (see also chapter 4, section 4.3 for an account of psychological reflexivity that recognizes its potential equivocation with forms of personal reflexivity).

decontextualized competence (e.g., Biggs, 1987, 1991).

A further possible connection between the social constructionist account of how psychologists "explain themselves" and Wittgenstein's philosophy is that an account can be provided of the sort of "seeing as" experience that can seem to provide new perspectives to students in their early training. For example, it might seem that a functional explanation of emotions (Averill, 1989) might provide a novel account of our experiences. The experiences of individuals in being taught and trained in new ways of representing (and therefore seeing) human action or practices is often one of the most rewarding features of learning psychological systems and theories. But individuals such as Greenwood (1991) are tempted to adopt a private-cognitive account of this training that presents it as the extension of existing, widely shared theories in everyday life: "what one sees is held to depend upon what one *sees it as,* and what one sees it as is held to depend upon one's prior theories" (p. 92). However, Wittgenstein suggests that where it is tempting to rely on an individual explanation it is crucial to note that what underlies the experience of "seeing as" is not a cognitive or other form of causal substratum but is instead "the mastery of a technique" (PI, p. 208). And even Wittgenstein realizes how strange it is for the mastery of a technique to be "the logical condition of someone's having such-and-such an *experience*!" (PI, p. 208). Nevertheless, where it may be tempting to think that there is a cognitive explanation for the differences in skills between what one trained psychologist can "see" and another cannot, the point stands that "it is only if someone *can do,* has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had *this* experience" (PI, p. 209).

To reiterate, the type of conceptual problems that lead reflexive

researchers in psychology towards philosophy are persistent. In accord with the view that reflexive psychologists need to cross between psychology and philosophy in a to and fro manner, it was argued that reflexive studies are only possible after mastering the concepts, theories, methods and techniques of psychology conceptual problems. *Pace* Shotter and Katz (1996), training in psychology (and, more specifically, many of its theories) is required before it is possible to attempt a reflexive and possibly Wittgensteinian disentanglement from conceptual errors. Although the result of reflexive work may sometimes be appropriately regarded as completing our training or contributing a rival theory to others, it is also possible that we can understand how psychologists might be trained to be "more reflexive". Social constructionist accounts seem to indicate the collaborative, conversational and public nature of achieving a reflexive position in contrast to private, cognitive accounts. The temptation to view reflexivity as either a collaborative-dialogical or cognitive-private achievement was resisted by examining some Wittgensteinian remarks about the experiences of "seeing as" that can help to attract neophyte psychologists towards a particular approach or explanatory system. Thus the "reflexive careers" of psychologists that connect with philosophical description do much more than indicate to other psychologists that they are simply completing their training in the discipline.

3.3 Psychological explanations and their relation to ordinary practices and concepts

One of the temptations in presenting a critical account of psychological

explanation and training is to survey the remarks of novices and other individuals who are free of the explanatory concerns and theoretical concepts of contemporary psychology. Yet in most cases, a potential psychologist will share much common understanding with individuals who have been trained in a particular explanatory system. Indeed, research subjects often have more experience and insights than traditional forms of psychological investigation such as experimentation and surveys allow. But psychological reflexivity in this context is the question of the possible relation between such an explanatory system and the other "system", as Smedslund (1985) mistakenly describes it, that people already have "for describing, explaining, and so on, the behaviour of persons, namely commonsense psychology" (p. 78). The relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy is that his remarks seem to encourage a commonsense, ordinary language approach within psychology that social constructionists have perhaps taken too far in the name of psychological reflexivity.

The limits of revision and the importance of participation

The view that psychologists who test their abstruse theories and engage in particular studies presuppose the same language of psychological concepts used by their subjects is an issue that has already been examined in terms of "linguistic objectivity" and creating "distance" (see chapter 2). Although the issue seems to have been addressed, further issues remain in relation to the potential Wittgensteinian remarks and methods to correct and augment some aspects of social constructionism. Two particular issues will be reconsidered which pertain to psychological reflexivity within linguistic and

cultural contexts and, more specifically, the idea that its recognition supposedly entails that the language used by psychologists to talk about psychological phenomena must be the same as (or potentially translated into) ordinary language (Smedslund, 1985). The first issue is that Wittgenstein helps to provide a perspective on the limits of psychologists' revisions of ordinary language. Secondly, we can evaluate the relevance of an alternative Wittgensteinian account of psychologists' participation in cultural and linguistic practices.

One of the problems faced by psychologists who attempt to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology is that Wittgenstein's work is still dismissed by many as "ordinary language" philosophy. For example, Hacker (1996) argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is unfairly associated with the ordinary language philosophy said to be inspired by his methods and remarks. More specifically, Parker (1989) argues that the "linguistic turn" in philosophy is increasingly being left behind by other important developments in postmodern philosophy (the extent to which Wittgenstein produced a richer account of culture than any strict focus on linguistic details will be examined in chapter 4). However, it is important to resist the conception that Wittgenstein was only interested in describing ordinary language: hence the broad argument that Wittgenstein's philosophy seems to support an untenable epistemology in which description of the use of psychological concepts in ordinary language and practices is the foundation for all psychological investigations.

Such a position is evident in Shotter's (1992a) remarks that psychological theories must inevitably "be made intelligible in ordinary language" and evaluated "in the same way that they (ordinary people) do"

(p. 179). In this Wittgenstein-inspired position, Shotter also finds good reasons for resisting forms of realism:

> . . . it is this reflexive turn that has a number of consequences unpalatable to scientists of the external world: because theories and models do not have immediate intelligibility in everyday life in their own terms, social constructionists have become more interested in accounts, narratives and the use of discursive repertoires. (p. 179)

The problem with Shotter's position is not only that it gives individuals in everyday life the power, at least in principle, to evaluate a theory, but also is an important part of an ostensibly Wittgensteinian alternative to psychological theorizing. This is despite the fact that Wittgenstein did not want his philosophy to relate to ordinary language use of psychological concepts in a manner that could be described as producing only a "certain jargon" (LFM, XXXI, p. 293; see Rorty (1989) p. 88 in chapter 1).

Wittgenstein's philosophical aim was not to restate the use of ordinary psychological concepts when faced with problems caused by the concepts and theories of psychological science. The private language argument, for example, engages with misconceptions about private experiences in everyday life, but can also be extended to remarks made by psychologists in describing the results of their theoretical and empirical studies (see examples from Rosenberg (1990) in Part 2). Wittgenstein's clarification of ordinary forms of explanation is concerned with highlighting "idle language" in everyday life, but without interfering directly to reform language (i.e., either with regard to everyday or more technical matters (PI, §§124, 132; LFM, I, pp. 14-15)). But what sort of description does Wittgenstein offer of the relations between psychology and people's cultural and linguistic practices?

First, it is important to note that the ordinary language use of

psychological concepts that Wittgenstein describes is not static and fixed. Although Wittgenstein's implication that the grammar of psychological concepts is autonomous, psychology does have the potential to revise many expressions, remarks and accounts in everyday life. In other words, this grammatical autonomy is not undermined by the fact that terms used within areas of psychology such as psychoanalytic theory are often taken up and used in everyday life (i.e., thus suggesting a broad cultural sense in which psychology reflects back upon and changes the phenomena it investigates). Wittgenstein's remarks are not, however, being used to support the argument made by commentators such as MacIntyre (1985), who suggests that psychology has the power to "make itself true or false" (p. 897; i.e., that in a restricted linguistic sense psychology "has itself brought into being new ways of thinking, feeling, acting, and interacting" (p. 897; see chapter 4 for accounts of ways in which language and forms of psychological expression change through which psychology). Instead, we are interested in how philosophy can describe the relations between what Shotter (1993b) describes as conversational and academic discourses and thus provide a useful account of the limits of any reflexive effect of psychology on cultural and linguistic practices (i.e., such as where the misuse and incorrect explanation of a useful theoretical concept in psychology by an average "man on the street" would be highly amusing to experts).

Wittgenstein's philosophy can be used to describe the relations between ordinary language and the practices in which it is mastered represented, revised, or ignored by psychologists. Although it is reasonable to think that psychological studies may lead to some revisions of the everyday use of psychological concepts, they could not lead to complete revision of all of these concepts and categories. However, the aim here is

not to examine the broad view that our everyday use of psychological concepts is explanatory in a manner that might eventually be replaced. Strom (1994), for example, has already presented a convincing Wittgensteinian perspective against Churchland's (1988) eliminative reductionist view of everyday explanations of psychological phenomena. Rather, the conceptual criticism about the relations between psychology and particular cultural and linguistic practices is restricted to the point that the *concept of revisability* cannot itself be the subject of revision[20].

The basis of theorizing in everyday life provides an important point not only with regard to the fact that we do not need to change our language of psychological concepts after we have learned them, but also that the possibility of revising some concepts presupposes practical mastery of them. Hacker (1996) argues this point and extends it to include descriptions of data and non-theoretical observations:

> Theory presupposes description of data demanding a *theoretical* explanation. The bottom-level data for any theory-construction are non-theoretical observations that stand in need of such explanation. One must have a high degree of concept-mastery and have engaged in extensive concept-application before one can have any articulate observations that stand in need of a theoretical explanation. (p. 415)

It is quite possible, of course, that some cultures use the vocabularies provided by psychologists to talk about their emotions in considerable detail (see next section). But this issue needs to be kept distinct from the fact that

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[20] A better suggestion is that Wittgenstein's philosophy counters any view that psychology tests the theories that people offer as part of their "folk psychology". But it is unhelpful to think that many of the concepts that people use to express their emotions and ascribe psychological phenomena to others are akin to scientific theories. Even if the problems that are disentangled by the private language argument, for example, are confined to western "theories" of autonomous individuals who have such private objects as emotions, there is still no need to adopt the view that the language used by individuals should be described as a

"numerous desires, beliefs, intentions, and emotions presuppose the possession of concepts available only to language-users" (p. 442). And although the examples offered by Hacker are clearly not motivated by any conceptual interest in reflexive agency and reflexive cognition, still one example of a language-dependent phenomenon that is relevant to Part 2 is "a love of one's country or pride in one's work" (p. 442; see chapter 5 for the possibility that these statements involve a form of reflexive positioning against other cultures and individuals).

These points about the limits of revision, initially raised in terms of reflexivity in psychology, lead to the further issue of the extent to which participation in many cultural and linguistic practices is presupposed by psychology. A Wittgensteinian reconsideration again suggests some points that have not been raised by social constructionists but which have the potential to augment that perspective. Social constructionists are, of course, interested in the ways in which highly conceptual and language-dependent phenomena develop and are maintained in particular cultures. This issue might even be explored in the sense that, for example, emotions and emotion-related expressions might involve too much talk in some cultures. Such a cultural study might include an examination of how the highly-conceptual and unnecessarily linguistic practices surrounding the expression of an emotion in mainstream American films could be contrasted with the use of silence and facial expressions in other forms of cinema, thus reducing the sense that everything of importance has been explained to the viewer. In other circumstances, it is important to entertain how limited the possibilities of moving other people would be without language. Such

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widely shared theory as to how psychological states are expressed in behaviour (Greenwood, 1991).

perspectives may provide a contrast to the practices that we participate in as psychologists and also show that our engagement with such theory-informed or highly-conceptual expressions of emotions is worthy of critical study.

Wittgenstein's remarks also explore a similar line of argument that is relevant to a consideration of the participation and mastery of cultural and linguistic practices that psychology presupposes. Indeed, Wittgenstein's example takes the example of the sceptical student mentioned in section 3.2 one stage further and applies it to the sort of knowledge that a child learns by participation. For many of the phenomena grouped under the ostensibly revealing categories of personal reflexivity and emotion presuppose a type of knowledge that "can only have learned it by living with people" (RPP II, §29). Wittgenstein's broad point is that although it is possible to imagine "being allowed merely to observe life without participating in it", Wittgenstein argues that "anyone who did this would then understand human life as we understand the life of fish or even of plants" (RPP II, §29). There are obviously degrees of difference in the understanding that is presupposed by participation in a culture and which might be represented by examining the learning that either someone from another culture or a child would make (in addition to our reactions to them when they made a mistake). These are just two of many other potential examples of people (or potential people) who could not "fully understand" (Shotter, 1996) many of our everyday psychological phenomena.

There are many circumstances in which we can watch other people in the same manner that it is possible to view a foreign film without subtitles and see how much we understand. However, it is doubtful whether we could so easily overcome our lack of participation in other cultures to the

extent that we could fully understand and therefore share the strange language, reactions and expressions of another culture (RPP II, §30). And, as already noted, it may be difficult to represent clearly the type of knowledge that "outsiders" from our culture learn by participation in its highly linguistic and conceptual practices. In this context, it might be tempted to adopt a position in which we imagine what our highly conceptual practices are like from outside (i.e., in order to represent the exact nature of what others have to learn and how this participation shapes their emotions, judgements, actions and reactions). One relevant example Wittgenstein offers is where we might entertain the possibility that individuals lacked many of the phenomena described by Rosenberg's theory. In particular, Wittgenstein asks:

> . . . can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual? (PI, §420)

But in practice the result of an attempt to imagine, for example, that "the children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism" has unexpected effects:

> . . . you will either find these words becoming quite meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort. (*loc. cit.*)

Such "uncanny feelings" can hardly be regarded as a source of fundamental insights especially about the "real nature" of language-dependent emotions and other complicated psychological experiences. Instead, the use of a technique like this in psychology may simply create a feeling of distance from other people that goes against the participation in practices that the

ability to understand fully other people presupposes.

To summarize, specific issues surrounding the social constructionist emphasis on psychological reflexivity by social constructionists were explored. It was argued that although Wittgenstein's philosophy does indeed examine ordinary language, psychological studies must not always be evaluated and eventually understood by the ordinary "man in the street". The contrasting eliminativist perspective was avoided in favour of a position in which some concepts and accounts in everyday life may be revised by psychological investigations. More specifically, it was noted that the mastery of many highly conceptual and language-dependent forms of emotion and personal reflexivity is presupposed by descriptions of data and non-theoretical observations (i.e., that psychologists may attempt to explain in theoretical terms). In a final point it was noted that the importance of participation is better achieved by examining the type of learning that is required by "outsiders" in order to fully understand and share the linguistic practices of another culture (i.e., in contrast to the sort of "uncanny feeling" produced by imagining that other individuals are not reflexive agents and thinkers).

The relation between newly fashioned concepts in psychology and everyday linguistic practices

It is clear from the previous section that there are normative and practical limits on the revision that psychology can achieve as well as the nature of the distance between psychologists and their "subjects" that theory can provide. However, both Greenwood's (1991, 1992) account of the linguistic objectivity of theoretical descriptions and Shotter's (1996) contrasting

attempt to cut-out the theoretical "middleman" were not endorsed. Still a remaining question relevant to both perspectives is how newly fashioned concepts in psychology relate usefully to everyday linguistic practices. Further Wittgensteinian remarks are therefore used to address this issue before an evaluation of Wittgenstein's so-called methods of "social poetics" (Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996) is attempted in the last section of this chapter.

The argument that a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey is the appropriate end product of reflexive work within psychology has been developed to this point by exarnining Wittgenstein's remarks. The position is in agreement with some aspects of social constructionism although, *pace* Shotter (1996), it is argued that newly fashioned concepts and theories are important to psychology. This is not, however, to argue that an understanding of a particular phenomenon can be achieved by substituting a new vocabulary for those used in our present cultural and linguistic practices. Instead, we should be concerned with an account of how:

> . . . in order to create 'new theory', research must restructure the language out of which theory can grow. In order to do this, it is necessary to restructure those forms of practices to which the relevant elements of everyday languages are bound. (Gustavsen (in press) in Shotter & Katz (1996), pp. 214-215)

Shotter and Katz (1996) paraphrase Gustavsen's position with the remark that this different view of the relation of theory to practice "has grown out of a new view of the relation of language to reality, mostly influenced by Wittgenstein's (1953) later work" (Shotter & Katz, 1996, p. 214).

One of the reasons why a form of restructuring of language and practices is involved is that "psychological concepts are just everyday

concepts" (RPP II, §62). In this respect, a Wittgensteinian surview of psychological concepts is quite different from the results of a theoretical survey because "they are not concepts newly fashioned by science for its own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry" (RPP II, §62). Therefore, we should not conflate Wittgenstein's interest in *psychological concepts* with the many *concepts of psychology* evident in discipline's theories and practices. But Shotter (1996) is right to challenge the view that we should first know about many psychological phenomena through the concepts and models of particular theories. Relating this issue to the comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview that will be produced in Part 2, it is clear that a survey of theories would not achieve the same clarity (and potential for other new theories) as a surview. Unfortunately, with regard to training and teaching in psychology, by taking Wittgenstein's relevance to psychology to be a general argument against a theory-first perspective, potential reflexive psychologists seem to be spared the type of engagement with theory that led Shotter and other social constructionists to discover the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

A surview also, of course, is likely to engage with theories in order to disentangle some (but not all) of their conceptual problems. As a result, the notion of a surview argued for thus far provides a different conception of the relations between theory and practice. It does not, however, provide a specific method that allows psychologists to avoid engaging with theory, nor does it entirely substitute for theory construction which, it should be noted, may be both useful, challenging and creative. In this manner, it may still be regarded as allowing for theory construction to occur in specific domains without necessarily providing any guidance as to which lines of research to pursue into particular disciplines. Instead, it provides a resource and basis

from which these different areas of potential or actual growth can be judged. More specifically, by surveying particular clusters of concepts, their relations, and limits a surview does not proceed through the concepts of psychology even though these may also be in common use.

In this manner, the survey of pride does not proceed through a survey of concepts such as self-esteem. Indeed, this activity reverses the attitude of researchers such as Wells and Marwell (1976) towards everyday concepts:

> . . . although self-esteem may be a theoretical construct requiring a clear conceptual statement of definition before we can arrive at its operational counterpart, it is also, unfortunately, a term in common day-to-day usage. (p. 8)

The aim of the investigation in Part 2 is not to gather people's theories about other people or collect their reflections on personal experiences. An example relevant to pride might be the following: "vanity and pride are different things, though the words are often used synonymously" (Austen, 1813/1985, p. 16). In other words, such embellished remarks about what individuals do and feel are not regarded as theories which can be systematically tested and refined (although the example may approximate what psychologists do when they formalize their insights). This account of a surview and its status therefore contrasts with Shotter's (1996) view that Wittgenstein "redescribes in a more practical way many topics and events that we are tempted to put into theoretical terms" especially "whenever we find ourselves faced with questions about why we act as we do" (p. 8).

As noted in the previous section, a constraint on theorizing in psychology is that the theories produced cannot stem too far from the concepts of ordinary life. However, although the result of fashioning new concepts in psychology may be unintelligible to the "man in the street", why

should this be a criterion for psychology? For psychology does fashion new concepts and theories for the purpose of highlighting and perhaps even revising and explaining many of the ordinary circumstances in which psychological concepts are used. The criterion of intelligibility is therefore questionable because many challenging and creative scientific theories, techniques and discoveries can be described as external and additional to shared language-games, without necessarily being nonsensical. Moreover, legitimate reflexive work of the sort described by Barker (1989; see chapter 1) is similar to other challenging and creative advances within the social sciences that initially may not be intelligible to other practitioners let alone the "man in the street". Of course, because psychologists can be said to work within, explore and extend the possibilities of grammar, this description does not mean that the general public *must* eventually be able to comprehend and support every aspect of theoretical advance.

It can be difficult to distinguish between the description and exposure of philosophical prejudices and potentially useful and creative critiques of scientific work (as Baker and Hacker's (1985) account of a surview demonstrates; see chapter 1, section 1.3). A further aspect of Shotter's position is to argue that Wittgenstein's "ordinary language" methods are useful within psychology because:

> . . . by the careful use of selected images, similes, or metaphors he suggests new ways of talking that can lend or give a first form to such sensed but otherwise unnoticed distinctions, thus to make reflective contemplation of their nature possible. (p. 10).

While it is clear that philosophers and psychologists may engage in such work, it is often difficult to distinguish where the line between philosophy

and psychology should be drawn. However, one way of drawing the distinction is to ask whether the images, similes or metaphors produced in a practice are for practical purposes (i.e., since applicability provides an important criterion for any theory). In other words, a useful theory should do more than merely provide a rival language for talking about phenomena of interest to psychologists. Thus while new theory should not necessarily "restructure" a cultural and linguistic practice as Gustavsen claims, still it should lead to some practical change or, more specifically, change in the way we view our cultural and linguistic practices (see chapter 4).

Considering the status of newly fashioned concepts in psychology also provides an opportunity to assess issues relevant to Rosenberg's reflexivity and emotion theory. For example, do the categories of reflexivity agency and reflexive cognition provide a specific example of "organizing models for the production of fruitful empirical theories or typologies" (Baker & Hacker, 1985, p. 539)? Or is it a misleading pseudo-explanation to say that these two reflexive processes radically transform the physiological basis of emotional identification, display and experience? While Rosenberg's account seems to provide an important organization of existing concepts, it is also a potential target of Shotter's (1996) Wittgenstein-inspired criticism:

> . . . we wilfully look for general theoretical principles hidden behind appearances instead of for the particular practical details we use in following the immediate activity between us. (p. 7)

To put this point in more relevant Wittgensteinian terms, the difficulty with conceptual redescription of the type provided by the categories of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition is that it involves a wider tendency to "confuse category differences with differences between kinds" (BB, §64). As

such, the theoretical vocabulary gives us the mistaken impression that "reflexive processes" are something in common between a large number of diverse emotions and emotion-related phenomena.

Apart from the fact that Rosenberg ignores many important conceptually-obvious details about emotion, further problems occur which seem to be internal to the theory and its definitions. We might want to know, for example, whether hope provides a good example of the effects of reflexive cognition or reflexive agency. Or is the main problem that hope may need to be identified through language in some contexts, controlled in its expression in others (e.g., in order not to upset others), and perhaps avoided in thought (e.g., to be preoccupied by the fact that a loved one may be still be alive in impossible circumstances)? The point is not necessarily to reject all general propositions and their role in a particular theory as it may be useful and interesting, for example, to know that most attempts to change negative emotions in everyday life involve attempts to act upon the body while positive emotion changes rely more on cognitive strategies. Or it might be important to have evidence which shows that only particular types of emotions can be accurately judged without being dependent on individuals to confirm our guesses. And more specific, legitimate empirical work might flow from the provision of such general propositions and hypotheses. Nevertheless, it is also clear that general theories can prevent researchers from engaging in those practices where understanding and conversational engagement with research participants, practical mastery of relevant everyday concepts, descriptions of "data" and non-theoretical observations are crucial research requirements.

This issue is also demonstrated by the fact that theories describe information gained from particular practices for the purposes of prediction

and control: that is, by summarizing knowledge about a particular psychological phenomenon or building on the experiences of others, a theory indicates how a specific instance or case can be approached. It is not necessarily the case, as Shotter and Katz (1996) describe it, that theory-informed practice always puts us in situations where:

> . . . instead of being able to directly and immediately sense the fitting of one's actions to one's circumstances, bodily, one is in the position of having to act 'blindly'; one must work things out, cognitively, step-by-step, as if by inference. And furthermore, in such circumstances, one always has to argue and to justify to others one's interpretation of the theory in question. (p. 233)

While much of the work of Part 2 was produced in agreement with Shotter and Katz's view of a kind of reflexive practice in psychology, it is also important to accept that theories can be useful in practice. For example, theories developed from the "resource" of a surview could provide skills and techniques that could help others to reduce the gap between theory and experience. And it is quite possible that the practical familiarity with a theory provided by training might well be independent of any debate about the worth of specific psychological explanations. For example, a theory may be useful even though it does not decide the issue of whether research participants or counselling clients have changed because they have directly controlled the cognitive cause of their emotions or, instead, adopted a type of linguistic and conversational practice that involves a variation in an emotional syndrome (and its uptake by others).

To summarize, confusions surrounding psychological reflexivity in descriptions of the relations between psychological theory and ordinary linguistic practices were examined. A surview was presented as an alternative to more traditional views of the relation between theory and

critical practice in psychology. While Wittgenstein is correct to note that psychological concepts are not newly fashioned as is the case in other sciences, nevertheless theory should not be evaluated solely in terms of intelligibility constraints. Creative theoretical advances can occur without necessarily needing to be understood by the "man on the street". Particular problems with Rosenberg's theory were also addressed including its generality and avoidance of the detail of specific emotions. The issue of applicability also raises the issue of how to reduce and perhaps even replace the need to act in relation to a theory in psychology. Thus it was argued that newly fashioned concepts and theoretical constructs should continue to play a potentially challenging role in clinical and research practices.

An assessment of social constructionist alternatives to theoretical explanation

Shotter's (1996) account of alternatives to theoretical explanation seems to make one concession to the defence of some newly fashioned concepts and theoretical constructs in the previous section. In particular, Shotter's concern seems to be with our initial research stages or training in the discipline where it is important that we grasp "the dialogical nature of our social practices more directly in practice, rather than attempting first to know them in theory" (p. 3). In this last section, it is important to examine whether Wittgenstein's philosophy can be inserted into the practice of psychology and used as an alternative to theoretical explanation (Shotter, 1996; Shotter & Katz, 1996). For in contrast to Shotter's position, it has been argued that Wittgenstein's methods aim to achieve a surview of the use of

psychological concepts that can be contributed to by philosophers and psychologists without belonging exclusively to either practice. Nevertheless, Shotter's use of Wittgenstein's methods seems to be similar to the account offered thus far of the type of work that reflexive psychologists can achieve and which is, moreover, exemplified by the approach towards pride in Part 2.

Although Wittgenstein's methods provide a radical challenge to traditional argumentation in philosophy, it is important to be clear about their relation to psychology. In particular, Shotter's (1992) rejection of metatheory and change from metamethodological discussion to the insertion of Wittgenstein's method into psychology sets a difficult precedent. For it combines an extension of Wittgenstein's rejection of explanation in philosophy and demonstrates the use of particular methods within psychology in order to provide an alternative to theoretical work. One of the reasons why Shotter adopts this position is that it follows the Wittgensteinian recognition that we have to work within language using various techniques and approaches to highlight our cultural and linguistic practices. But Shotter also presents an example of the temptation to include Wittgenstein within psychology which is motivated by the view that reflexive work can solve the problems of psychology autonomously (i.e., without necessarily retaining a role for philosophy). In other words, psychologists do not need to engage with the ideas or arguments of an independent philosophical position, but instead can import what they need to be able to do reflexive work.

Shotter and Katz (1996), in particular, admit "we have been most influenced by Wittgenstein's (1953, 1980a, 1980b, 1981) innovative approach to philosophical investigation" (p. 215). There are many ways of stating the "problem" of our dependence on language in ways that tease out

reflexive issues. For example, if theories are language-games how could one language-game be any more fundamental or useful than another? In this respect, it is interesting to examine Shotter and Katz's (1996) Wittgenstein-inspired solution for psychology:

> . . . we must begin our studies in a quite different way: by studying how, by interweaving our talk in with our other actions and activities, we first develop and sustain between us, different particular *ways* of relating ourselves to each other in our activities in the world — that is, that we should first study how we construct what Wittgenstein calls our different *forms of life* with their associated *language-games.* And only then should we turn to a study of how we might 'attend out' *from within* those forms of life, so to speak, to take explicit notice of the various ways we can make contact with our surroundings through the forms of talk (the language-games) that our forms of life make available to us. (pp. 228-229).

This is similar to Harré's argument that it is important first to describe the "cognitive and moral features of the language-games of emotional display and ascription" (Harré, 1986, p. 12). But what are the details of Wittgenstein's methods and why are they more revealing than existing methods in psychology?

This issue is important because the argument presented to this point has suggested that a conceptual-discursive investigation will survey and include examples that psychological methods often bypass. For example, we want to examine the detail of how people engage with diverse and different cultural and linguistic practices and to assemble reminders about how such nontheory-based abilities are employed. One of the ways in which this "greater experience of mankind" (PI, p. 227) can be approximated is by assembling a wide variety of examples of a particular phenomenon of interest. Unfortunately, Shotter and Katz's example is quite different to the interest in the potential of a surview of pride to counter some of the

generalities of Rosenberg's theory of emotion. Wittgenstein's methods are instead applied to a mentoring program in which students and mentors focus "on fleeting events, on subtleties, on the unique, novel, only 'once occurrent' events that 'strike us'" (Katz & Shotter, 1996, p. 245). However, while the result in their case is a kind of reflective practice, it is interesting to examine whether the attempt to represent the clusters of concepts surrounding pride in a critical but clear manner has a similar basis.

The notion of "cluster" in this context provides one example of the new ways of talking that need to be constructed to summarize the linguistic detail encountered (i.e., novelistic details and examples that we are "struck by" which are also revealing). In this manner it is possible to extend Wittgenstein's notion of a surview since he not only indicates:

> . . . that, by the careful use of selected images, similes, analogies, metaphors, or 'pictures,' he also suggests *new ways of talking* that not only orient us toward sensing otherwise unnoticed distinctions and relations for the first time, but that also suggest new connections and relations with the rest of our proceedings. (p. 231)

Part of the method used in Part 2 is to assemble examples from a broad variety of texts that can be readily accessed by many participants in our cultural and linguistic practices. However, because of their different focus, Katz and Shotter provide few details as to how the results of the application of Wittgenstein's methods in psychology can be reported. For example, since all of the conditions in which a particular psychological concept such as "to pride oneself" cannot be enumerated, it is better to explore and evaluate talk employing the words "pride" and "proud" in all possible pronominal forms. In this regard, it may be difficult to argue that particular ways of organizing and presenting these conceptual similarities and

distinctions in psychology are not theoretical in some manner (e.g., that the notion of a "cluster" of concepts is purely descriptive).

Nevertheless, by engaging in this activity we employ a less reflective and more practical ability with regard to representing the use of a concept. Wittgenstein describes this ability in the following way:

> . . . if a circumstance makes the use doubtful, I can say so, and also *how* the situation is deviant from the usual one. (RPP II, §202)

Also while we may examine whether other synonyms could be substituted for pride without losing any meaning, we may also ask whether the opposite of pride, in different cases, might be inactivity or boredom as in children whereas it could easily be depression, shame, low self-esteem or a lack of dignity in adulthood. In this manner the linguistic detail and conversational-dependence of pride can be revealed and represented (see chapter 2, section 2.1). Moreover, a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview can achieve what Shotter and Katz (1996) describe as the use of Wittgenstein's methods to:

> . . . help us grasp something new, as yet unseen, in the emerging articulation of our speech entwined activities as they unfold in our very ears (if not before our very eyes). (p. 11)

This focus on detail in specific circumstances may also indicate how particular word choices are, apart from their role in ascribing or expressing an emotion, employed "to make crucial differences, in the larger flow of activity within which we are involved" (Shotter & Katz, 1996, p. 229). The linguistically-created, conversationally-maintained, materially-interwoven and culturally-specific practices that constitute this larger flow of activity are

therefore also objects of investigation in Part 2.

In this last section, alternatives to theoretical explanation in psychology demonstrated in work by Shotter (1996) and Shotter and Katz (1996) were examined. In contrast to the position developed in this thesis, Shotter and Katz (1996) argue that Wittgenstein's methods can be inserted into the practices of psychology. But this aspect of their position is problematic especially when a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview is regarded as a resource that should not be viewed as part of the activity of philosophy or the practice of psychology. Moreover, Katz and Shotter's (1996) example of developing a reflective mentoring practice does not relate particularly well to the surview of pride that is used in Part 2 to counter the problems of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory. Thus while many of their points are relevant to the conceptual-discursive survey of pride, Shotter and Katz's overall position on Wittgenstein's methods as a replacement for theoretical explanations in psychology was rejected.

Summary

The reconsideration of psychological reflexivity in this chapter focused on issues relating to critical psychological and philosophical positions on explanation and explanatory systems. One of the first tasks was to clarify Wittgenstein's remark that all explanation should be rejected in favour of description. In this context, pursuing psychological reflexivity to useful ends involves recognizing that at some point explanation must pass to description. Some of Wittgenstein's remarks were presented to show why it

is important to describe the grammar of concepts rather than offer broad explanations. More specifically, it was argued that psychology can achieve a critical, reflexive attitude towards general theories that seem to have the potential to inform both scientific *and* everyday reasoning, by a to and fro movement between explanations in psychology and philosophical description. Wittgenstein's revealing remarks therefore set important limits on attempts to apply concepts that are used within psychological theories and the use of those same concepts to describe the background of our activities.

Wittgenstein's philosophy also has the potential to augment social constructionist alternatives to explanatory systems. Wittgenstein's remarks can be used to highlight the assumptions and tenets of theories, sometimes as the basis for creative scientific work. The ubiquity of causal explanation in psychology can be challenged by showing how related expressions and pictures in the articulation of the theory produce a distorted account of our use of psychological concepts. However, it was also noted that determinism could also become the property of an alternative to causal explanatory systems in psychology if not carefully examined. Consideration of these issues lead to a more specific treatment of the internal relations between concepts and the way in which these relations can be distorted by causal explanation. The importance of challenging causal accounts of the relations between individuals and collectives as well as individuals and cognitive phenomena was illustrated with examples of pride. The potential for psychologists to be trained to be "more reflexive" about the sorts of issues examined in this chapter by using Wittgenstein's philosophy was also examined. In particular, it was argued that reflexivity can be encouraged but not trained, especially if psychologists are to realize the potential to cross

from a reflexive stance within psychology to connect freely with Wittgenstein's methods and remarks.

The relations between psychological explanations and everyday concepts and practices was also examined through notions of psychological reflexivity. In particular, it was argued that Wittgenstein's remarks help to counter any position that does not place important limits on the potential for revision of ordinary language. The fact that our understanding of psychological concepts that we may wish to revise in psychological practices presupposes participation in many cultural and linguistic practices was examined by way of Wittgenstein's example of detailing an outside perspective on a culture or adopting an odd perspective on other people. An account was then provided of the importance of newly fashioned concepts and theoretical constructs to psychology. While the aim was not to endorse the contemporary focus on theoretical explanation, theories are an important part of the training that we need to work through before the relevance of critical perspectives can be realized. In the last section it was noted that a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview should not be regarded as an insertion of Wittgenstein's methods into the practice of psychology. In contrast to Shotter's (1996) position, therefore, it was argued that a surview provides a resource that reflexive psychologists should attempt to achieve, but it should not be regarded as a directly competing alternative to existing theoretical and empirical studies.

CHAPTER 4: Wittgenstein's conservatism, radical forms of psychological reflexivity and specific reflexive techniques

Introduction

The reconsideration of psychological reflexivity has, to this point, addressed a number of issues from a Wittgensteinian perspective. However, one issue that has not been adequately addressed is the extent to which Wittgenstein's philosophy is radical or conservative in its potential effects on psychology. Previous chapters have demonstrated the differences between Wittgenstein's view of his philosophy and the changes that psychologists have attempted to promote through different accounts of his remarks and methods. Shotter (1996), for instance, argues that Wittgenstein's methods can be inserted into psychology and used to dismiss theory in a radical way. In contrast, other critical psychologists emphasize the practical changes and political alternatives that reflexive theorizing promotes without any great concern about Wittgensteinian criticism. Many critical psychologists also focus on culture and power in order to produce challenging theories. Accordingly, in this last chapter of Part 1 an assessment will be made of Wittgenstein's conservative view of philosophy and the fact that recognition of this point need not rule out innovative and challenging reflexive work in psychology that can either be said to extend his work or "get beyond" potential criticisms.

The conservatism of Wittgenstein's philosophy and the possibility that it bypasses many issues raised by new reflexive theories and techniques in psychology is examined in the following manner. Section 4.1 assesses whether a sufficiently reflexive approach to psychology should

examine cultural and power aspects of many everyday practices. A question raised is whether the lack of explicit remarks on culture and power in Wittgenstein's work indicates a major oversight (and is therefore a limitation of the descriptive approach). Issues raised by cultural theorists and postmodernists such as Foucault are also compared with Wittgenstein's philosophy. An introduction is therefore provided to some radical directions for contemporary reflexive psychological research. Section 4.2 extends the critical account of Wittgenstein's philosophy by examining the relations between psychology and culture. Examples from the psychology of emotion and personal reflexivity are used to illustrate how psychology shapes rather than merely reflects cultural, political and ethical changes. A major interest is whether any other forms of reflexive work in psychology also escape potential Wittgensteinian objections. This section also examines forms of psychological reflexivity that provide a source of social and cultural criticism, challenge the institutions of psychology and attempt to change its aims and practices. Section 4.3 explores the similarities between forms of psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity. A central topic is whether the personal insights and experiences that psychologists gain as they work in the discipline are potentially of positive use. The supposed problem of psychologists' familiarity with many of subjects they investigate is also examined. The last section provides a brief account of specific reflexive techniques and experiences of various forms of reflexive technology that may provide a useful resource for future psychological studies.

4.1 Wittgenstein's philosophy, cultural issues and psychology

By raising the issue of culture and Wittgenstein's philosophy at this point, it might appear as if remarks about the relations between Wittgenstein and other postmodern philosophers from chapter 1 were being presented in a new guise. In a sense the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein and other philosophers are being re-examined, but the main purpose is to highlight gaps in Wittgenstein's work that are addressed by other philosophers and psychologists. A central concern is to provide a Wittgensteinian account, if possible, of the insights provided by cultural and critical theorists along with criticial psychologists, social constructionists, critical realists and others. This includes the considerable potential for reflexive work in psychology to connect with other articulations of cultural, political, ethical and historical differences. Consideration of these issues from the perspective of reflexive psychology can be used to demonstrate the conservative nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy and, paradoxically, provide the intellectual space for the description of reflexive studies that may successfully promote moral, cultural and political changes.

Postmodern and critical psychology views of Wittgenstein's philosophy

One of the problems with Wittgenstein's later philosophy is the emphasis placed on the description of linguistic practices. Social constructionists such as Shotter (1996) argue that Wittgenstein's philosophical denial of explanation and emphasis on description have radical implications for

psychology. But this position contradicts Wittgenstein's own admission that he was not interested in reforming language (PI, §132) or interfering with the actual use of language in such practices as mathematics and psychology (PI, §124). Critical psychologists similarly adopt a conservative reading of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, but without considering other important aspects of Wittgenstein's later work. For example, Parker (1989) seems to regard Wittgenstein's philosophy as little more than an ordinary language approach that has been superseded by postmodern and poststructuralist theories. Social constructionism as advocated by individuals such as Coulter (1989) is similarly regarded as an approach that focuses on ordinary language. Thus the Wittgenstein-inspired emphasis on language-based research and the social nature of the research subjects' forms of personal reflexivity is largely described by Parker (1989) as a humanist reaction to other approaches in psychology.

However, critical psychologists often fail to recognize the developing cultural and epistemological orientation of Wittgenstein's later remarks in *On Certainty, Culture and Value, Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough* and other collections of notes. It is difficult to summarize the potential for all of this work to be connected with postmodern philosophy and critical psychology. While the task is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis, some of the lines of thought in Wittgenstein's work can be explored. For example, Wittgenstein was concerned to survey the present terrain of many intellectual practices without feeling compelled to adopt any particular opinions or schools of thought. Moreover, the combination of Wittgenstein's attitude against traditional sources of progress in Western culture and an interest in ordinary language was, at the time, a radical and innovative philosophical position. An interesting point is that Wittgenstein felt that he

was writing for a future age in contrast to what he described as "the darkness of this time" (PI, p. vi). But whether social constructionism, qualitative psychology and discursive studies all demonstrate Wittgenstein's role in bringing that age into being is beyond this investigation (see chapter 1, section 1.1 for Wittgenstein's vision of an analogous, conceptually sensitive mathematics).

Postmodernists certainly give the impression that the age that Wittgenstein criticized has now passed. For example, Wittgenstein could not be said to place faith in scientific methods to solve all our problems or, in other cases, for social scientists to represent the role of religion and aesthetic judgements in our lives adequately. Moreover, themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy accord with Parker's (1989) description of the postmodern age:

> The deconstruction of each of the three aspects of the Classical Age of reason and the Modern Age now finds its end in language: the relativism, which displaced beliefs in absolute truth, is twisted further under a post-structuralist emphasis on discourse and texts as the grounds of reason; the common sense, which displaced science, is also seen as organized into language games in which science is an equal partner in the search for pragmatic usefulness, and the 'self' loses its position as the central creator of meaning as its dependence on others becomes seen to be constructed by language. (p. 133)

But all of these positions cannot be ascribed to Wittgenstein and, moreover, they are not necessarily the changes in our way of thinking that Wittgenstein was trying to produce. Thus the fact that critical psychologists and others can now discuss these ideas in terms that are close to Wittgenstein's does not necessarily confirm his place in a transition from modernism to postmodernism.

To demonstrate this scepticism the description of the change of "ages"

can be examined point by point. A charge of relativism against Wittgenstein can be resisted as a way of summarizing his remarks on specific similarities and differences between cultures, subcultures and particular linguistic practices (see next section). Whether Wittgenstein would regard discourse and texts as the grounds of reason is also debatable since he emphasized a basis of common actions, similarities of judgement (PI, §242) and the importance of features such as recounting stories in our natural history (PI, §25). Parker's argument about commonsense displacing science and being organized into language-games that are perhaps, more accurately, an equal partner in social science owes more to Lyotard (1984) than Wittgenstein. As already argued, Wittgenstein's concern was to highlight the philosophical errors and prejudices that can occur in many areas of science without necessarily allowing the corrections to be taken as doing the work of the practices described. In terms of philosophy and its role in Western culture, Wittgenstein's scathing criticisms of Russell's attempts to popularize philosophy and science indicate the seriousness of his commitment to a non-elitist, outside perspective (see Monk, 1990). And in so far as the self is described as losing its position, Wittgenstein helps us to recognize that we are culturally and linguistically saturated beings.

However, many of these issues raise the question of whether Wittgenstein's remarks and insights based on a survey of language are sufficiently cultural. Does Wittgenstein's notion of a surview include unique features of our relation to a supposedly postmodern environment which includes the role of technology, specific cultural artifacts and objects, and considerations of their roles in creating an understanding of past, possible and future forms of life? In reply it may be said that many of the cultural aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations can be found among

the notes of his later philosophy (see below). Moreover, while technological changes may seem to consign Wittgenstein's remarks to a more simplistic age, these developments do not necessarily provide a permanent distraction from enduring philosophical problems. Also, given the quite different interests of contemporary psychologists from the problems of interest to Wittgenstein, many of his remarks are relevant to contemporary forms of critical psychology which attempt to address, for example, cultural and historical differences between different peoples (see chapter 3, section 3.1). Moreover, regardless of whether Wittgenstein explicitly mentioned it, there is no reason to think that a surview could not include literature, works of art and many other material, media and cultural products.

Nevertheless, few attempts have been made to detail useful Wittgensteinian observations in relation to reflexive psychological studies of particular psychological phenomena. A preliminary engagement with some of Wittgenstein's specific culturally oriented remarks can be attempted that connects, potentially, with the results of more radical reflexive studies. For example, at one point Wittgenstein suggests that "one age misunderstands another; and a *petty* age misunderstands all the others in its own nasty way" (CV, 86e). The importance of the remark lies in its suggestion that we should not reproduce misunderstandings that characterize a "petty age", such as generalizations based on culturally and historically specific values. While it could hardly be said that Wittgenstein's use of "we" in many of his statements is perniciously restricted to Western individuals, it may nevertheless lessen any consideration that the excluded group, whoever "they" are, could have quite a different perspective. More specifically, although we can hardly blame Wittgenstein for failing to anticipate many of the cultural and political movements of the twentieth century, Monk's (1990)

account of Wittgenstein's attitude towards women suggests that he may have had little time for the insights and advances that have occurred as a result of the development of feminism and feminist theory (and which might now be used to provide further reasons for dismissing his relevance to critical psychological studies).

Insights about the way in which one age may misunderstand another may also be derived from theories of art, artifacts, novels, entertainment, images, communication media, icons and the functions of all of these aspects of culture (despite the fact that they provide broad reconstructions that can become problematic). Obviously, many of these issues are restricted by an interest in psychological reflexivity and a concern with what the results of radical self-regard might usefully achieve in a culture (see Section 4.2). Some of these questions could be very specific although their range when reconstructing their psychological importance may vary considerably. For example, without the cultural invention of mirrors and our extension of abilities to use them would we ever take as much pride, as many Western individuals do, in our appearances? Or, to offer a completely different example, is the *Parson's Tale* in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* an early equivalent of a self-help book on pride? Was its dissemination through sermons or other means used at the time to support the power of the church to control and dominate people's lives that has since waned with increased literacy and education? And is it important whether instances of pride that make up a surview occur in a newspaper report, talkback discussion, magazine editorial, cartoon, arthouse film, television news programme, situation comedy, or number one pop song?

Clearly, these specific aspects of culture indicate important points about the background discourse that surrounds us and which may be used

to communicate values, shape aspirations and provide cultural images that have a powerful role in directing individuals. These discourses and texts also engage different people for different reasons and, accordingly, may be more or less readily understood and accessed by an individual researcher. For the restricted purposes of the present critical study, examples of an emotion or emotion-related word may play a more or less explicit role in the remarks that can be as varied as those of a school principal, prime minister, feminist leader, political activist, parent, school-pupil, or octagenarian talking about themselves, another person or other people. As already suggested, people engage with the texts, examples, literature, and images of a culture that surround them. Sometimes this engagement occurs almost without any conscious recognition (e.g., notions of identity and home can begin very early and may not be as abstract and reflective as commonly believed). Other instances of cultural engagement occur self-consciously as in the case of an individual who wants to be like someone famous or, in contrast, through culturally self-referential forms of self-commentary. For example, Parker (1989) paraphrases work by Eco (1986) to provide a specific instance of the effects of an age on its culture and people:

> . . . while a modern expression of affection might be 'I love you madly', the postmodern rendering might be 'as Barbara Cartland would say, I love you madly'. (p. 134)

Among the myriad of possible examples that could be produced of culturally self-conscious expressions of pride it may be better to focus on more commonly occurring examples. Otherwise, these instances could invite a potential Wittgenstienian criticism that the interest in the products and cleverness of our own culture merely demonstrates the preoccupation of our

age with itself.

A further postmodern temptation which has already been explored is the potential to regard "our" culture as more advanced in its emotions and related considerations than other less complicated groups. Alternative ways of life suggested by cultural differences showed in chapter 3 that there are a number of points at which "we", even as individuals, could not come to share the experiences of another culture or fully understand an analogous practice. In this sense, Wittgenstein's contribution to psychology through philosophical description is consistent with a growing concern in Western culture to articulate the background of ways of judging and feeling. It is important to add that judging and feeling are not regarded as the sole concerns of psychology, although they are certainly central to a full understanding of people. For in addition to these issues, a reflexive investigation may also involve other aspects of our everyday and psychological practices. As Gergen (1987) notes:

> . . . if technology, value positions, political and economic climate and the like favor the development of particular theories, then the theorist is invited to a reflexive repose. (p. 13)

Unfortunately, while features of our practices such as technology, value positions, political and economic climate are relevant to reflexive psychological studies, they play less of a role in Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks than the results and rich potential of a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey suggest they should.

To reiterate, this section indicated why postmodern and critical psychologists present Wittgenstein as an ordinary language philosopher who had little interest in culture. Parker's (1989) account of postmodernism

was used to address features of the "postmodern age" for which Wittgenstein seemed to be writing. For example, the importance of language, the blurred distinction between commonsense and social science, the relations between texts and reasons and a decentring of the self are all themes that can be connected with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. But it is more important that a surview can include the images, texts, technology and artifacts of a culture without necessarily requiring the insights and reconstructions of cultural theories. Also a Wittgensteinian survey should helps us to represent reflexive psychological issues in such way that any attendant form of cultural self-regard does not make our "postmodern culture" part of a "petty age".

The philosophical articulation of cultural and historical differences

One of the difficulties when collecting reminders of striking aspects of our cultural and linguistic practices is how to organize and present the remarks that we regard as significant. While there is no easy answer to this question some examples from Wittgenstein can be used to indicate a possible direction for our studies. More specifically, a few Wittgensteinian remarks can be assembled to help us imagine how Wittgenstein might have viewed many of the problems that now preoccupy postmodern philosophers, critical psychologists and social constructionists. These remarks are by no means comprehensive, but they do help to show how Wittgenstein's conservative interest in changing psychological practices might nevertheless relate to reflexive work by psychologists who want to understand the effects of culture.

One of the major advances that Wittgenstein's form of philosophical description provides is that the background of our practices cannot be represented by many of the concepts that are appropriately used within those practices (e.g., in the language-game of theorizing). Since these differences involve participating in (or taking up) a different way of living, the notion of any objective evaluation is removed. In some cases, an objective view seems appropriate as an ideal for our investigations (i.e., especially where it can be shown from examples that we were indeed misguided at some previous time but required distance or detachment to be able to reach a more considered perspective). In one example of the sort of clash that psychologists might even contribute towards through their discipline, Wittgenstein suggests:

> At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa. (OC, §336)

Although the remark seems quite reasonable, Wittgenstein's concern is to address individuals who would be tempted to ask "but is there no objective character here?" (OC, §336). It is important to be clear about what an appeal to objectivity could mean when faced with such a difference (see also chapter 5, section 5.3 for examples of circumstances that change around people's pride in particular societal roles).

Although we might be able to appeal towards some certainties that hold across different cultures, subcultures, or periods of history, the broad problem is that it can be difficult to have a clear idea of what it means for an age (and its people) to be unreasonable. In part this seems to be because we have a much better notion of what it is for an individual to be unreasonable, myopic, or mistaken. Wittgenstein's example seems to take

the middle ground because of the way in which he describes the differences between individuals of contrasting backgrounds:

> *Very* intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former. (OC, §336)

This example, however, may seem to have little relevance to psychological reflexivity or, more specifically, any application to critical studies of emotion and personal reflexivity. But we might apply the same possible knowledge of the criteria of differing positions to accounts of pride since religion has provided a historical and cultural framework within which various groups have evaluated their own and others' behaviour.

Articulating the way in which religious ideology and its related practices have persisted in the practices of Western cultltures is a obviously a difficult task. A more specific point of interest to reflexive psychologists is that the values of a religious perspective might provide a basis for evaluating the results of a type of scientific psychology (i.e., that it might provide the reason for determining which of the techniques that Chaucer recommends for dealing with excessive pride might be the best). We might want to investigate why an individual might, for example, respond "no, I'm thankful" when asked by another person whether they were proud of a particular achievement. Within a moral-religious framework this denial makes sense, but in terms of social scientific criteria we might regard it as a potentially unhealthy and self-deceptive. And if we pushed such a person to justify her position she might well argue that God punishes pride and then proceed to cite particular examples. The reasons given might resemble the account in Faulkner's (1929/1986) *The Sound and the Fury* of an ageing

matriarch who views her handicapped son as a form of divine punishment for the fact that she was and still is "too proud" (p. 68). The point is that we could not combat such an "explanation" only by assembling current theories and evidence about the causes of disabilities. Obviously, "we" might say that in this respect that the other "system of thought" was poorer or less rational than our scientifically-informed view. But there is a sense in which it is only appropriate to regard it as different, simply because it cannot be changed by appealing only to factual claims. Instead other means of persuading such individuals to think and live differently must be involved[21].

The claim that science clarifies the lesser or folk "theory" of the religious view is ridiculous since it fails to understand the significance, role and basis of its practices and rituals. For example, a scientific understanding of pride would not dissolve any clash between a priest and a psychologist over their identification, definition and "cure" for a particular instance of pride. The inquiry, tests involved and proof required in both cases is different since the priest's view lies within a tradition and which has commitment as its basis, whereas for the psychologist the truth probably lies in the empirical investigation of mechanisms and processes of self-evaluation and internalization (or the empirical investigations of different methods). Furthermore, both of these frameworks will also involve different forms of training and education so that any conflict between two individuals

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[21] Interestingly, Rorty (1989) also speculates that despite many other differences, both religious and scientific approaches to human forms of judging and feeling involve a common but:

> . . . vague sense that it would be *hybris* (sic.) on our part to abandon the traditional language of "respect for fact" and "objectivity" — that it would be risky, and blasphemous, not to see the scientist (or the philosopher, or the poet, or somebody) as having a priestly function, as putting us in touch with a realm which transcends the human. (p. 21)

operating within different frameworks is likely to resemble the following description by Wittgenstein:

> . . . where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. (OC, §611)

In such cases, the contradiction does not simply occur between two individuals but is instead about the different backgrounds that inform particular subcultures. Moreover, the example highlights the sense in which such a dispute may be better explained in terms of power because of the possibility that one group will eventually use force to dominate the discourse of the other (see next section).

As Wittgenstein also suggests, it is only in a complicated form of life that phenomena such as pride can occur and be spoken of as a reason for particular actions and events. This way of life will involve rituals, conventions for expression and appropriate forms of confession in particular circumstances: the point being that there seems to be no reason why a religious faith could not provide a world-picture with regard to human action that is the substratum of all our (or my) inquiring and asserting. In other words, the values and ideology of a religious position would be part of "the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false" (OC, §94). In such cases it is important to see how the organization of a group has implications for the way in which individuals will think and act so that objective criteria, for example, will not be universally applicable. Again pride provides a good example of a problem that everyday people attempt to deal with in different ways within different systems of thought. For example, in a religious context individuals do indeed agonize over their

pride, attempt to control it and also seek guidance as to how to reduce its effects on others. It would therefore be ridiculous, as Wittgenstein notes, for a scientist or anyone else to fail to recognize that "'consciousness of sin' is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith" (CV, 28). The interesting point about this and many other cultural differences is that an individual's experience is a consequence of "something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference" and can be understood as "a way of living, or a way of assessing life" (CV, 64).

A further aspect of the appeal to objectivity is discussed by Rorty in a manner that is compatible with some of Wittgenstein's more cultural remarks. In particular, Rorty (1989) argues that the impetus towards objectivity is not:

> . . . the desire to escape the limitations of one's community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the desire to extend the reference of 'us' as far as we can. (p. 23)

Rorty suggests that this is an alternative to a potentially meaningless theoretical reduction of the variety of human ways of judging and feeling to a common form or foundation (see chapter 3, section 3.1). Clearly, the judgements and feelings involved in expressions and experiences of pride in this and other cultures are very much connected to quite specific cultural differences. The notion of solidarity is therefore useful in the sense that "we" may be regarded as including others when we attempt to understand their thoughts, feelings and actions. This seems to be consistent with Wittgenstein's remarks and his description of attempts to understand other peoples as well as to remove superficial and mythical differences that "we" have created (although this attitude might also obscure *in principle*

collective and individual limits to understanding that need to be examined in detail).

People from other cultures do not share the same sorts of cultural practices, complex problems, difficulties and preoccupations of contemporary western adults in specific countries. However, other differences within first-world countries may be articulated in statements which, despite their generality, contain claims that are still easily understood by many people. For example, Greenwood (1989) notes that cross-cultural and transhistorical differences are obvious in such statements as: "the English take pride in their homes while Italians take pride in their sister's virginity" (p. 46). While these generalities are understood to describe different values, institutions, societal roles and expressions of pride they need to be unpacked in specific detail if they are to prove useful for our purposes. Nevertheless, the ability to describe and understand broad differences between groups suggests a great deal of knowledge about common behaviour, institutions and propensities. The fact that "we" can understand these examples does not entail that the different cultural practices, of which pride provides the measure, are shared. Thus although an examination of general remarks about cultural differences extends the scope of a conceptual-discursive survey, their investigation is not entirely at odds with a Wittgensteinian approach.

Although it has been ignored by critical psychologists, a Wittgensteinian approach can also help to study the manner in which many of our emotions and related personal considerations might well be described by individuals in other cultures as excessive, selfish, indulgent or luxuries. The latter might also help to provide more detail of cases where a culture may be regarded as degenerating or disappearing: not necessarily

because of an excessive self-regard but perhaps also due to suppression by another culture. The following remark by Wittgenstein is relevant to such possibilities:

> The disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of expressing this value. (CV, 6e)

For a broad attitude of solidarity and an interest in generalities would be of little help to a culture that is losing its means of expressing (or defending) its values. Instead, it is important to detail the moral-practical surroundings and background to our activities that are raised by these sorts of issues (Shotter, 1996). Interestingly, Wittgenstein also questions whether individuals in another culture must, for example, be acquainted with such a specific concept as that of "swaggering men" (RPP II, §680). Although Wittgenstein did not necessarily intend this point to be used to detail the relations between Western culture and indigenous peoples, the point is useful here because it suggests circumstances in which members of an indigenous culture may require such a concept. Moreover, the example also implies that improvements in the expression of value may occur at the very point in which cultural imperialism leads to the disappearance of, for example, an indigenous culture (see chapter 5, section 5.2 for examples suggested by pride).

To summarize, the section began with an examination of the appeal of objectivity when describing cultural and historical differences. Views of what is reasonable may vary from one period or age to another so that it is important to be able to describe the grounds of any difference or dispute. Wittgenstein's example of disagreements in relation to a religious framework

on human life was used to highlight cultural or subcultural differences that might be of more interest to culturally-oriented psychologists: for example, where different ways of understanding pride and its role in human life may lead a priest and a psychologist, respectively, to declare the other a heretic and a fool. Rorty's argument that a notion of solidarity that extends our notion of "us" as far as possible seems, in such cases, to remove our concerns about objectivity. However, it is important to avoid the potential generalities of cultural theory in order to examine the detail of cultural and linguistic differences, generalities, disputes and clashes.

Reflexive theorizing, Foucault and Wittgenstein

To this point, sufficient material from Wittgenstein's remarks has been assembled to remind postmodern philosophers and critical psychologists that a Wittgensteinian position is capable of examining broad cultural differences (or at least, through a surview, of highlighting features of our practices that are important to reflexive perspectives on psychological phenomena). Although a detailed account of the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein and other postmodern philosophers was avoided, in this section an attempt will be made to consider the work of Foucault. The approach is relevant because the two main examples introduced in the previous section both give the impression that the cultural or subcultural clash occurs in a ideal space where eventual dominance of one group is not an issue: a sort of Habermasian "ideal speech situation" (Parker, 1994b) that is concerned with attaining a naïve *agreement to disagree.* The last section will focus on criticisms derived from Foucault because his work is

increasingly connected with reflexive studies of culture and language in psychology. Thus, although there are flaws in Foucault's social theorizing, it seems capable of extending Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophical approach to include issues of materiality and power.

Through a growing interest in reflexive work, many psychologists and social scientists have begun to examine perspectives that offer more radical and relevant solutions to contemporary problems (Stam, 1996). In particular, reflexive researchers in psychology and many other disciplines have turned to the work of Foucault and bypassed Wittgenstein's descriptive approach. Parker's (1989) account of critical psychology, for example, ignores any interest in Wittgenstein mainly because Wittgenstein does seems to consider power differences, their origins and reasons for their persistence. Although not explicitly considered by Parker, a potential Foucauldian criticism could centre on Wittgenstein's use of "we" and "us" in many of his philosophical remarks. For example, in chapter 3 the use of "we" in such statements as "we must do away with all *explanation,* and description alone must take its place" (PI, §109) was argued to suggest a general faith in science by many individuals in Western culture. Similarly, throughout the argument developed thus far, "we" has also been used to draw in as many individuals as possible who might see a connection between their work and issues generated by various forms of psychological reflexivity. In both cases it is important to realize that the language used is not without considerable cultural and historical baggage. As Parker (1989) reminds us:

> . . . the culture we have been describing is the *dominant culture,* not just one among many that compete equally in the world market. (p. 151)

Thus it seems possible that we feel compelled to cultivate an attitude of solidarity towards other cultures, subcultures or indigenous cultures because there is little fear that those cultures will ever dominate us or our institutions.

These points about the discourse of a dominant culture and the institutions that provide its backing introduce a further Foucauldian theme: the view of discourses as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Parker (1989) provides a summary of the relevant aspects of Foucault's (1970) book *The Order of Things*:

> The book described overarching structures of discourse — called *epistemes* — which determine what it is possible to speak of, and think (though there will always be some swimming against the stream). The *epistemes* (or epistemological structures) are wider-ranging than Kuhn's (1970) paradigms, and the mutations which create and destroy them are not necessarily historically progressive. (p. 62; see chapter 1, section 1.3)

The notion of an episteme conveys the sense in which the thinking of an age can be superceded in such a comprehensive way that it is difficult to survey and reconstruct what individuals thought and did in previous epistemes. Also it accords with Ash's (1993) description of a reflexive historiography of psychology in which the aim of examining the historical context of the discipline is to effect practical changes. Hence, the notion of episteme seems to describe cultural changes in a manner that is broader than Kuhn's concept of paradigm and also more relevant to cultural and historical changes than Wittgenstein's more neutral notion of language-game.

The notion of discourses within epistemes explicitly includes a sense of language which is intertwined with issues of knowledge and power. However, it is interesting to see that a Foucauldian treatment of the problem of reflexivity in psychology by Stam (1996) appeals to a perspective that is close to Wittgenstein's:

> Psychological theories in turn support the edifice of an empiricist, justificationist network of claims like an unspoken grammar. In that sense, they are practices enabled by and productive of a discourse of human subjects "about which entire sets of psychological statements can be uttered that, in turn, as propositions can be judged true or false" (Bové, 1990, p. 57; in Stam, 1996, p. 27)

Foucault's position is clearly complex and difficult to apply to psychology and its theories. But the general point to emerge from this consideration is that discourse "enables and maintains disciplines and institutions which circulate those discourses" (Stam, 1996, p. 28). In Wittgensteinian terms we might say that grammar is not autonomous but closely related to the forms of knowledge and related cultural practices that a particular age has "arrived at".

Foucault's position also seems to be broader than Wittgenstein's notion that "grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (PI, §373) because it allows us to examine the way in which "we" relate to others (i.e., it shows the narrowness of Wittgenstein's focus on first person and third person uses of psychological concepts (Hacker, 1996)). As Parker (1989) describes it, the function of power and its related discourses is not only to constrain and exclude others: "just as discourse produces objects or topics of investigation, it also produces subjects" (p. 65). The implication for psychology is that the discipline is intimately involved in recreating and

maintaining broader social arrangements and power relations. The creative role of discourse is not avoided by the sort of linguistic distance that, for example, Greenwood (1991) attempts to achieve. Instead, Greenwood's approach might well be argued to provide the basis for psychologists to continue the dominance of particular individuals within a culture. For example, an emphasis on personal reflexivity does not merely represent existing independent "objects" to be studied by psychology but subtly reinforces moral-practical institutions that are prepared to discipline and coerce individuals who do not take responsibility for their own judgements, feelings and actions.

The latter point suggests a feature of reflexive theorizing and the interest of some psychologists in Foucault which is not necessarily inimical to the broad aims of a conceptual-discursive surview, since a surview can include cultural practices and suggest background issues in a manner that provides the basis for more specific and revealing studies. In other words, there is no reason why a surview cannot also be:

> . . . concerned with culture, and in particular with the transformations in social interaction and self-understanding which have attended the emergence of postmodernity. (Parker, 1989, p. 129)

A Wittgensteinian position, of course, might well be critical of the characterization of either "our age" or the one that Wittgenstein seemed to be writing for as postmodern. Nevertheless, many of the aspects of "postmodern life" suggested by Parker and others suggest new directions for work in psychology such as: the way in which technology alters our ways of relating to and connecting with each other, the effects on individuals of a growing cultural and linguistic self-consciousness, the role

of material objects in our social and emotional lives, the importance of television and other media in shaping reality, and the difficult task of charting the way in which our culture generates new forms of emotional self-regulation and expression. All of these points occur in relation to a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview and do not necessarily require a general cultural theory or broad reconstruction of history in order to frame an appropriate investigation.

Given the specific interest in emotion and personal reflexivity, two potential lines of investigation are suggested by a further description of Foucault's relevant to psychology:

> In modernity, human agency is a valuable commodity, and humanist sentiments are, at first sight, progressive. Foucault goes on to show, however, that the belief that individuals are endowed with the ability to produce meaning, truth, is a trap. The human being is seen as both the object and also the subject of understanding. Foucault's later work described how although this paradox may be a mere academic puzzle to philosophers and psychologists, it is an unpleasant lived experience for inhabitants of the modern world. 'Subjects' in modernity are fixed in place from without by apparatuses of discipline (Foucault, 1977), and from within by processes of confession (Foucault, 1981). (Parker, 1989, p. 63)

Foucault suggests the importance of examining the cultural meaning, power and practices, at least in this case, related to situations in which thoughts and emotions are identified, displayed, experienced and controlled (as well as studied by psychology). Description of many Western cultural practices in terms of forms of discipline and individual confession could be used to understand examples provided by the surview of pride in chapter 5 of Part 2. For example, many of the cultural and societal practices surrounding the ascription and expression of pride show how it is possible for individuals to "freely" and "spontaneously" express their later embarrassment, shame and

guilt as a result of broad moral and political changes (or, alternatively, remain defiant and thus face more punishment and coercion).

Foucault's (1977) notion of the panopticon may also provide a metaphor with which to examine the importance attached to pride, shame and guilt in Western culture as emotions of self-regulation. For example, Scheff (1988) argues that without the respective possibilities of self-praise and self-punishment demonstrated by the emotions of pride and shame, society in its present form would disappear. Interestingly, Scheff presents responsibility and agency as the potential to generate these and other conduct-maintaining emotions when "no one else is watching". In this respect, the circumstances in which these emotions are created resemble the coercive aspects of the panopticon: namely, a general extension of Foucault's argument that because prisoners cannot see whether they are being watched from a central vantage point they will eventually act *as if* they are under constant surveillance. The idea that people in such conditions come to "regulate themselves" and their emotions plays an important role at particular points (cf. Scheff's (1990) argument that these emotions occur all the time at low levels due to constant self-monitoring). However, the aim is not so much to present a Foucauldian account of the coercive basis of pride, shame and guilt as to demonstrate why Foucault's work appeals to psychologists who adopt a critical and reflexive stance on their "objects" of study.

To reiterate, Foucault's account of epistemes and their discourses seems to challenge and extend the results of Wittgenstein's more conservative form of philosophical description. Parker's remarks, for example, were used to show that Wittgenstein's use of "we" refers to a dominant culture. Foucault's work considers cultural and power issues

which are relevant to the discipline of psychology and are contrastingly difficult to find in Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophy. However, while a Foucauldian approach provides insightful and general reconstructions of our cultural past and present through notions of discipline and confession, more work is required to provide a convincing account of our "self-regulative" emotions.

4.2 Reflexive psychology and its relation to cultural and linguistic practices

At this point, it may seem as if a central argument is that Wittgenstein anticipated the results of many forms of reflexive, critical, discursive and social constructionist psychology. While it is certainly true that Wittgenstein's philosophy has helped to stimulate the "turn to language" in psychology and related interest in reflexive issues, his methods and remarks are not without their limitations. The previous section made a case for incorporating cultural practices, changes, inequities, artifacts and arrangements in a Wittgensteinian philosophical perspective. In this section, further reflexive issues are examined that do not connect with Wittgenstein's conservative approach to psychology including: the relation of psychology to culture, reflexivity as a form of cultural criticism, and specific alternatives to the institutions of psychology. Although many of these issues could be described as Wittgenstein-inspired because they have been highlighted by social constructionists (e.g., Gergen, 1996; Shotter, 1996; Stam, 1996), the most relevant point is to consider the extent to which they are beyond potential Wittgensteinian criticisms.

The relations between psychology and culture

Psychology is clearly related to culture in a way that does not simply reflect psychological phenomena and their wider constraints. Some individuals have argued that psychology shapes many of the phenomena it investigates and, as a result, "makes itself true" (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 897). Of course, if this reflexive effect occurred with every psychological investigation, the certainty of many perspectives and findings within the discipline would be undermined. However, this extreme view of psychological reflexivity suggests the potential for a more reasonable account of the way in which psychology shapes and is shaped by cultural forces. In this section, an attempt is made to assess the following suggestion that psychology:

> . . . is not only the study of human thinking, feeling, acting, and interacting: it has itself — like the other human sciences — brought into being new ways of thinking, feeling, acting, and interacting. (p. 897)

Although the issue is relevant to many actual and potential investigations, only examples relevant to the reflexive effects of emotion and personal reflexivity studies will be examined.

A central part of MacIntyre's account is that psychology, in a manner that is similar to the role of philosophy in the past, "is inevitably a new mode — or rather a set of assorted, even rival new modes — of human *self*-knowledge" (p. 897). One of psychology's roles in our culture is to alter many of the practices that previously were carried out without question, commentary or investigation as to their effects. Foucault's perspective, of course, gives some indication also of how practices and institutions of discipline in the past (e.g., such as prisons or the church) have played a role

in shaping the way in which individuals understand and regulate their own activities. But MacIntyre's recognition of the interplay between culture and psychology leads to a more specific, exemplary question: "what happens when it is psychology and not the religious confession or the novel which provides us with our ideals of self-knowledge?" (p. 898).

In an account that is similar to Parker's (1989) Foucauldian account of psychology, MacIntyre's answer to this self-posed question is:

> The cultural impact of psychology is two-fold: it provides new models for self-knowledge *and* a partially new self for us to have knowledge of. Partially new, of course, because even in those geographical and social areas where psychology has had the most cultural impact, the new psychological models of self-knowledge and selfhood have to coexist — even in one and the same person — with a variety of older models. (p. 898)

Interestingly, Macintyre suggests that the conflict between a new and old perspective might be found in one person (i.e., a kind of individual version of the priest-psychologist dispute based on different systems in which two people respectively call each other a heretic and a fool). While an individual may feel this contradiction only where he or she thinks that one system must dominate, it is more useful to extend MacIntyre's view and illustrate it with a case specific to psychology. One example is Averill's (1982) position that anger is very much like putting on a social performance because the theory helps to create other forms and expressions of anger (i.e., anger is no longer viewed as an uncontrollable, animalistic emotion and bodily affliction). But since this seems to produce no profound feeling of self-contradiction how can a psychologist advocating a position similar to MacIntyre's respond?

MacIntyre argues, to reiterate, that new forms of self-knowledge produced by psychology lead people to adopt new views of themselves and

new ways of thinking, feeling, acting and interacting. Although MacIntyre uses the example of suicide to support his account, the points he makes can be connected with other examples of new models of self-knowledge and personhood that contrast with existing experiences. For example, it may suit the purposes of a particularly angry and aggressive individual to view his or her anger as the product of uncontrollable bodily processes. However, that same individual might recognize that he or she is a risk to others and therefore attempt to institute some measure of self-control (e.g., by directing his or her anger toward him or herself). The example is plausible because it has been found, at least with psychiatric patients, that "a substantial proportion of violent individuals alternate between the display of aggression against self and against others" (Hillbrand, 1995, p. 670).

The point is that the behaviour of such individuals might correspond to the example that MacIntyre uses to demonstrate the effects of psychology: namely, where early work in 1952 on "self-damage" and the possibility of "self-destruction" suggested that in some cases individuals who engage in this behaviour may not be consciously aware that their behaviour is a cry for help. The most interesting aspect of MacIntyre's example is that the subsequent effect of this early suicide study was that it:

> . . . made clear to many genuinely distressed people that if they were to appear to have attempted suicide in a particular way, their action would almost certainly be interpreted as just the type of cry for help which they had already been trying unsuccessfully to utter in different ways. (p. 899)

Interestingly, this view of suicide has also been extended to the way in which the more specific phenomenon of deliberate self-harm is regarded: that is, although deliberate self-harm can be distinguished from suicide and

is instead better understood as a way in which many individuals under extreme stress attempt to regulate their own emotions, much of the literature reflects the general "cry for help" theme of the self-damage literature. In other words, the growing view that such forms of emotional self-regulation (e.g., by cutting or burning themselves) is perhaps a reasonable and often successful response by people in extreme circumstances is hindered by the view that self-harm is a misdirected form of communication (i.e., in contrast to other less reasonable forms of self-harm which are used to manipulate other people or gain attention). Moreover, while many individuals who engage in self-harm do not agree with the "cry for help" account of their actions their attempts to resist the model and thus "make psychology false" are more isolated than the psychological institutions that continue to promote the "miscommunication" view.

MacIntyre's account is also useful because he suggests how individuals actively seek out new models of self-knowledge with which to understand and potentially create new forms of expression for themselves. In particular, MacIntyre suggests that an additional way in which psychology changes the practices of a culture is through the popularization and vulgarization of theories and studies. One of the most obvious ways in which psychology has shaped the way we think about ourselves is through popular psychology and self-help books. Indeed, a recent account of emotional intelligence by Goleman (1996) seems to combine both functions: the book provides a selective summary of recent research and uses it to promote the argument that it is intelligent to be aware of and be able to control our emotions in many specific circumstances *and* also describes practical ways in which people may cope with depression, control their anxiety, assert themselves, increase their self-esteem and so on.

In a way, Goleman's book is useful because many of its ideas provide a more detailed account of the sort of abilities that are highlighted in Rosenberg's (1990) theory of emotion in which intentional activities and forms of cognition which focus on the self or its components are crucial to emotional and personal development. Indeed, the notion of emotional intelligence may be superior to Rosenberg's emphasis on the radical effects of the intentional use of "reflexive processes" by people (i.e., because many important aspects of our emotions can be described as the indirect products of other attempts to achieve other goals and, hence, are unintentional). Also the emotional intelligence account avoids many of the conceptual problems that accompany the "picture" of personal reflexivity as public thoughts, expressions and actions that are normally directed towards others in conversational practices, but which become significant when they become "self-directed" and "internalized" (i.e., pride and shame can, respectively, be regarded as automatized forms of conversationally derived "self-praise" and "self-punishment"; see chapters 6, 7, and 8). Thus it could be said that Goleman's account is better than Rosenberg's because it indicates how individual variations both in levels of emotion and also in the strategies for emotional display and expression can be combined to describe a wide variety of types of people and styles of interaction.

However, Goleman does not provide an account of why people feel that they must be able to cope with their emotion-related problems in an autonomous manner (i.e., in a manner that includes the stigma in Western society that is still attached to people's seeking help when they are unable to cope with emotional and related psychological problems). It is also interesting to speculate that books such as Goleman's are not just catering to a need but, in a sense, creating demand by echoing wider aspects of

Western, individualistic culture. Perhaps the effectiveness of the techniques, advice and information disseminated through popularized versions of psychological research and therapy could also be questioned if our demand for self-help literature were found to be increasing. In relation to all these points, it should be noted that Goleman's main argument is to improve "emotional literacy" because of the social and personal costs of failing to act. However, it is still worth asking whether Goleman's popularized account of the work of individuals such as Rosenberg is maintaining a culture which is concerned with explicitly avoiding the effects of negative emotions and encouraging positive experiences (i.e., as opposed to individuals who are not sure why they engage in such culture-based "diversions" as seeing a movie, "telephoning a delightful friend, reading an interesting novel, or engaging in a challenging task" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 11)).

In summary, an account was presented of the complicated relations between psychology and culture in which the former does not simply reflect the latter. Instead, psychology provides models of self-knowledge within our culture that may complement, compete with, or replace others. Averill's (1982) work on anger was used to demonstrate MacIntyre's point about how the results of psychological investigations can be said to "make themselves true". MacIntyre's example of the cultural effects of early studies of self-damaging behaviour was combined with the more recent example of self-harm by cutting or burning. In particular, the widely disseminated view of suicidal behaviour as a "a cry for help" has been extended to self-harm and continues to influence our view of what has, in contrast, been regarded by individuals engaging in it as a radical but effective form of emotional self-regulation in extremely distressing circumstances. Psychology was also argued to create new models of self-knowledge and expressions of thought,

feeling, action and interaction in our culture, at least for more literate but not necessarily less disturbed individuals, through popular psychology and self-help books. Further critical work should therefore study psychology's effect on an increasing literate but not necessarily more "emotionally intelligent" and literate population.

The role of reflexive work as cultural and social criticism

Although the relations between Wittgenstein's philosophy and psychology have been explored, for instance through the game analogy, there are still other forms of reflexive work that can have important effects in the discipline without appearing to attract Wittgensteinian criticisms. The point is that even discursive studies such as those advocated by Shotter (1996) and Shotter and Katz (1996) are not beyond Wittgensteinian criticism, while few criticisms can be offered of some psychological theories (i.e., apart from a social constructionist reinterpretation). For example, Harré (1983), Gergen (1985) and Shotter (1996) have presented various arguments for the view that political and moral background aspects of psychological investigations should be included as additional, relevant aspects of a reflexive investigation. This process can be regarded as providing a radical critique, for example of individualistic psychological studies (Parker, 1989), because it invites psychologists to support, or become advocates for, a theory-based form of identity politics (Gergen, 1996). The issue to be examined here is whether the general insights of Gergen (1996) and Parker (1989) can be combined with points of social and cultural criticism raised by a

Wittgensteinian surview of pride in order to illustrate political and ethical problems with Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion.

Even though it has already been argued that Wittgenstein's philosophy is conservative in a manner that contrasts with the results of some reflexive work in psychology, it is important to reiterate that a surview may provide the basis for studies that are considered radical. Moreover, while a comprehensive Wittgensteinian conceptual-discursive survey can arguably achieve many of the same ends as reflexive, qualitative and discursive psychological studies it should not be regarded as replacing existing methods within psychology. By occupying a position that is between philosophy and psychology that can be contributed to by both disciplines, a surview can counter philosophical prejudices within psychology, encourage a more conceptually-oriented approach and reveal the cultural and linguistic detail of many practices. Thus the detailed examination of pride in Part 2 can avoid a misleading account of Wittgenstein's relevance to reflexive work in psychology, while still demonstrating the potential to reveal what Shotter and Katz (1996) describe as "those fleeting moments in which the essentially ethical and political struggles are (or would be) at work in their initial formation" (pp. 229-230).

This position on a surview allows for reflexive work within psychology to function as a form of social and cultural criticism, but in a way that is quite unlike the effects that Wittgenstein thought his remarks should have on psychology (see chapter 1, section 1.1). Also as argued in the previous chapter, approaches such as Gergen's (1996) retain an important role for theory. In this respect, Gergen's later position is more reasonable than the radical doubt espoused in the earlier version of social constructionism (Gergen, 1985). Moreover, Gergen's later remarks

demonstrate that many reflexively-revealed aspects of psychological phenomena can be explored in radical, creative and practice-changing ways within psychology. Gergen's (1996) position is therefore consistent with the surview account because it suggests the potential for further work that will engage in the critical evaluation of cultural practices, generate rationales for personal or collective action, alter conversational patterns, and create images of alternative futures.

The potential for a surview to suggest issues and examples that might be used to develop further challenging remarks, criticisms and specific theories — always with the potential to return to the surview from these new directions if conceptual entanglement occurs — has therefore been established. Given this complicated positioning with regard to Wittgenstein, Shotter and Gergen it is important to ask what criticisms can be offered of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory, without feeling compelled to produce an alternative theory or theoretical organization of the sort of issues and insights suggested by Gergen. The best point at which to direct criticism against Rosenberg's theory is a core assumption:

> It is my contention that people, unable to exercise direct control over their emotional experiences, adopt the strategy of attempting to control the *causes* of these experiences. Where are these causes to be found? The first place is in the mind: the second, in the body. (p. 11)

Although Rosenberg examines the "logic of emotion" and "cultural scenarios" that help to guide our display and identification of emotions in particular situations, the main aim of his account is to emphasize the importance of self-directed cognitions and actions (see below for a more detailed account).

However, an initial problem with Rosenberg's position is that it raises ethical concerns about the possibility of having direct control over our emotions. Although it is unclear in Rosenberg's account, it seems that direct control implies a desired potential or ideal ability that can be contrasted individual's unaided attempts to produce particular emotions by "indirectly" controlling the causes of emotions:

> . . . it may be possible for me to decide which emotion to show and to proceed to show it, but can I decide which emotion to feel and then proceed to feel it? (p. 10)

The questions of whether we would want to achieve the requisite technology of control and then what the cultural effects would be are worth contemplating. For example, if because of advances in the localization of emotions in the brain and the delivery of biochemical or electrical stimulation it were possible for us to produce positive emotions and remove negative ones, would we really want this technology? How might this potential undermine many aspects of our present existence? And, more specifically, would such direct control become addictive? Although this speculation seems to be in the realm of science fiction, it highlights the way in which ethical limits have curtailed many forms of research, mainly because of existing knowledge of the social and personal side-effects of widely available forms of "self-medication" in our culture.

Another ethical issue generated by concerns about forms of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition in our emotional lives is the way in which they weaken and devalue our ability (or commitment) to endure particular experiences. In other words, continued use of Rosenberg's favoured strategies by an individual for the purpose of emotional control would

probably invite a charge of shallowness. For example, the first strategy mentioned by Rosenberg is to control the stimulus events that give rise to emotion-evoking cognitions through "selective exposure":

> If I am watching a movie that bores me, I can leave the theater; if I am talking to someone who angers me, I can cut short the conversation; if I am listening to news that depresses me, I can switch channels. (p. 11)

In addition, he argues that:

> . . . people may shift their thoughts intentionally from one topic to another or selectively may perceive, remember, attend to, and interpret events in ways that produce the intended emotional outcomes. (*loc. cit.*)

Also:

> . . . a variety of physical methods (e.g., jogging, aerobics, controlled breathing, muscular relaxation) and biochemical devices (e.g., alcohol, tranquilizers, stimulants, hypnotics) are used by people for emotional self-regulation. (*loc. cit.*)

While the efficacy of all of these techniques for controlling or creating particular emotions would be worth examining, the point here is to imagine the cultural effects of widespread use. For example, if a widely shared aim in life was to feel happy or proud whenever individuals desired these emotions, the resulting emotion-culture would probably be what we would describe as self-centred. Moreover, it is likely that an emphasis would be placed on emotional distractions such as entertainment or leisure designed to appeal to people's preference for particular feelings, in contrast, to the sort of emotional control and discipline required, for example, to achieve a difficult goal.

A further point is that those emotions may be generated by focusing on what Rosenberg call components of the self rather than the whole individual. In the latter case, however, it is difficult to think that an individual could feel proud of themselves, for example, by altering one of these components; it would be odd and indeed strangely unethical for a person to attempt to produce an emotion such as pride by one of Rosenberg's methods since it would not actually involve according with or surpassing a standard, rule or goal. And if individuals were to make the production of a particular emotion or feeling the goal of many practices, many of the reasons for engaging in particular activities would be undermined, such as maintaining a focus on long-term goals, retaining a sense of personally important outcome, or according with notions of resilience, consistency, depth, or integrity. In this respect, Rosenberg does note that emotional display in particular circumstances along with concealment in others may play equally important roles "in enabling people to realize their objectives" (p. 9). However, Rosenberg does not consider that instead of focusing only on coping with or creating alternative emotions we might instead imagine the possibility of changing the situation or even society through collective action.

But this possibility seems to be exactly the type of case which is, according to Shotter and Katz (1996), identified by the use of Wittgensteinian methods: ". . . fleeing moments in which the essentially ethical and political struggles are (or would be) at work in their initial formation" (pp. 229-230). Shotter and Katz are partly correct when they note that existing mainstream psychological theories overlook these aspects of our practices along with particular sources of the feelings that motivate ethical and political change. But the main point is to provide a social and

cultural criticism of the individualistic and apolitical stance of Rosenberg's focus on reflexive strategies and emotion. For example, some forms of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition do not merely involve coping with a marginal position in a dominant culture because individuals form social and political movements. These movements are directed towards changing the situations, society or culture that does not allow them to take pride in their identity, provide opportunities to achieve and also generating criticisms of the type of bodily appearances of which an individual can be proud (see Part 2, chapter 5).

The formation of ethical and political positions and the articulation of the experience of effectively producing a desired change may, of course, be described by a theory or ideology (without necessarily implying that the formation of such issues is derived from theories). Gergen (1996) describes the sort of identity politics that has emerged to support the type of challenge that may lead to social, political and cultural change:

> Marginalized groups generate a self-designated identity (group consciousness) that is instantiated by the individual identities of its constituents (in the U.S., for example, blacks, feminists, homosexuals, lesbians, Chicanos, Asians, the aged, the homeless, the disabled). (p. 14)

It is clear from the different identity politics issues summarized by Gergen that a wide variety of individuals may realize the arbitrary injustice of their exclusion or denigration and act in organized groups to challenge intolerance and discrimination (see chapter 5 and chapter 6, section 6.5). Similarly, Parker's (1989) account of critical psychology includes examples of political activity in South America, the resistance of gay men and lesbians, activism in South Africa, and women's rights (issues which are all,

it should be noted, illustrated in Part 2, chapter 5 by the survey of pride). Thus it is crucial that we also look at how individuals can be isolated sources of cultural innovation until they begin to act with others to produce social change.

In summary, when reflexive work in psychology takes a form that is similar to a Wittgensteinian surview it can provide the descriptive basis for important social and cultural criticisms of specific practices. Ethical and political issues revealed by a surview may also allow for theoretical work that is both pragmatic and challenging with regard to a wide variety of problems. The example of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion was presented to show the cultural effects of the possibility that we might somehow be able to gain direct control over our emotions (and thus have a self-centred, shallow or distraction-oriented culture). Ethical problems associated with encouraging people's attempts to control their own emotions or create alternatives through "selective exposure", cognitive techniques and physiological changes were also examined. The individualistic and apolitical nature of Rosenberg's account was demonstrated by exploring attempts by marginalized groups to improve pride in their identity by changing the situation (i.e., society or culture). Gergen's emphasis on identity politics therefore has the potential to identify in a reflexive manner, topics of social and cultural criticism that connect with the results of a survey and the possibility of further pragmatic and challenging theorizing.

The institutions of psychology: specific criticisms and alternatives

An important part of this account is that philosophy has the potential to describe psychology as a practice, for example, through the similarities and differences between psychology and mathematics (see chapter 1, section 1.2). Since the game analogy proved useful in highlighting the problems with other responses to psychological reflexivity issues, a further Wittgensteinian remark about mathematics can be used to highlight a further feature of reflexive work and the line between philosophy and psychology. In particular Wittgenstein argues that to attain a clear view of mathematics "it is not that a new building has to be erected, or that a new bridge has to be built, but that the geography, *as it is now,* has to be judged" (RFM, IV, §52). The point is important because of its similarity to a remark by Parker (1994a) about critical psychology: "it is necessary to reflect on the structure of the institution of psychology as it operates now" (p. 240). In this case, another important difference between Wittgenstein's approach and the reflexivity of critical psychology is the sense in which reflexivity is connected with attempts to erect a new building or, at the very least, make a number of radical changes to the existing "psy-complex" (Parker, 1994a).

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein makes the point that "we" as a community are bound together by particular forms of science and education (OC, §298). The remark does not seem terribly relevant to psychology and an account of its relation to culture until we consider that much of the research taught in psychology still construes the reality of psychological phenomena in ways that Wittgenstein would criticize. In this context, the argument in favour of constructionism is essentially that "reality does not exist for us in a ready-made form; we 'construct' it" (Ravn, 1991, p. 96).

However, as argued in chapter 2, it may be better to think that we have "arrived at" many of our cultural and linguistic practices. There are also a variety of reasons why we may not have the power to change those practices (i.e., in the sense in which someone might extend MacIntyre's claims about psychology making itself true). Nevertheless, Ravn mistakenly insists "the point that social institutions are the constructions of a community of human agents" also implies that "the same human beings possess the power to radically change those institutions" (p. 96).

However, because our community has "arrived at" various practices does not mean that the task of changing reality or, more radically, dismantling these practices can be so easily achieved. Still this activity is different from the view that linguistic changes may radically *effect* rather than *affect* reality because they focus "analytically upon the reflexive functions of language that construct representations of 'objects' in the world, and that have material-discursive effects" (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994, p. 228). This position is described by Henwood and Pidgeon as the third and most radically discursive and reflexive of three strands of qualitative psychology in which:

> . . . representations of the world, and specifically linguistic representations (called discourses), do not merely reflect an objective reality, but reflexively construct both objects and subjects. This general epistemological position is termed constructivism, and the term reflexivity is coined to refer to the power of discourses to effect practical actions in the world when language is used. (p. 233)

Ravn's position therefore appears to be more reasonable when the clarification is offered that "we" do not construct or, as the case may be, deconstruct reality in a manner that is independent of "our predispositions, desires, histories, and social backgrounds" (Ravn, 1991, p. 96; see section

4.3). Ravn's point is evident in the extent to which we must share many community based experiences, considerations and commitments in order to produce theories, without necessarily implying that changes in our theoretical constructions have effects on our "arrived at" practices.

Instead, in terms of the way that reflexive work may reveal and allow us to challenge the institutions of psychology, it would seem better to describe the language of discipline-based differences. For example, we want to know why — more than Wittgenstein can suggest to us — mainstream psychology and, more specifically, "social psychology . . . traditionally abhors reflexivity" (Parker, 1994b, p. 528). The problems affecting the institutional differences between philosophy, when construed as having many of the aims of reflexive work, and the critical practices of psychology have already been explored (see chapter 3, section 3.2). The problem here is one of the relations between forms of reflexive work that attempt to produce institutional change in more mainstream areas of psychology. Although there are some indications that interdisciplinary work is being increasingly regarded as a virtue by mainstream psychologists, resistance to these and other initiatives may indicate that "perhaps continuing creative tension between critical scholarship and uncritical practice is the only viable answer" (Ash, 1993, p. 55).

It is also illuminating to examine how discursive positioning by the mainstream works within psychology (i.e., in addition to attempts to construe work that connects with philosophy as between the two disciplines or in a "hinterland" of theoretical psychology). For example, Parker (1994a) makes the point that the institutions of psychology in their present form use criticise critical psychology in order to:

> . . . position those who are developing hermeneutic, post-structuralist or feminist critiques of positivist methodology as being in favour of fragmentation (and so immature), in favour of sharing the research process with those outside the discipline (and so acting out), and in favour of conflict (and so irrational). (p. 248)

Mainstream psychology also distances itself from sociology for reasons that, on occasions, seem to be based in arbitrary features of the present institutional forms of both disciplines. However, with regard to the work that constitutes Part 2, sociological aspects of pride are acknowledged without attempting to review the relevant sociological theories and literature. Moreover, despite Rosenberg's (1990) background in sociology, his theory provides a good substitute for mainstream psychological study because most of the research it summarizes is from mainstream psychology (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962). Moreover, as it also does not have many of the usual self-critical and discursive features of challenging reflexive studies, it is hoped that Part 2 will represent the benefits of challenging discipline-based exclusions of otherwise relevant work.

A further important way in which reflexive work provides a non-philosophical and potentially theory-based challenge to mainstream psychological studies is by challenging its culture of scientific presentation. For example, Harré (1989) emphasizes several directions for a potentially useful reflexive approach to psychology's institutions that would be the result of:

> . . . a thoroughly deconstructive effort to find out how the whole activity of experiments, written papers, conference presentations, text-books and the media of instruction go to create the illusion of knowledge. (p. 186)

A specific criticism of emotion studies, which includes the study of pride in

Part 2 of this thesis, is the failure to use contemporary technology in order to include images of pride and examples from other existing forms of cultural and linguistic practice. Such text books and media of instruction would not only accord with the culturally-oriented position developed in relation to a surview, but also raise new questions for critical psychology. For example, a wide ranging study might include the reasons for and effects of the portrayal of negative aspects of pride in highly stylized, gender-based forms (i.e., whether this occurs in contemporary news reports in addition to archaic forms such as pictures of Queen Superbia (see Part 2, Appendix, Figure 1 and Figure 2, pp. 692-693)).

Changes to the ways in which psychology is taught might also address the interdisciplinary use of psychological studies and the growing recognition that it is not only psychology students who may need to develop a critical, reflexive stance towards many of the concepts, theories, explanations and methods imparted in undergraduate and introductory courses. For example, sociologists, nurses, occupational therapists, social workers and many others gain a brief understanding of psychology without necessarily being presented with other worthwhile alternatives. The point is that although dissatisfaction with the simplified accounts of psychology may motivate an interest in critical perspectives, the interdisciplinary use of psychology makes it is more likely that mainstream views and preconceptions will be disseminated throughout our culture. The effects of interdisciplinarity on our culture may be more pernicious than the criticism that much empirical and laboratory-based psychological was in danger of becoming the empirical investigation of undergraduate students. For it is not uncommon to find that many of the "everyday individuals" who participate in research want to talk about the "theory" that is being tested or otherwise

provide their own theoretical contribution (e.g., pride is nurture rather than nature). Reflexive work in this context might alleviate the problems of conducting research on an increasingly educated and psychologically-literate culture by avoiding theory-first introductory overviews in teaching, producing multimedia texts and suggesting that alternative perspectives to mainstream psychology can be creative.

In contrast to Shotter's position, other types of theorizing are also worth pursuing especially where they have the potential to present novel accounts of many of the practices. Cultural theories, in particular, may provide an unsettling perspective on contemporary practices and promote change within psychology. In addition to this role for theorizing, it is important to retain a sense in which psychologists, rather than philosophers, might:

> . . . find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such'—whatever that may mean. (PI, §109)

With regard to reflexive research, this phrase could mean that collected examples of the detail of our cultural and discursive practices reveal how misguided more traditional psychological studies are (e.g., where language is thought not to play an important role in constructing and maintaining private psychological experiences). Interestingly, Shotter and Katz (1996) are interested in assembling such reminders, but insist that an unsettling perspective is not necessarily a theoretical or empirical reconsideration. Instead of any positive role for theory they opt for the vague suggestion that "by shifting one's stance and position in relation to one's surroundings, yet further unnoticed aspects become visible" (p. 232).

Rather than attempt to resurrect an appearance-reality view of theory, a surview of our cultural and linguistic surroundings may help to challenge practices within psychology that support particular theoretical divisions. For example, the following tendency described by Parker (1994b) can be challenged by a surview so that, in this case, only some theoretically defined aspects of pride are allowed to dominate our attention:

> . . . either the individual *or* the social is described, and it is difficult, when we are stuck with behaviourist or cognitivist descriptions, to conceive of a model of the person which would account for both. (pp. 529-530)

Although it is clear that Wittgenstein examined problems that do not involve directly changing the practices or language of psychology, some forms of pragmatic, reflexive theorizing can provide a challenging perspective. In this regard, theories may reveal unnoticed aspects of our practices, although it is still important to assess any general claims made as a result of reflexive work. For example, the notion that feminist theory is largely responsible for the current explosion of interest in emotion is itself an unsettling claim that needs to be carefully examined. A Wittgensteinian perspective is of limited use here, although it is important to describe how an individual's shifting stance, whether it is informed by theories or other collections of what we are "struck by", can be revealing in relation to shifting surroundings.

In summary, the potential to survey and criticize the institutions of psychology in a manner beyond Wittgenstein's concern not to attempt to construct "new buildings" or "bridges" was introduced. It was argued, however, that because we have, in a sense, constructed our present institutions, it is no easy matter to change those same institutions (e.g., through language). Parker's (1994b) arguments were used to show that it is

important to challenge the language upon which demarcations between disciplines are based. This includes specific forms of positioning to exclude reflexively-oriented positions from infiltrating mainstream approaches. Harré's deconstruction of institutional aspects of psychology was then described, illustrated and extended to problems caused by the interdisciplinary use of mainstream psychology. In contrast to Shotter and Katz's (1996) account of Wittgenstein's revealing "methods of social poetics", it was argued that cultural theories may also allow us to shift our stance creatively toward the theories, institutions and surroundings of psychology.

4.3 The positive use and exploitation of similarities between psychological and personal reflexivity

This chapter has been concerned with reflexive studies that can challenge contemporary practices and which cannot be viewed as a source of conceptual problems. The previous section showed that reflexive thinking and theorizing can promote changes in psychology in a manner that contrasts with the conservative nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In this section, similarities between useful forms of psychological reflexivity and relevant instances of personal reflexivity by individual researchers will be highlighted. In particular, the emphasis is on reflexive studies that provide an affirmative answer to the question of whether it is possible:

> . . . given one's intellectual interests along with one's passions and commitments . . . to undertake the self-conscious development of new and specialized mental accounts. (p. 13)

In contrast to the usual treatment of psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity as separate topics, occasions when the two are combined will be examined. A particular reason for this combination is that it may seem difficult to provide a critical study of emotion and personal reflexivity if it is true that:

> . . . psychology continues to be in a quandary about whether and how scientific approaches can be applied to subject-matter with which humans feel personally intimate. (Munro, 1992, p. 110)

The aim of this section to make some recommendations of positive uses of personal reflexivity in the conduct of a critical study of familiar forms of emotion and personal reflexivity

The consequences and limits of useful forms of self-awareness

Many individuals have argued that giving voice to and analysing the experiences of individuals as they carry out research produces new and revealing insights about the discipline. These insights range from jokes about experimental psychologists who admit "I'm not very good with people" to recognition that many fields of psychology are of interest to psychologists because of a relevant personal experience. Although some of these issues will be examined in the next section, it is important here to ascertain what the consequences and limits of useful forms of self-awareness could be in psychology. Thus, to put this issue more precisely, what use is it to ask "how do we function as subjects when we do research, and reflexive research in psychology?" (Parker, 1994a, p. 246).

Although it may seem unlikely, Wittgenstein entertained issues in connection to mathematics and psychology that would be regarded by contemporary researchers as reflexive. In particular, Wittgenstein considered whether an investigation of the psychology of individuals as they engage in the practices of mathematics might be useful. And it should not be at all surprising given the overall emphasis of this chapter to find that Wittgenstein was not particularly interested in examining a specific reflexive issue:

> Time and again I would like to say: What *I* check is the *account books* of mathematicians; their mental processes, joys, depressions and instincts as they go about their business may be important in other connections, but they are no concern of mine. (PG, III, p. 295)

Is it similarly appropriate for a reconsideration of psychological reflexivity to examine only the account books of psychologists? Is the supposed similarity between psychological researchers and their "subjects" really psychology's equivalent of other interesting but otherwise logical problems? To be more succinct, why should turning the focus of a study back on the researchers and their discipline be of any benefit?

One reason why it is useful to examine the "account books" of psychologists as they go about their research is that an understanding of the role of researchers' motivation, skills and insights should help to improve how we study psychological phenomena. Clearly, Wittgenstein was not interested in "doing psychology" in the sense of a commitment to improving its practices from within. Apart from the broader issue of the importance of participation in a culture to understanding its people and their experiences (see chapter 3, section 3.3), further evidence is provided of Wittgenstein's

conservative attitude towards directly changing the practices of psychology. Instead, Wittgenstein is more interested in what we, as psychologists, are tempted to say about what we do. And it is misrepresentations of linguistic and cultural practices, on Wittgenstein's view, that are central to the philosophical errors that we produce and sustain in accounts of our research activities.

However, to be fair to reflexive psychologists, an important advance over the traditional emphasis on objectivity and disdain for subjectivity is to provide a clearer account of linguistic and cultural practices. Ash (1993) suggests:

> . . . psychologists already claim to do this when they state the number, age, gender, race and social status of subjects. It is only necessary, then, to include broader societal and other context-specifying conditions. (p. 55)

But as Henwood and Pidgeon (1994) note:

> The tactic of reflexively writing in the personal and social basis for knowledge (as part of making the research process accountable) can be conceptualised as moving towards a stronger form of 'objectivity' than is provided by the traditional scientific mode of reporting in psychology. (p. 236)

Henwood and Pidgeon's concern is to demonstrate the virtues of adopting a reflexive stance against potential critics from mainstream psychology. We could add that there is a variety of techniques that may help to increase a researcher's self-awareness and also suggest the limits of their approach. For example, one technique for researchers is to acknowledge their own cultural backgrounds, personal interests, possible biases, and relevant experience. But what other tactics are possible and useful?

A further reflexive writing tactic that is especially relevant to the topic of emotion and personal reflexivity, is to turn the type of examples studied back on the discipline. For example, the personal and emotional nature of many debates in psychology between radical perspectives and the mainstream suggests that pride is often at stake. Indeed, where individuals refuse to discuss the merits of other positions because of personal commitments, the result can be described as a kind of "logical rudeness" (Bartlett, 1976). While psychology is no different from other cultural practices in allowing its practitioners to remain unmoved by a sound argument, more awareness and control with regard to this aspect of many debates would improve the discipline. It would then remain to be seen whether these differences could be avoided, as Greenwood (1991) suggests, by "scientists taking an open, critical, communicative approach ('getting their egos out of the way') combined with the various social processes of criticism through which scientific claims are put before they are accepted" (p. 312).

Although Greenwood's account may be hopeful, a further way in which reflexivity may lead to improvements in psychology is by explicitly presenting (or making easily accessible) the "data" used to "ground" a piece of research. Since a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview represents many of the aims of discourse psychology, a further point by Henwood and Pidgeon (1994) is also applicable to this investigation:

> . . . the emphasis is on presenting 'raw' transcripts so that audiences can create other readings. The onus is then on the researcher to present a more coherent and persuasive account. In this way the reflexive processes of constructing knowledge are laid open to public view. (p. 235)

With regard to the survey of pride in Part 2, examples are integrated into the text so that readers may judge whether they have been subjected to elaborative interpretation. In addition, it is acknowledged that the presentation of topics resulting from the survey of pride is *an* organization of the examples along broad grammatical lines, not *the* organization. Also because the surview relies on documents that are widely available in Western culture this approach has the potential to allow others to produce rival accounts and organizations. However, although the surview attains a sense of objectivity and public access it only postpones the difficult issue of reflexivity in conversation with "research subjects" which would occur if many of the themes identified in Part 2 were to be researched in more detail.

Self-awareness of the form cultivated by these techniques is not always a source of philosophical insight or of theoretical advance in psychology, but perhaps merely the first step towards clarity (cf. techniques such as imagining that other people are automata which were examined in chapter 3, section 3.3). Such psychological and personal reflexivity contrasts with forms of self-consciousness and doubt that would make it more difficult to carry out research. Useful reflexive techniques therefore work within normative limits (hence they can be criticized by philosophy) and the new stance they provide must have an intelligible rationale. This consideration is evident in Rosenberg's (1990) vacillation between a radical view and something that is obvious about us as individuals:

> . . . although the idea that the human mind can decide to manipulate its own content may seem paradoxical, in fact few processes are more familiar. (p. 10)

Interestingly, Shotter and Katz (1996) argue that Wittgenstein occasionally adopted a similar stance in his philosophical work. Their aim, of course, is to extend some of Wittgenstein's remarks into the methods and research of psychology to show that clarity is possible "only after he has brought us up against many things that we take for granted, causing us to see them as surprising" (p. 233).

Wittgenstein supposedly demonstrates this method in the following excerpt:

> Don't take it as a matter of course, but as a remarkable fact, that pictures and fictitious narratives give up pleasure, occupy our minds.
>
> ("Don't take it as a matter of course" means: find it surprising, as you do some things which disturb you. Then the puzzling aspects of the latter will disappear, by your accepting this fact as you do the other.) (PI, 524)

Despite Wittgenstein's clumsy expression, Shotter and Katz (1996) want to argue that such an unsettling approach is an important addition to psychology. However, it is also clear that Rosenberg adopts a similar stance in talking about reflexivity and emotion without achieving clarity or opening up the right kind of new possibilities for research (i.e., at least with regard to overcoming our familiarity with "reflexive processes"). The relevance of Wittgenstein's point to psychology is that we should occasionally find various phenomena of everyday life surprising without necessarily allowing ourselves to be puzzled or mystified. Unfortunately, Shotter and Katz omit the point that Wittgenstein added to the end of section 524: "(the transition from patent nonsense to something which is disguised nonsense)" (PI, §524). It is relevant because it suggests that linguistic techniques designed to make us more aware of everyday aspects of

psychological phenomena need to be carefully used if they are to achieve clarity. Rosenberg's example, in contrast, demonstrates the use of an expression that is patent nonsense but which is quickly incorporated into a theory and thus becomes disguised nonsense because it seems to offer a revealing insight.

In summary, there are a number of reasons why cultivating self-awareness through reflexive techniques is useful. Although Wittgenstein's philosophical interest was on the "account books" of mathematicians and, hence also psychologists, the possibility that a "subject" of psychological research may reveal important points about the practices of psychology should not be underestimated. For example, it may suggest aspects of our practices that need to be changed. It was also noted that including the social and personal bases of knowledge can provide information that helps to make psychology more accountable. In a sense it is also closer to the traditional ideal of objectivity than those accounts which avoid the subjective experiences of the researcher. It may also seem as if important reflexive questions are addressed by describing the subjects of a psychological study along with other context-specifying conditions. However, it is important to turn the example of personal and emotional aspects of interaction back on the discipline in order to show how more open communication is required in the discipline's "reflexive accounting".

Is psychological research an extension of personal reflexivity?

In an account of critical psychology, Parker (1989) argues that the subdiscipline's continual "reflexivity also informs and subverts self-

knowledge" (p. 139). But as already noted, the reflexivity of research cannot be reduced to the reflective, thoughtful and self-conscious properties of individual psychologists (see chapter 2, section 2.1 and chapter 3, section 3.2; cf. Parker, 1994b, p. 531). Nevertheless, it may still be argued that apparent similarities between psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity are problematic when researchers investigate personally familiar psychological phenomena. This section will address some of the ways in which psychologists "function as subjects" when they carry out comprehensive, critical work on such topics as emotion and personal reflexivity.

The traditional contrast between objectivity and subjectivity in psychology has created problems that recent accounts of reflexivity are beginning to remove. Reflexive aspects of research have only been regarded as providing opportunities to explore research issues that would not be addressed by traditional psychological studies. In some cases, both the skills and experience of a researcher as well as a kind of "insider" status may encourage research participants to provide more revealing accounts, information and insights. Much of this work is, of course, restricted to the experiences of researchers in carrying out qualitative research although the similarities between psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity can be extended to include personal experiences that occur as a result of attempting reflexive research in the form of a comprehensive surview. We can therefore include experiences of being critical of training in the discipline, the development of a "reflexive career" and also, for a few reflexive psychologists, experiences of crossing between psychology and the work of philosophers such as Wittgenstein.

The added difficulty of engaging with Wittgenstein's work in contemporary terms — even when restricted to remarks on rules, rule-following, the private language argument and psychological concepts — would make the pursuit of the latter "fully reflexive" approach a daunting prospect for many students. A complicated engagement with existing theories is required as well as the ability to make the conceptual moves required to identify and remove a philosophical prejudice. Moreover, attempts to untie the "knots in our thinking" (PR, I, §2) may be difficult to explain to other psychologists especially if they refuse to acknowledge that they have a similar problem or confusion. Given these complicated connections between psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity, it is easier to accept Wittgenstein's suggestion that "there is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (PI, §133). Hence it is important that other psychologists must be brought to agree that they have similar problems before an attempt can be made to work through to a solution.

Wittgenstein's remarks therefore invite us to engage with the detail of language in a way that adds more dimensions to descriptions of qualitative work such as Parker's (1994a):

> In qualitative work, where an analysis of reflexivity is encouraged and where new forms of subjectivity are allowed to take shape in the course of the research, there is often a strong personal engagement with the material, a sense of being immersed, overwhelmed, and sometimes of being transformed by the subject matter. (p. 240)

The details generated by examples of pride from newspapers, novels, plays, films, transcripts of conversations and many other sources provide the basis from which many connections can be drawn. The sense of immersion may

be overwhelming and the examination of similarities and differences within a particular "cluster of concepts" may not appear to be surveyable. But this activity can also be illuminating, especially where we are struck by cases that highlight similarities and differences between our practices and those of another group. An example is of children from another culture who wave flags at other people in an enthusiastic manner but who cannot be described as proud because they have no direct acquaintance with the cultural surroundings in which this practice is significant. Also we could examine the mistakes that children make in the early learning of psychological concepts: in part because adults' responses to children encourage further linguistic refinements and help to create new reactions (see chapter 8). The result of an investigation of such examples is often a kind of practical conversational skill which can, moreover, lead to a preoccupation with particular concepts or categories in everyday life (e.g., such as a focus on pride to the detriment of other emotions or a view of emotion). This effect of a discursive investigation may also require Wittgensteinian "therapy" in much the same way that the themes and categories produced in qualitative work need to be checked against transcripts or returned to participants for confirmation.

When the results of a comprehensive survey are used and refined in ordinary conversation we may find that there are aspects to the use of a psychological concept that we have assumed. For example, that parents refer to emotional aspects of pride in their use of the word more frequently than personality aspects. There is a sense in which a surview will, if combined with the preliminary, everyday form of qualitative investigation, improve a researcher's ability to represent linguistic distinctions and important cultural variations. It is also possible that other co-occurring

forms of personal reflexivity such as self-presentation and social skills (Jenkins, 1995) will help the research process in the sense that they will prevent a research agenda from dominating conversation (including any interest in particular theories or accounts that provide a critical focus). In this sense, both the task of engaging in reflexive research and the personal results (including any personal transformation of interest or understanding) should not be regarded as a private, individual skill or experience. The results of reflexive research must, in principle, be communicable and intelligible to others even if this means supplying new metaphors and further refinements based on personal experience (e.g., as is demonstrated by the relatively rare circumstances in which people may vacillate between particular emotions; see Part 2, chapter 7, section 7.4).

The results of a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey are also not a finished product. For example, Henwood and Parker (1994) argue that although there are many different qualitative approaches that use individual reflexive skills, they "all face up to the task of making sense in some way of multiple, ambiguous and shifting meanings" (p. 235). Shotter and Katz (1996) take this argument further and draw a connection with Wittgenstein's philosophy. They argue that using Wittgenstein's methods never "leads to a final, fixed account of what something 'really' means" (p. 232). Both accounts are consistent with the extended view of personal reflexivity in relation to the potential to become aware of new and unfamiliar cultural and linguistic practices. This perspective is consistent with Parker's (1994a) view that "the method a researcher should use, then, also needs to grasp the specific forms of experience lived as culturally constructed resources — resources shared by researcher and researched" (pp. 244-245). But it is also possible that some forms of personal reflexivity may be

extended and provide a basis for research though the further cultural resource of new technology. This adds to Shotter's (1996) sense of being "struck by" incidents and events in everyday life and thus attempting to make unnoticed aspects of our lives visible. For example, watching a videorecorded interview with subjects may not only reveal interesting aspects of a researcher's emotions and reactions but also improve his or her potential to provide a commentary on those responses. And it is also possible to imagine a person using similar technology to determine how well they could hide or convincingly reproduce particular emotions.

Technological and other means of improving both researchers' and subjects' reflexive abilities may therefore provide us with new and unfamiliar ways of re-presenting many psychological phenomena. However, familiarity with culturally shared or available resources is not the same as personal familiarity with emotional and related experiences, for included with the latter category are accounts of unusual and potentially unique experiences. Regardless of whether these accounts are recorded by psychologists or others, they constitute an autobiographical resource about such phenomena as emotions and personal reflexivity. Interestingly, Ellis (1991) is tempted to describe such forms of "introspection" as a research tool (see Part 2, chapter 5) although it is important to ask what extra tools and abilities sociologists, psychologists or other academics bring to their articulation and exploration of these experiences. One answer is that academics are aided by an additional vocabulary that allows them to explore and express their own and others' personal experiences. This skill could be based on the type of understanding that could emerge from accumulating the insights and intimations of novels and biographies (i.e., in addition to people's accounts when ethical guidelines about confidentiality

have been followed). The activity of assembling reminders from novels and biographies may therefore provide a challenge to assumptions about our own and others' emotional experiences. The overall conclusion, therefore, is that personal familiarity with particular forms of emotion, reflexive agency and reflexive cognition may be overcome by collecting our own or others' autobiographical accounts of unique experiences.

To reiterate, the theme of forms of psychological reflexivity that are beyond Wittgensteinian reproach continued in this section with an investigation of some ways in which psychological research is an extension of personal reflexivity. An initial concern was to describe the extension of individual awareness of cultural and linguistic practices that occurs through attempting a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey. This may lead to a feeling of being immersed in and transformed by the material involved, in the sense that conceptual and practical skills have been attained. These experiences and skills should not be regarded as private since new aspects and stances will occur in relation to the researcher's cultural and linguistic surroundings. In this manner, forms of personal reflexivity will be useful although other cultural resources can also augment understanding of ourselves and others. Collecting relevant examples of other people's private experiences may also see aspects of emotion and emotion-related actions in new and surprising ways (but without necessarily producing nonsensical remarks or disguising them in theories such as Rosenberg's). Such cultural resources may include our experiences and reactions in relation to the personally reflexive possibilities of new technology. Autobiographical accounts of our own or others' unique, private and personal experiences can also be used to extend our forms of personal reflexivity and provide a resource for further research.

Summary

The chapter began with an attempt to examine why postmodern and critical psychologists present Wittgenstein as an ordinary language philosopher who had little interest in culture. Parker's (1989) critical psychology summary of our "postmodern age" was used to identify similar themes in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. However, several of Wittgenstein's overlooked remarks on culture and value seem to connect with the results of reflexive social scientific theorizing. Wittgenstein's remarks on cultural, historical and linguistic differences, disputes and clashes are also insightful and manage to avoid the generality of many social and cultural theories. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein's philosophy does not match the challenging perspectives and new directions provided by Foucault which seem to extend the results of Wittgenstein's more conservative form of philosophical description. Foucault's work also examines power and ideology issues relevant to the discipline of psychology that are not found in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Thus despite the many additional problems that a Foucauldian approach would bring to critical and reflexive psychological studies, its form of broad theorizing may contribute to psychology in ways that Wittgenstein's cannot (i.e., through the awareness of cultural aspects of power/knowledge as well as the detail of disciplinary and confessional practices).

The limits of Wittgenstein's philosophy to criticize or direct forms of reflexive theorizing in psychology were also illustrated by the further issue of the relations between psychology and culture. Examples of forms of personal reflexivity illustrated how psychology provides models of self-knowledge and new forms of thought, emotion, action and interaction that may complement or replace others. MacIntyre's (1985) example of the

effects of studies of self-damaging behaviour was combined with the more recent example of research on deliberate and repetitive self-harm. The aim was to show how widely disseminated views of both behaviours as a "a cry for help" and "miscommunication" continue to influence our view of deliberate self-harm as a radical but effective form of emotional self-regulation in extremely distressing circumstances. Psychological studies also change our culture through popular psychology and self-help media although this is perhaps a product of education, increased literacy and the interdisciplinary use of psychological studies. Reflexive research also plays a role in our culture in a manner that is beyond any Wittgensteinian criticism when it offers cultural and social criticisms of psychological practices. Rosenberg's theory was taken as an example of how ethical issues arise in relation to research of which the aim is eventually to achieve direct control over our emotions (in addition to an increasingly self-centred, shallow and distraction-oriented culture). The individualistic and apolitical nature of Rosenberg's account was also demonstrated by marginalized groups attempts to improve identity-based pride by changing the situation (i.e., in accordance with Gergen's view of pragmatic reflexive theorizing and identity politics that involve changing our society and culture). Also specific comments on the potential of reflexive work to change the institutions of psychology — in contrast to a Wittgensteinian survey of the "buildings" — were presented. Issues included changing the language of the discipline, extending its presentation media in connection with a wider view of a surview and problems associated with psychology's interdisciplinary use.

An account then followed of reasons why psychological reflexive techniques that cultivate forms of personal reflexivity or self-awareness can be useful to psychology. Despite Wittgenstein's philosophical interest was

on the "account books" of mathematicians and, hence also psychologists, it was argued that some of the "subjects" of psychological research may also be used to reveal important points about the discipline. The main reason for adopting this contrasting position to Wittgenstein is that an awareness of the role that emotions play in research, teaching and knowledge dissemination can be used to improve the discipline's practices. It was also noted that writing in the social and personal basis for knowledge can provide information that will help to make psychologists more accountable. Also examined were some ways in which psychological reflexivity provides an extension of personal reflexivity rather than a source of bias. Personal reflexivity was argued to provide an opportunity for the experiences of researchers — as users of cultural resources and people with similar experiences — to contribute to our understanding of many psychological phenomena. The analysis included an account of the extended awareness of cultural and linguistic practices that is a result of immersion in the activity of providing a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey. It was also noted that the skills researchers acquire, as well as their personal experiences of being "struck by" new aspects of personally familiar cultural and linguistic aspects of psychological phenomena, should not be regarded as private (e.g., through experiences of using a culture's new technology). Collecting relevant examples of other people's private experiences may also allow us to see culturally and personally familiar aspects of emotion and emotion-related actions in new and surprising ways.

CONCLUSION: PART 1

Wittgenstein's philosophy continues to be relevant to psychology in ways that Wittgenstein himself could not have envisaged. The increasing mention of reflexivity in relation to a number of psychological and social scientific debates presents an opportunity to demonstrate this relevance. Although the final form of the issues presented across the various chapters is not the only possible way of organizing the psychological reflexivity literature, the argument that the chapters embody is less likely to change: it is a useful and revealing exercise to reconsider the variety of forms of reflexivity understood to occur in psychology through the methods and remarks of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. A critical part of this reconsideration is that adopting a reflexive stance in psychology involves a to and fro movement between philosophy and psychology. Thus while there are many points at which reflexive issues and problems considered by psychologists are very similar to Wittgenstein's concerns, it is crucial to recognize the limits of philosophizing for or against particular forms of psychological reflexivity.

A number of Wittgenstein's remarks were used to show that philosophy should not attempt to take over the work of psychology, even though the work of theoretical psychology may seem to be indistinguishable. Wittgenstein's outside perspective cannot therefore be subsumed by increasingly self-critical (and self-confident) multidisciplinary social scientific work in areas of psychology. Moreover, approaches that are closely connected with Wittgenstein's later philosophy *and* emphasize reflexivity are not immune from "reconsideration". In this regard, social constructionism received more attention than the more obvious target of realist-cognitive

accounts of psychology. In particular, the Wittgensteinian "end" to reflexive issues in psychology is a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview of a given domain of grammar. But in contrast to a number of social constructionist positions, a surview was argued to provide a resource that can be contributed to by both philosophers and psychologists. Moreover, while a surview can provide a basis for empirical investigation and theory construction, it is not because surveyed remarks and assembled reminders are the "psychological reality" that needs to be explained. Instead, a surview can be used to resist the constant push to theorize in psychology (i.e., to understand ourselves and others only in terms of existing theories). While it may seem important to use Wittgenstein's philosophy to describe the differences between theories, it is the central role of theories in organizing representations of our cultural and linguistic practices that we must upset. Thus we examine cultural and linguistic details from "within" in a critical tension with existing psychological theories, models and methods while acknowledging the *in principle* difficulties of mastering both philosophy and psychology and the necessity of moving to and fro between them.

The further important component of the argument for a Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity is that some forms of reflexive work within psychology are capable of criticizing and extending Wittgenstein's work. It may seem that the argument has turned full circle by suggesting that some types of reflexive work should be encouraged (although in the present form this suggests a task that few are likely to achieve given the present institutions of psychology and the limited possibilities to pursue such a "reflexive career"). Nevertheless, social and cultural theories were used to highlight issues of power which are largely

ignored in Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophy. Reflexive studies within psychology may also suggest important social and cultural criticisms, reveal deficiencies in the present institutions of psychology and provide alternatives to individualist and apolitical psychological accounts. In this respect, a surview provides a basis for potential multidisciplinary theoretical and empirical work which complements other linguistic, cultural and technological devices we use to reveal new aspects of our emotional and personal experiences (or to collect relevant examples of experiences we are "struck by"). Thus, even though some social constructionists have used Wittgenstein's remarks and methods for the purposes of doing work within psychology, a surview should not compete directly against and potentially replace the theories and methods of psychology.